Posts Tagged: "patent quality"

This week in technology and innovation hearings taking place in Washington, D.C., subcommittees in the House of Representatives discuss the worker pipeline for the clean energy sector and ways to promote C-Band spectrum auctions on Tuesday. Then on Wednesday, the Senate IP Subcommittee holds a hearing on preventing the issuance of poor quality patents, which is likely to include some contentious viewpoints on the U.S. patent system. Other Senate hearings this week focus on innovation in water security as well as national security issues in the 5G supply chain. Elsewhere, The Brookings Institution explores the role of the Federal Trade Commission in consumer data privacy legislation and closes out the week with an event that takes a look at ways to mitigate the risks of artificial intelligence technologies.

With exponential growth in patent filings each year and expanding company portfolios, Patent Quality Assessment (PQA) has become a significant and crucial task. USPTO maintenance fees, which are required to be paid periodically to keep a patent alive for 20 years, further add to the importance of maintaining only quality patents. Patent professionals worldwide have developed a myriad of metrics to assess the quality of patent assets. Benchmarking tools include terms like “Qscore” and “Asset indexes” to quantify the qualitative attributes of a patent.

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently released its 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, setting various goals to ensure high quality services for the agency’s customers and stakeholders aligned with the Department of Commerce’s strategic objective to strengthen intellectual property protection… “We are confident in attaining the goals set out in this plan and look forward to the continued engagement and feedback from our stakeholders and employees,” Director Andrei Iancu is quoted as saying in a press release issued by the USPTO upon the release of the new strategic plan. “Together we celebrate innovation and entrepreneurship—we are very proud of the men and women who stand behind a well-balanced American intellectual property system.”

Here we go again with a new villain, the bad patent. If a patent is a bad patent, there must be a negative economic effect. But what is the negative economic effect with respect to this cat exercising method? In what universe does it make sense to set patent policy for the 21st century based on a cat exercising patent? Like the myth of the patent troll, the myth of the bad patent exists only to protect huge monopolistic multinational corporations from the creative destruction of a small inventor with a big idea at the expense of our economy, our job creation engine and our national security.

The U.S. patent promise of exclusivity has become nothing more than lip service with no credibility for more than half a century. A patent system maintained by offering lip service must fail over time. The American inventor population is vanishing rapidly as a result of the changed laws and anti-patent movement. If the patent reward fails, both those who are inventors and those who would be inventors will be influenced not to pursue innovating and society will see an era of slow progress. Bad policy advice has misled Congress into belief that inventing without the participation of inventors will be fine. Reality will soon prove it was a fatal mistake that the U.S. should not have made.

One of the great aspects of the Unitary Patent is that it follows the normal EPO procedure up to grant. And indeed, the search and the examination processes will be precisely the same as those you’ve been used to with the current EP and PCT procedures, and will be performed by the same examiners. One of the strengths of the EPO is that we allocate examiners to applications according to their technical expertise, regardless of the filing route through which applications arrive. It will only be at the end of the procedure, when the application proceeds to grant, that applicants will have to indicate if they want to have a single Unitary Patent instead of a bundle of patents for individual member states, as is the case for the European patent. So it’s extremely straightforward, cost effective, and much simpler to administer post grant than the current European patent. My impression is that many U.S. applicants already understand the logic and advantages of this very well, sometimes even a little better than European applicants, as the geographical size and the GDP of the market covered by the Unitary Patent is very similar to that of the U.S. patent.

At first sight Amazon´s patent portfolio is indeed remarkable, with respect to its total value as well as its development over time: the total value of the company’s patent portfolio shows a strong over-proportional growth within the past six years. Starting 2010 with about 550 patent families and € 130m, the patents have reached a total value in September 2016 an impressive total sum of € 1,15b with 4,162 alive patent families. For a company being recognized as a retailer this is indeed remarkable and shows the trend of being more and more a high tech company. This can be seen within their strong increase of total patent portfolio value but also the technical analysis.

Since U.S. patents are granted with exclusive right to exclude, the only way to realize values of inventions is licensing, suing for damages or both. This reward mechanism would depend upon corporate cultural attitude to patents. In the early time, corporations were more willing to license and buy patents. After corporations have developed a culture of using free inventions, patent owners are unable to get rewards and unable to enforce their rights due to excessive enforcement fees. Thus, the only way to recover tiny values is selling patents to enforcement firms… All inventions are rare birds that cannot be mass-produced like articles in production shops. Thus, the patent office must use the most inclusive fishnet with an ability to capture as many inventions as possible. Since each invention is unknown at the time of capturing, one cannot design any method to capture all good inventions. Placing any limitation in the capturing method could exclude great and even greatest inventions before the patent office even knows what would be excluded.

High novelty, high non-obviousness standard, inconvenient court venue for patent owners, and limited availability of injunction remedies, reduced damages, threaten liabilities will hurt all classes of inventors except that it has less impact on corporate inventors. The invalidation procedure will discourage inventive activities of all classes with most serious impacts on independent inventors and accidental inventors. This is one biggest class of inventors who often come up with game-changing and surprising inventions. When would-be-inventors run into problems or solutions, why would they spend time and money to make inventions, spend more money to get patents, and get the business to defend patents in endless invalidation actions? High patent quality standard forces existing professional inventors to leave their invention business and discourage young people from becoming future inventors. In this highly uncertain time with a large number of dormant epidemic diseases, one or a few inventions may save population life when vaccine is unavailable.

The U.S. inventor pool is now limited to corporate inventors and a very few resilient professional inventors. The number of professional inventors will rapidly decrease with fewer and fewer of young people joining the inventor population… U.S. patent applications are predominately filed by foreign corporations, while for all other national patent offices the domestic applications comprise a super majority. In 2016, the Chinese patent office received totally 3,465,000 applications for three kinds of patents, making an increase of 23.8% year on year. The number for invention, utility model and design are respectively 1,339,000 (increase by 21.5%), 1,476,000 (increase by 30.9%) and 650,000 (increase by 14.2%). China has a high share of domestic applications (which means that inventive activities take place inside the country). The total application number in 2016 is 1,339,000+1,476,000=2,815,000. Patent applications filed with China patent office in 2016 is almost ten times of the U.S.-originated applications filed with the U.S. patent office. The number of patent applications filed with Japanese patent office is close to the U.S.-origin applications filed with the U.S. patent office. South Korea will surpass the U.S. in application filing number.

Patent reformers argue that too many patents can hurt business, and low-quality patents cause problems. Their lobby activities have successfully persuaded the Congress to pass the AIA, with the primary purpose to raise patent quality…. The patent office uses all patent rules in an even-handed manner to all applicants. So, it treats corporate applicants and U.S. individual applicants in the same way: entering frivolous rejections, using one-way bias high patent quality standard, giving the same opportunity to demand inter-party review (by paying $23,000), and affording the same opportunity to defend a challenge to patents (which would consume hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney fees). Nobody can question those rules.  However, this money-can-buy fairness practices have distorted technological landscape. Frivolous rejections can force individual inventors to abandon their applications, but do not affect giant foreign corporations; outrageous fees and maintenance fees can discourage individual inventors, but will not affect foreign corporations; and the right of harassment can be used by all corporations but not U.S. independent inventors.

We need to ask ourselves: what are the defining features of a “filler patent”? At least two things stand out. First, “filler patents” go through more rounds of prosecution than other patents. Secondly, the independent claims of “filler patents” are longer (have higher word counts) than other patents… A “round of prosecution” means an Office action from the USPTO and the applicant’s response. It is typical for “filler patents” to go through multiple rounds of prosecution, such as six or more rounds. At each round of prosecution, the claims are tailored, so that the scope of protection of the resulting patent is whittled down until essentially nothing is left. Then the application is allowed to issue.

“I think at the end of the day, patents are either valid or invalid as a legal instrument and therefore it’s not very helpful to talk about quality or ‘good’ or ‘bad,” Judge Michel said. “They’re either valid or not valid and with respect to someone practicing the technology, the patent is either infringed as properly construed or it is not infringed.”

The facts are that the quest for the golden patent is misplaced. The real problem has been the shifting and artificial criteria of patentability, inventiveness and “obviousness.” In effect, the changing law on patent validity standards has essentially shifted the goal posts. The idea of a golden patent was originally rebutted because it is cumbersome, expensive and unworkable, with all of the burdens placed on the inventor as a sort of huge regressive tax.

Patent quality is a proxy for attacking patent validity, which has a complex history. Patent critics, particularly market incumbents, obtain a free ride when the bar is set low to attack patent validity. The changes to standards for patent obviousness have been a core source of lowering the standards for patent validity. The recent Inter Partes Review (IPR) program has overzealously applied the weak obviousness standards, causing a broad range of problems for innovators.