Federal Circuit Affirms ITC Finding That Redesigned Vacuum Products Do Not Infringe Bissell Patents

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a precedential decision today in Bissell, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, affirming a final determination of the International Trade Commission (ITC) that found no import violation by redesigned vacuum products. The CAFC affirmed the ITC’s refusal to grant an exclusion order and also agreed that the Commission properly determined that Bissel’s products satisfied the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement.

Bissell, Inc. and Bissell Homecare, Inc. own U.S. Patent Nos. 11,076,735 and 11,071,428, directed to surface cleaning apparatuses. The patents describe a wet-dry surface-cleaning device featuring a storage tray used during a self-cleaning mode and for battery recharging. The specification notes that the battery does not recharge during the self-cleaning mode because the battery charging circuit is disabled. Bissell filed a complaint with the ITC alleging that Tineco violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing and selling devices that infringe the patents’ claims.

The ITC originally barred Tineco from importing certain accused products found to infringe. After the complaint was filed, Tineco redesigned the accused products. The ITC determined that the redesigned products did not infringe certain claims, and thus no exclusion order was entered. Bissell appealed the finding of no violation regarding the redesigned products. Tineco cross-appealed to challenge the finding that Bissell established a technical domestic industry.

Writing for the CAFC, Judge Stoll first addressed Bissell’s direct appeal that the redesigned accused products do not meet the limitation requiring the battery charging circuit to be disabled by the actuation of the self-cleaning mode input control and remain disabled during the unattended automatic cleanout cycle. Bissell argued that the Administrative Law Judge relied on an implicit error in claim construction to find that the redesigned products do not literally meet the disabled battery limitation. Bissell also contended that the analysis for why those same products do not meet the limitation under the doctrine of equivalents improperly relied on the doctrine of claim vitiation.

The CAFC was not persuaded by Bissell’s assertion that the Administrative Law Judge construed the disabled battery limitation for the first time in the Initial Determination. The Federal Circuit noted that the Administrative Law Judge merely applied the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language and made credibility determinations, finding the testimony of Bissell’s expert unpersuasive. The Administrative Law Judge found that the redesigned accused products do not complete a cleanout cycle during which the battery charging circuit does not operate. Timing diagrams showed that the redesigned products charge twice during the 120-second self-cleaning period, and the court affirmed the determination of no literal infringement.

Regarding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit rejected Bissell’s argument that the Administrative Law Judge relied on the legal doctrine of claim vitiation. The CAFC explained that the Administrative Law Judge “did not find persuasive the testimony that a battery circuit that does the opposite of what the claim requires is insubstantially different from the claim.” The court viewed this as a factual finding that the expert opinion was legally inadequate, and affirmed the finding of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

Turning to the cross-appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed Tineco’s challenge to the finding on the domestic industry. Tineco argued that the Administrative Law Judge erred by relying on testimony that Bissell’s products satisfy the disabled battery limitation because the expert relied on source code produced during discovery but not introduced as evidence at trial; however, the CAFC disagreed. The court noted that under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of.

The court pointed out that there was no dispute that the source code was produced in discovery, the expert relied on his review of the source code, experts in this field would reasonably rely on source code to understand the operation of the domestic industry products, and Tineco never provided contrary expert opinions. The CAFC concluded that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s finding that the claim limitation is met by the domestic industry products.

The Federal Circuit then considered Tineco’s challenges to the fact findings comparing the accused products to certain limitations of the asserted patents. Tineco argued that substantial evidence does not support the finding that the accused products meet the brushroll within the recovery pathway limitation.

The court found that substantial evidence supports the alternative finding that, even under a narrower view of the recovery pathway, the accused products satisfy the claim requirement that the brushroll be within the recovery pathway. Tineco’s expert agreed that if at least 50% of the brushroll is inside the recovery pathway, the limitation is met. The court concluded that a reasonable fact finder could have relied on the demonstrative and expert testimony to conclude that the brushrolls are not materially different from a brushroll 50% inside of the recovery pathway.

The CAFC also found that substantial evidence supports the finding that Tineco’s products meet the suction nozzle limitation. Tineco’s expert conceded that the suction nozzle of the accused products suctions fluid and debris off the metal blade and off the floor. The Administrative Law Judge reasonably concluded that the suction nozzle could also suction fluid and debris off the brushroll, and the court affirmed the decision.