Federal Circuit Affirms Section 101 Dismissal Over Method for Treating Patients Using Remote Devices

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a decision Friday in Linden v. ResMed, Inc., affirming a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California that dismissed a patent infringement lawsuit after finding the asserted claims ineligible under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. Craig L. Linden argued that the district court erred in treating Claim 1 as representative at each step of the eligibility analysis.

Linden, who represented himself on appeal, owns U.S. Patent No. 9,639,150, titled “Powered Physical Displays on Mobile Devices,” which was issued on May 2, 2017. The specification describes interactive powered displays that transmit signals or energy to enhance communication between people, and the claims are directed to treating patients with such a display.

Claim 1, the only independent claim, recites a method for treating a patient that uses a first device at the patient’s location, which is “internet and networking capable” and includes a physical output display and an input transducer, and a distinct second device at a remote location. The method involves a patient-provider video consultation, measuring at least one vital sign, forming a diagnosis, and administering treatment through physical interaction with the device’s output display.

In 2024, Linden filed a lawsuit against ResMed, Inc., ResMed Corp., and ResMed Holdings Pty Ltd. in the Southern District of California, alleging infringement of certain claims of the ‘150 patent. ResMed moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on Section 101 grounds, and the district court granted the motion with leave to amend. Linden then filed a first amended complaint (FAC) adding allegations that certain features of the claimed invention were not well known or routine, and the district court granted a second motion to dismiss with prejudice.

The district court treated Claim 1 as representative, pointing to the exclusive focus on that claim in the briefing and to Linden’s own description of it as exemplary. At step one of the framework from Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, the district court found Claim 1 directed to an abstract idea. At step two, the district court found no inventive concept, concluding that many of the added FAC allegations were conclusory and that the others lacked technical specificity.

Circuit Judges Reyna, Bryson, and Hughes issued a per curiam opinion that applied Ninth Circuit law to review the dismissal de novo. The CAFC found that Linden had not raised the argument before the district court, where his counsel agreed that Claim 1 is representative. The original complaint and the FAC also referred to Claim 1 as exemplary, but the CAFC concluded that the argument was waived and treated Claim 1 as representative, as the district court did.

At step one, the CAFC agreed with the district court that Claim 1 describes “a remote version” of an in-person doctor visit, which the CAFC described as a type of “conventional organized human activity.” The CAFC noted that it has routinely affirmed the ineligibility of claims directed to similar activities performed remotely, and cited University of Florida Research Foundation, Inc. v. General Electric Co., which involved claims for a remote computing device that collected medical information from bedside machines.

Linden argued that the claims are directed to a “specific technological system” with a “concrete technological architecture.” The CAFC disagreed, explaining that Claim 1 requires only that the first device be capable of internet and network connections and include a physical output display and an input transducer, while saying nothing about the structure of the second device. Since the specification states that the invention adds communication or remote control features to devices that were already known, the CAFC concluded that Claim 1 recites generic hardware that does not render the claim non-abstract.

Linden also asserted that the claimed method improves the technological operation of network-connected medical devices. The CAFC was not persuaded, since Claim 1 recites generic computer hardware for remote communication and Linden did not describe any advancement to computing devices encompassed by the claim. The CAFC held that the asserted claims of the ‘150 patent are directed to an abstract idea.

At step two, Linden argued that the ordered combination of capturing patient data, transmitting it, receiving remote control signals, and implementing those signals through a powered device is an inventive concept. The CAFC found that this combination restates the abstract idea, since every step is directed to remotely treating a patient, and stated that “the abstract idea cannot supply the inventive concept.”

The CAFC agreed with the district court that nothing in the ‘150 patent or the FAC provided plausible factual allegations to prevent dismissal, since neither the claims nor the specification provided specific implementation details on how the generic components deliver treatment. In paragraphs 29, 32, and 35 through 37 of the FAC alleged that the ordered combination is not conventional or routine, but those conclusory allegations received no weight since they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” The remaining paragraphs alleged advances over the prior art without explaining in technical terms how the improvements would be achieved, which the CAFC noted is consistent with the lack of technical detail in the ‘150 patent itself.

Linden further argued that the claimed elements are arranged in a specific configuration that enables device-level control and therapeutic execution. The CAFC rejected that argument because Linden cited neither the FAC nor the ‘150 patent in support, and neither term appears in the claims or is discussed in the specification. The CAFC pointed to American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC for the principle that unclaimed features are irrelevant at steps one and two.

The CAFC affirmed the district court’s dismissal, finding that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept on the motion-to-dismiss record and that Linden’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive.