Federal Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Pro Se Inventor’s Patent Term Adjustment Suit as Untimely

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a decision today in Guymon v. Squires, affirming a decision from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissing with prejudice an inventor’s lawsuit challenging a patent term adjustment (PTA) determination. Circuit Judge Hughes wrote for the court, joined by Chief Judge Moore and Circuit Judge Lourie, and rejected each of the three arguments that Guymon raised on appeal.

John Lewis Guymon Jr. is the inventor and owner of U.S. Patent No. 10,943,030, which covers a method for creating secure electronic documents that allow for the protected exchange of information. Upon issuance, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) awarded Guymon a PTA of 1,525 days under 35 U.S.C. Section 154(b) to account for delays during prosecution. Guymon believed he was entitled to 2,327 days and requested reconsideration from the USPTO Director, who denied that request on March 28, 2023.

Guymon, who represented himself, sought review of the denial in the Eastern District of Virginia under Section 154(b)(4)(A), which gives dissatisfied applicants 180 days to challenge a PTA reconsideration decision. Guymon attempted to file his complaint electronically that day before learning that the district court barred pro se litigants from e-filing without leave. He then emailed the complaint to the clerk’s office, though the record contains no evidence that the clerk ever received it, and mailed a paper copy by overnight delivery. The mailed complaint was dated September 25, but the clerk’s office did not receive and file it until September 27, 2023, which was two days after the deadline.

The USPTO Director and the Office of the General Counsel moved to dismiss for lack of standing and timeliness in March 2024. Guymon requested leave to amend, arguing that resolving timeliness before he addressed standing “would be improper.” The district court granted leave but noted that Guymon had not directly responded to the timeliness argument. His amended complaint, filed in April 2024, still did not address the issue beyond repeating an assertion that it was timely. After a renewed motion to dismiss, the district court found that the original complaint was filed on September 27, 2023, and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The district court rejected Guymon’s excusable neglect argument, finding that he “knowingly assumed a significant risk to the status of his claim by waiting until the last day to file it, and thus failure to act was not the result of excusable neglect but rather the consequences of his procrastination.”

Guymon, now represented by counsel, first argued on appeal that his complaint should be deemed timely because he emailed it to the clerk’s office on the filing deadline, contending that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 5(d)(4) prohibits a clerk from refusing to file a paper based on its “form.” The Federal Circuit disagreed with that reading, and since other rules explicitly govern permissible filing methods, the court explained that “form” under Rule 5(d)(4) refers to aspects of a filing’s content, such as the case caption and required information, rather than to the manner in which it is submitted. The court noted that Rule 5(d)(3)(B)(i) separately allows pro se litigants to file electronically only when permitted by court order or local rule. Local Rule 1(A) for the Eastern District of Virginia requires electronic filing through the Electronic Case Filing System, and the district’s filing manual bars pro se litigants from electronically submitting initiating documents such as complaints. Since no local rule or order authorized Guymon to file by email on September 25, 2023, the court noted no error in the district court’s timeliness determination.

Moreover, Guymon argued that the district court improperly resolved a statute of limitations defense, an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c), through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that such dismissals are typically improper unless the facts supporting the defense appear on the face of the complaint. It determined that the standard was satisfied here, since the complaint’s assertion of timeliness was a conclusory statement contradicted by the clerk’s filing stamp and the docket entry.

The court applied the two-part test from Holland v. Florida, which requires a showing “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” It determined that Guymon’s asserted unfamiliarity with the district court’s electronic filing restrictions amounted to “garden variety claims of excusable neglect” rather than an extraordinary circumstance, and it declined to remand for further factual development on tolling.

Guymon further argued that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice rather than granting leave to amend a second time. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument since Guymon never moved for a second leave to amend, and a court does not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a motion that was never made. The court added that Guymon’s pro se status before the district court did not obligate that court to invite further amendment on its own.

Ultimately, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Guymon’s amended complaint challenging the USPTO’s patent term adjustment reconsideration decision.

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