In any patent dispute, the strength of the patent still matters. But increasingly, it is not the only thing that matters—or even, in some cases, the thing that matters most. That means where a patent dispute takes place cannot be a tactical afterthought or viewed as a choice of federal district courts in the United States alone. This is true today more than ever because despite patents ostensibly being property—at least according to the Patent Act—which tribunal and which judges make the ultimate decisions affecting the patent often matter most of all because patents and patent enforcement have become driven by ideology and the type of fervor normally reserved highly emotionally charged discussions, like religion and politics.

Patent monetization is often discussed as if the hard part begins when a patent owner makes the decision to license, sell, finance, or enforce its patent assets. That is a mistake and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the difficulties and complexities of patent monetization. By the time a patent owner is sitting across the table from a potential licensee, buyer, lender, litigation funder, or accused infringer, much of the outcome has already been fully determined. The real work begins years earlier in preparation for monetization.

The United States patent system is not failing because Americans have stopped inventing. It is failing because the legal and institutional architecture built to protect invention no longer operates as a coherent innovation framework. Over time, the system has become a patchwork of overlapping tribunals, inconsistent legal standards, procedural inefficiencies, and doctrinal barriers that make it harder to obtain, defend, enforce, license, and rely upon even high-quality patent rights covering innovations of extraordinary consequence. Now in the coming months we will move forward with a candid, serious, historically grounded, and focused conversation on building—not merely patching—the next American patent system.