Posts in Courts

O’Malley recognized that in Perfect Web the Federal Circuit did authorize the use of common sense to supply a missing claim limitation, but she pointed out that this was the only case where that has been done. O’Malley further explained that in Perfect Web that which was missing was “unusually simple and the technology particularly straightforward.” In fact, in Perfect Web, which dealt with sending e-mail to an e-mail list, the missing claim limitation was nothing more than merely repeating the step of resending e-mails in accordance with the claim. Thus, O’Malley explained that Perfect Web is properly considered an exception to allowing common sense to supply a missing claim limitation, rather than the rule.

Within one week of the Pokemon Go July 6th release date, the digital monster catching game surpassed 10 million downloads, the fastest that this feat has ever been achieved by a mobile platform game… Niantic’s mobile-based gaming business is currently protected by a portfolio of 3 U.S. patents which are directed at what the company refers to as “location-based parallel reality games.”

The CAFC then approvingly noted that the district court invoked “an important common-sense distinction between ends sought and particular means of achieving them, between desired results (functions) and particular ways of achieving (performing) them.” As the district court reasoned, “‘there is a critical difference between patenting a particular concrete solution to a problem and attempting to patent the abstract idea of a solution to the problem in general.’” According to the CAFC, the claims at issue in this case do the latter, namely, “rather than claiming ‘some specific way of enabling a computer to monitor data from multiple sources across an electric power grid,’ some ‘particular implementation,’ they ‘purport to monopolize every potential solution to the problem’…Whereas patenting a particular solution ‘would incentivize further innovation in the form of alternative methods for achieving the same result’… allowing claims like [the ones at issue here] would ‘inhibit[] innovation by prohibiting other inventors from developing their own solutions to the problem without first licensing the abstract idea.’”

Removing section 101 would remove the language granting patents only to processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or new and useful improvements thereof. These categories however have only rarely been used to limit patentablity. The Court has in fact described these terms as expansive. Their removal would not suddenly make the inventions found unpatentable by the Court as abstract ideas or articles of nature patentable. As shown by the discussion above, the judicial exceptions do not rest on a legal interpretation of section 101 in any of its forms. They come from Supreme Court precedent established BEFORE section 101 existed.

Murata argued that the district court should have relied on the traditional three-factor test, which does not consider the burden of litigation on the court and the parties. By considering the burden of litigation, it alleged that the court committed a reversible error. The Court disagreed, ruling that courts have broad discretion to manage their own dockets, including the power to grant a stay of a case. This discretion does not come from statute, but is an inherent power of the courts. Thus, a district court may consider other factors beyond the three-factor stay test at its discretion. Further, the legislative history of the AIA reveals that Congress intended IPR’s to reduce the burden of litigation.

The Court also affirmed that the this means-plus-function term was indefinite. In the case of computer-implemented functions, the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function. The patents-in-suit did not disclose an operative algorithm for the claimed “symbol generator.” A patentee cannot claim a means for performing a specific function and then disclose a “general purpose computer” as the structure performing that function. The specification must disclose an algorithm in hardware or software for performing the stated function.

There is simply no reason for so many patent cases to wind up in a district with so little relation to those cases. Basic principles of equity and justice don’t vanish just because a patent is involved. The court hearing a patent case should have a real interest in the case, just like any tort or contract case. The Eastern District of Texas has literally created a local industry of patent litigation, intentionally or not. Even local businesses acknowledge it and exploit it. Patent venue reform is long overdue, and it’s something that Congress can and should get done.

How will our patent system treat this wonderful new discovery? How long will it take before its curative benefits can be deployed ? We can only hope that DC’s meddlers in our innovation ecosystem read the Ms. Sun’s article. Because however fervently the medical and scientific communities respond to this growing superbug crisis, IP’s DC government legal eagles are either unaware or unconcerned. The USPTO is regularly rejecting microbial patent applications in blind servitude to Alice-Mayo’s confusing eligibility formula. We can hope, but cannot be assured, the Federal Circuit will make sense some day of Alice-Mayo’s two-step test. But when? Worse, it appears that SCOTUS is infected by the anti-patent poison infesting our Capitol. How refreshing it would be to have our Congress and the nation’s highest Court be as concerned with superbugs as they seem to be with PR-created patent trolls.

Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of Halo, companies can no longer rely solely on reasonable litigation-inspired defenses to prevent a finding of willfulness… The Federal Circuit also found that the district court abused its discretion in failing to issue a permanent injunction. While there is a public interest in safer generators, there is also a public interest in the security of patent rights. The patent owner presented evidence that it had sufficient production abilities to satisfy market demand for the product. Finally, in similar contexts, Congress has expressly indicated that permanent injunctions may issue to prevent infringement of other life-saving goods like pharmaceuticals.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s obviousness ruling, finding that the Board had improperly shifted burdens onto Magnum, the Patent Owner, in several instances. For example, Petitioner McClinton asserted that a motivation to combine argument made with respect to a first set of prior art references was also applicable to a second set of prior art references, but did not explain why the rationale applied to both sets of references. The Federal Circuit found that the Board improperly “expected [the Patent Owner] to explain, and faulted [the Patent Owner] for allegedly failing to explain” why the motivation to combine argument made by Petitioner based on the first set of prior art references would not be applicable to the second set of prior art references. The Board’s obviousness finding thus constituted an improper shifting of the burden to Magnum, the patentee, to prove that the claimed invention would not have been obvious.

On June 30th, Judge George King of the Central District of California entered the Final Order and Judgment in the matter of Good Morning to You Productions Corp. et al. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. – the “Happy Birthday” class action. Only the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the plaintiffs’ attorneys remains, and must be decided for many of the settlement terms to become effective. Nonetheless, it is not too early to consider what, if any, effects this case will have on the field of intellectual property.

Unlike Judge Chen’s breadth-based approach, Judge Hughes appears to adopt the proposal of using the European technical effect ( or “technological arts”) analysis to determine whether a U.S. claim is patent-eligible… The CAFC decides that the above claim indeed is related to an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. This once again approaches the “technical problem” analysis of European law, which at least has the advantage of possessing something of a legal principle about it, as opposed to being a tautology.

During 2016’s second quarter, plaintiffs filed a total of 1,282 patent infringement cases in U.S. district court. This is a 33 percent increase in the 958 patent cases filed during the first quarter but data suggests that the second quarter tends to see the highest level of infringement cases over all other quarters according to Lex Machina data scientists Brian Howard. “We would expect a jump up from the first quarter,” he said. The first quarter was also a trough for patent infringement cases after last November’s massive number of 847 patent cases, just more than 100 cases less than the entire docket for this year’s first quarter. “The rise we’ve seen puts this year on track with 2011 or 2012 rather than the last two years,” Howard said.

In two cases written by Judge Chen (DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com L.P., 2013-1505 (Chen, Wallach, Meyer (dissent) and Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc., v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2015-1763 (Newman, O’Malley, Chen)) the patents were found to be patent-eligible principally because analysis typically regarded as being under Mayo step 2 demonstrated that the claims added “something more” to the abstract ideas than merely well-understood and conventional steps. In effect, Judge Chen’s opinions focus on whether the narrowness of the claim is adequate. If it is, the claim is not abstract. How narrow is “narrow enough” is, like “abstract”, not defined, but this approach bears a closer resemblance to the original limiting principle of the abstract idea doctrine – preemption – than many recent decisions.

This case concerns Star Athletica’s alleged infringement of Varsity Brands’ purported copyrights in the design of certain cheerleading uniforms. Under the Copyright Act, because clothing possesses an intrinsic utilitarian function (covering the body, providing warmth and protection from the elements, etc.), clothing designs historically have not been protected by copyright unless the claimed design is physically or conceptually separable from the garment’s utilitarian features. The district court found in favor of defendant Star Athletica, concluding that the design elements in Varsity Brands’ cheerleading uniforms were not separable from the uniform’s function. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and in doing so, devised a new test for assessing the copyrightability of a design of a useful article.