Posts Tagged: "PTAB"

O’Malley recognized that in Perfect Web the Federal Circuit did authorize the use of common sense to supply a missing claim limitation, but she pointed out that this was the only case where that has been done. O’Malley further explained that in Perfect Web that which was missing was “unusually simple and the technology particularly straightforward.” In fact, in Perfect Web, which dealt with sending e-mail to an e-mail list, the missing claim limitation was nothing more than merely repeating the step of resending e-mails in accordance with the claim. Thus, O’Malley explained that Perfect Web is properly considered an exception to allowing common sense to supply a missing claim limitation, rather than the rule.

Amongst the appeals involving patent-eligibility rejections, the most recently filed appeal brief was filed in November 2015. Thus, all of the appeal briefs and most of the PTAB decisions were filed prior to the development of more recent case law that has further illustrated why and how various software technologies can be patent eligible. Further, most of the eligibility-involved PTAB decisions were issued prior to these recent cases, which may further have disadvantaged the appellants. Continued assessment of PTAB decisions on post-Alice appeals will provide further insight as to the Board’s interpretation of this area of law fraught with uncertainty and applicant frustration.

One reason the PTAB is convenient for reaching reverse payment deals is that there is no direct antitrust oversight, since its judges are administrators with very narrow legal authority. Further, while there is a statute requiring agreements between Hatch-Waxman firms to be submitted to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for antitrust review, the parties may attempt to evade it. The statute requires submission of agreements that relate to the manufacture or sale of either firm’s drug. The parties might therefore feel justified (rightly or wrongly) in not submitting a consent decree stating that the patent is valid and would be infringed by the proposed generic, since this does not expressly address manufacture or sales. Alternatively, it could be that the parties submit a district court consent decree (which includes no reverse payment), but not the PTAB settlement (which could include a reverse payment). After all, a PTAB settlement simply says that the parties agree to terminate the IPR – it need not declare the patent valid – and this arguably does not relate to manufacture or sales.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s obviousness ruling, finding that the Board had improperly shifted burdens onto Magnum, the Patent Owner, in several instances. For example, Petitioner McClinton asserted that a motivation to combine argument made with respect to a first set of prior art references was also applicable to a second set of prior art references, but did not explain why the rationale applied to both sets of references. The Federal Circuit found that the Board improperly “expected [the Patent Owner] to explain, and faulted [the Patent Owner] for allegedly failing to explain” why the motivation to combine argument made by Petitioner based on the first set of prior art references would not be applicable to the second set of prior art references. The Board’s obviousness finding thus constituted an improper shifting of the burden to Magnum, the patentee, to prove that the claimed invention would not have been obvious.

While the Supreme Court spoke clearly and unanimously on the issue in Cuozzo, this hardly means the standard to be applied to claim construction in IPRs has been settled. Rather, it means only that the solution to the problem lies outside the courts. Because the Patent Office has adopted, by regulation, an unsatisfactory standard, Congress should step in. In the context of IPR proceedings, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) should be instructed to give claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning to one of skill in the art, just as the courts are instructed to do.

Due to a bizarre jurisdictional “feature,” the Board does not actually get jurisdiction over a case until either a Reply Brief has been filed or the time to file a Reply Brief has run. See 37 CFR 41.35(a). What this means is the patent examiner, in order to frustrate the applicant’s ability to have the Board hear a case, can simply refuse to file an Examiner’s Answer and instead reopen prosecution. This happens all too frequently in some Art Units.

Delay, frustrate, harass and ignore patent applicants. Issue frivolous rejections if necessary, but reject at all costs. If the Board issues a complete reversal just reopen prosecution. Eventually the patent applicant will get the idea and abandon the application. TC 3600 seems to be fighting a very successful and coordinated war of attrition against applicants.

So an applicant waits years on appeal to get relief from frivolous rejections, achieves a complete and total victory, and their reward is another bogus rejection from the same examiner who has been harassing them for years. It is no wonder many applicants just give up. If this were happening anywhere else in the world we would ridicule the system as fixed or rigged… How ironic, and sad, is it that the PTAB has the authority to invalidate issued patents in post grant proceedings but has no implementing authority with respect to its decisions completely reversing even frivolous examiner rejections. This is yet another reason the PTAB is appropriately characterized a death squad. The only power the PTAB seems to have is to take rights away from property owners (i.e., patent owners).

What is happening in TC 3600 is prosecution is being re-opened for the purpose of issuing Alice rejections. With the help of readers, so far I’ve found eleven (11) separate cases over the last 10 months where prosecution was re-opened by Greg Vidovich, Director of TC 3600, after the Board issued a decision completely reversing the examiner on every rejection of every claim. In each case the Vidovich authorized re-opening of prosecution simply to issue Alice rejections… What good is an appeal when the TC Director has demonstrated that even if the appeal is successful prosecution can be re-opened and more bogus rejections made? What good is going back into prosecution with the same unreasonable examiner that has just has each and every rejection of each and every claim reversed? There is no relief for applicants, which is not how the system is supposed to work.

Cooper and MCM have submitted Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, asking it to consider the constitutionality of Article I final adjudication of issued patent claims, subject only to Article III appellate review. Importantly, the resolution of this question turns on the determination of (1) whether the claim of patent invalidity is a public or private right, and (2) if a private right, whether the claim may be delegated to an Article I tribunal for (a) advisory determination, requiring (b) enforcement by a federal district court, where (c) legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and (d) factual conclusions are reviewed for substantial evidence. As revealed during briefing by litigants and amici, in addition to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“CAFC”) precedential MCM opinion, ambiguity in the Court’s Stern decision has led to confusion, and the analysis required for question (2) has been improperly applied to the resolution of question (1). In light of this confusion—and the merits of the constitutional question aside—Cooper and MCM present the Court with a rare opportunity to clarify that questions (1) and (2) are in fact separate, and require, per its own decisional law, distinct modes of analysis.

The battle of Cuozzo, and patent reform in general, is not between the tech industry and the pharmaceutical industry. The battle was started by wealthy multinational tech companies led by Google who, by using their huge market and deep pockets, massively commercialize technology they did not invent to take control of emerging multi-billion dollar markets. Once a tech market is taken, it is nearly impossible to unseat the incumbent, unless, of course, you have a patent and that patent can be defended. So these huge companies bought Congress to create law that destroyed hundreds of years of patent law repositioning it against the very people who invent most of the new technologies we all use, small tech startups and inventors. Congress and the Supreme Court have now ensured that the big stay big and the small do not disrupt their highly profitable cabal with the nuisance of patent rights.

The availability of PTAB patent review proceedings to address low quality patents is especially important in the financial services sector where, prior to Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, there was a lack of emphasis on patenting financial services innovation. As a result, patent examiners, who regularly search issued patents and published patent applications for prior art, often may not have access to prior art they need to avoid issuing patents on previously known technologies.

The Supreme Court’s ruling will disappoint those who had hoped to change the standard by which the PTAB conducts inter partes reviews through the courts, rather than through Congress or the PTO itself. The manner in which the majority framed the case also offers hints about the Court’s views of today’s patent landscape and the deference that may be granted to the PTAB in future decisions, should the Court decide to grant more petitions for certiorari in this area.

AIA trials have been sought over 5,000 times to challenge patents and are widely used to resolve patent disputes. Many patent owners complained that these proceedings were unfairly tilted in favor of those challenging patents. Cuozzo sought Supreme Court review of two such practices that it felt went too far and were inappropriate given the language and intent of the AIA. However, the Court sided with the PTAB on both issues, leaving the AIA trial process, as practitioners have come to know it over the last four years, intact.

“This is obviously a victory for some who challenge a patent’s validity in IPR proceedings since broadly construed claims are more vulnerable to attack than narrowly construed claims” remarked Scott Daniels, partner at Westerman Hattori Daniels & Adrian, LLP. “Still, the great majority of IPR decisions do not turn on claim construction and for those cases Cuozzo simply makes no difference.”… Levy, who was similarly dead on accurate with his predictions, raises an important point that so many in the patent community who were rooting for Cuozzo failed to keep in mind. Those challenging the action of an agency face a substantial uphill battle when they seek a judicial determination overriding agency rulemaking and statutory implementation.