Jianqing Wu, Ph.D.

The PTAB invalidation procedure violates due process because it drags patent owners into endless assaults by patent infringers and patent thieves. Due process requires compliance with standard notions of fair play and justice, which is lacking at the PTAB. The PTAB invalidation process does not afford due process because it allows an unlimited number of infringers and patent thieves to shoot down a patent in a never ending series of challenges. If one challenge misses the target, the second and the third challenge will hit it, or ultimately it will be hit by the Nth challenger. When patents can be attacked repeatedly in such a bizarre way, the patent reward of an exclusive right is a meaningless promise.

The U.S. patent promise of exclusivity has become nothing more than lip service with no credibility for more than half a century. A patent system maintained by offering lip service must fail over time. The American inventor population is vanishing rapidly as a result of the changed laws and anti-patent movement. If the patent reward fails, both those who are inventors and those who would be inventors will be influenced not to pursue innovating and society will see an era of slow progress. Bad policy advice has misled Congress into belief that inventing without the participation of inventors will be fine. Reality will soon prove it was a fatal mistake that the U.S. should not have made.

The effects of proposed Rule 11 on the patent system will be like putting an additional bullet to a dying man. As far as patent litigation is concerned, the pending rule is intended to deliver what was missed in the AIA: shifting fees from infringers to patent owners.

Congressman Lamar Smith (R-TX), has sponsored a bill to amend Rule 11 — H.R. 720. The changes are made to remove the safe harbor provision and make sanctions mandatory. This bill has passed the House. A companion bill — S. 237 — has been introduced in the Senate with no action yet being taken… The proposed changes to Rule 11, if enacted, will have an impact of keeping unrepresented parties out of courts, and make the U.S. courts even more inefficient. It will have an adverse impact on patent owners in patent cases… Given the nature of patent litigation, experience teaches that it is inevitable that whenever a case is disposed of the winner will almost certainly try to shift litigation fees by any means possible, including by invoking Rule 11 sanctions. The parties with strong financial powers will have better chances to get sanction awards.

Since U.S. patents are granted with exclusive right to exclude, the only way to realize values of inventions is licensing, suing for damages or both. This reward mechanism would depend upon corporate cultural attitude to patents. In the early time, corporations were more willing to license and buy patents. After corporations have developed a culture of using free inventions, patent owners are unable to get rewards and unable to enforce their rights due to excessive enforcement fees. Thus, the only way to recover tiny values is selling patents to enforcement firms… All inventions are rare birds that cannot be mass-produced like articles in production shops. Thus, the patent office must use the most inclusive fishnet with an ability to capture as many inventions as possible. Since each invention is unknown at the time of capturing, one cannot design any method to capture all good inventions. Placing any limitation in the capturing method could exclude great and even greatest inventions before the patent office even knows what would be excluded.