“The present [PTAB] system provides a do-over for the USPTO… [that] removes the presumption of validity from a valuable patent based on subjective argumentation from a highly incentivized party.”
Every experienced patent attorney knows what is written below is true, but if you want the quiet parts to be spoken loudly, keep reading. This article isn’t revolutionary, but it screams a truth that everyone with an interest in patents needs to understand.
Patent invalidation rates by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) are often used to attack the quality of examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). While I agree that there is room for improvement in examination quality, patent invalidation rates should not be used as a barometer for how well the USPTO is examining patent applications.
Plain and simple – invalidation rates are misleading. To understand why, let’s look at the practicalities of patent examination and the realities of the patents that are challenged at the PTAB. In short, to increase certainty of patentability to a degree that would substantially lower invalidation rates at the PTAB, the USPTO would have to spend hundreds of hours examining each patent application. This is unrealistic and contrary to public interest.
Patent Examination at the USPTO
For those not familiar with patent examination at the USPTO, the Office is divided into nine different technology centers. Each tech center includes hundreds of individual patent examiners. All patent examiners have a college degree in science or engineering and most have a technical background matching the subject matter of the tech center. Some patent examiners have worked in the public or private sector, while others came straight to the USPTO after graduation from college.
For example, the examiners in tech center 1600 examine patent applications related to biotechnology and organic chemistry fields and those in tech center 2100 examine patent applications related to computer architecture software and information security. Each tech center is further divided into art units, and each examiner generally examines applications in one or two art units. Art units are specific sub-categories of the technology of the tech center, and are designed such that, over time, examiners become experts in particular subject matters.
Limited Resources Allocated to Patent Examination
Each examiner is assigned a specific amount of time to examine a patent application and issue an action in response to the patent application. Depending on the experience level of the examiner, the complexity of the technology and other factors, it is my understanding that the examiner will spend between 10 and 45 hours examining an application in the first instance to determine whether the claimed invention should issue into a patent. This action is usually a rejection, but a skilled patent attorney can often turn that rejection, or the next rejection, into a patent. On average, utility patents issued in the first half of this decade averaged 1.7 rejections per patent, according to Juristat. Thus, to make this analysis simplistic, we will estimate that an average patent was subject to approximately 17 to 77 hours of examination time.
Which Patents are Invalidated by the PTAB?
Whether or not a granted patent’s validity matters to the public depends on whether the technology is valuable. For illustrative purposes, let’s compare (1) a patent that does not cover any product in the market, (2) a patent that covers one or more products generating $500,000 in annual revenue, or (3) a patent that covers one or more products generating $20 million in revenue.
Patent (1) is often narrowly tailored and has no value. Whether it is “valid” does not matter at all because its validity will never be even considered.
Patent (2) might be relevant within a niche industry and it might be the subject of a cease and desist letter sent by the patent owner to a competitor. There may be a license agreement, the competitor may design around the patent, or the accused infringer may just say “screw you, sue me.” But there is almost zero chance that an infringement lawsuit is filed or that the patent is challenged at the PTAB. Thus, the validity is also never analyzed by the PTAB or a district court.
Patent (3) will likely be litigated if it is not licensed, and if it is litigated, the defendant will file a petition at the PTAB challenging the validity of the patent.
A vast majority of patents are like patents (1) and (2), and exceedingly few patents are in the same sphere as patent (3). In the first half of this decade, around 330,000 utility patents have been issued each year, and around 1,360 utility patents are challenged each year at the PTAB. Accordingly, very few, yet valuable, utility patents are challenged at the PTAB.
What Kind of Resources are Thrown at Patents That are Being Litigated?
As I mention above, an average patent is subject to approximately 17 to 77 hours of examination time. Do you think an accused infringer, who could be on the hook for millions of dollars, says to their patent lawyers, “Spend less than 100 hours seeing if we can invalidate this patent”? Hell no, they don’t!
They throw substantial resources into finding prior art that the Examiner might have missed. They direct their lawyers to spend hours crafting reasoning as to why it would have been obvious to have combined the prior art references. They hire expensive expert witnesses and pay their lawyers to brainstorm on how to fill in any evidentiary gaps in the prior art. Almost all inventions are a combination of using previously existing technology in a new way, so skilled lawyers, especially with the help of hired-gun expert witnesses, can always craft solid arguments that claims of a patent are obvious.
Well, is it Obvious?
I am not suggesting that the behavior of challenging the validity of a patent is necessarily ill-intentioned or wrong. Obviousness, which is usually what is being considered in a validity challenge, is inherently subjective and subject to hindsight bias. If a patent was granted years ago on a technology that is now valuable, the natural instinct is to skeptically view its inventiveness. If a party is accused of infringement, their inclination is that the claims of the patent are obvious, especially if there are economic incentives to challenge the patent versus paying a licensing fee.
I also view obviousness as a sliding scale. At the ends of the spectrum are inventions that are clearly obvious and inventions that are clearly nonobvious. In between, it can depend quite a bit on advocacy abilities of the parties, and like in sports, good offense usually beats good defense. It is often the case that the accused infringer has deeper pockets than the patent owner, which means the accused infringer has access to more expensive lawyers and more expensive expert witnesses. While more expensive does not always mean better, capitalism often rewards skilled professionals in the form of higher fees. It would thus be hard to argue that this monetary imbalance does not skew in favor of patents being invalidated.
In patent examination, the Examiner is supposed to be a neutral party in determining patentability. The patent applicant usually hires an advocate – either a patent agent or patent attorney – to help convince the Examiner that claims are patentable. While examiners have varying views on obviousness (as illustrated by the widely varying rates at which examiners grant patents), there is no advocate for unpatentability when patents are being examined by the USPTO.
We Should Consider Changing PTAB Trials to More Align with Examination Instead of Trying to Align Examination with PTAB Trials
There is no reasonable reality in which a patent examiner can spend as much time analyzing a patent as an alleged infringer will if the patent is asserted in litigation. And there is no reasonable reality in which the neutral role of patent examination should be transformed to include an aggressive and skilled advocate armed with an expensive and persuasive expert witness. Such a skilled advocate can look to the thousands of PTAB decisions where patents were at least partially invalidated, craft convincing hindsight reasoning as to how the prior art would have rendered obvious a claimed invention based on these decisions, and prep a persuasive expert witness to support the convincing hindsight reasoning. In such a situation, the deck is stacked against the patentee, essentially eviscerating the presumption of validity that is supposed to accompany a patent granted by the USPTO and allowing the USPTO a second chance at establishing unpatentability after patentability was established by the Examiner.
If we want to strengthen U.S. patents and add certainty to patent rights, we should reconsider how PTAB trials are conducted. If I was redesigning the PTAB, I would start by removing the expert witnesses from PTAB trials. This would help to lessen the imbalance resulting from accused infringers having deeper pockets by causing the prior art to speak for itself when it is judged against a valuable patent. If a patent is truly of such poor quality that it is an undeserved burden on the public, an expert witness is unnecessary to prove invalidity.
I would also require more objective evidentiary support for proving obviousness by changing the standard for PTAB trials to the teaching, suggestion, motivation (TSM) test that was the obviousness standard before the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Sure, the TSM test was imperfect, but it placed more objective guiderails on the obviousness analysis than the overly flexible standard set forth in KSR. Specifically, the TSM test requires prior art evidence to support reasoning alleging that it would have been obvious to have combined prior art references to obtain a claimed invention. If the USPTO is taking away a patent right that has considerable value in the market, based on assertions by an aggressive and skilled advocate, the evidentiary burden should be higher than that required for a neutral patent examiner.
I think both of these changes would align PTAB trials with their original mission of invalidating “bad patents,” and would decrease the likelihood that a patent is challenged at the PTAB simply because it is valuable. They would help to restore the presumption of validity, which is lost in the present system that combines an aggressive and skilled advocate, an expensive and persuasive expert witness and an overly flexible obviousness standard.
Essentially, the present system provides a do-over for the USPTO – the PTAB panel second guesses the examiner and concludes the claim is obvious if they would have reached a different decision than the Examiner. Such a do-over removes the presumption of validity from a valuable patent based on subjective argumentation from a highly incentivized party. It does not result in the post-grant review system embodied by the version of the AIA that was sold to the legislature and the public as an error correction mechanism for examination mistakes. The PTAB should fix objective examination mistakes made by the USPTO and should not simply decide subjectively after the fact that the examiner could have rejected the claims. If the post-grant review system was more objective, then the PTAB’s invalidation rates would make more sense as a barometer for how well the USPTO is examining patent applications.

Join the Discussion
23 comments so far.
George
June 30, 2025 12:17 pmIt is now IMPOSSIBLE for even a well-meaning SINGLE ‘human examiner’ to correctly analyse and decide on proper claims language to allow a ‘broad as possible’ patent to issue that could then also be ‘easily enforced’.
The vast amount of knowledge and prior publications of that prior knowledge that must be considered, is just one reason for that. It is 1000x more than in the past when it was still possible for a human to absorb and use it to do this extremely difficult task properly (especially in the absurdly limited time allowed – for a ‘human’ to do it).
Only computers can do this now. Only computers can restore our once great system of IP protection, to one that is once again equitable and ‘affordable’ and one that is not merely a copy of the European system that the Founders would never have accepted for America.
A system where – as in the past – even a poor person (or ex-slave) could succeed against the rich and powerful. That system is totally gone now. We need to bring it back. AI can do that! Humans CAN’T anymore. It’s far too complex a problem and beyond the mental capacity of ‘any human’ (even a genius) to do that correctly and ‘fairly’ now. AI will be a perfect solution to this problem. And if we don’t do it first, China WILL and then they’ll have the best patent system in the world, that every inventor will want to use first!
George
June 30, 2025 11:54 amWhy it is so important to repeal the AIA, eliminate the PTAB and start all over again, by going back to our original American system including the concept of ‘First to Invent’ (and which could be verified with the help of AI). It should also begin replacing most ‘human’ examiners with AI analysis of patent claims and prior art to speed up the process by a factor of 1000 or more. In addition we should go back to NEVER publishing patent applications UNLESS the are actually issued as fully ‘validated’ and ‘bullet-proof’ patents, providing real and powerful protections, which in itself would greatly discourage would-be infringers of those patents. The AIA did none of this! It just made IP even more of a free-for-all and even more inefficient, time consuming and costly. The ‘new’ system, under the AIA, has just become a ‘smorgasbord’ for China and other countries now!
The advantages and tremendous economy gained by creating a true ’21st century patent system’, built around replacing fallible, inconsistent, often biased, incompetent, ego and ulterior motive driven ‘human’ examiners are too many to discuss at this time.
But, whoever (i.e. Congress) thought that it would be good idea to allow competitors (especially China) to see new concepts and technologies that could later ‘be forced’ to just become public domain, when they are NOT allowed true and effective IP protection, was just ‘nuts’.
All, would-be inventors, should read this excellent book already written pre-AIA (about the many perils of relying on a seriously flawed and corrupted patent system), before even thinking of applying for what would likely become a legally ‘worthless’ patent that would offer no real protections at all (only ‘theoretical’ ones) and thereby result in making their (potentially great and valuable ideas) simply public domain and ‘free for the taking’ (or at least free to look at and then design around).
https://www.amazon.com/Steal-This-Idea-Intellectual-Confiscation/dp/0312294085
China especially thanks us for this ‘brilliant system’ that supposedly protects valuable new America IP but in fact makes it especially easy for them to acquire and commercially exploit, without espionage or hacking even being required anymore.
At the very least inventors should be advised NEVER to allow their initial applications to be published (even if they’d then only receive American protection) UNLESS issued as ‘valid’ and ‘easily enforceable’ patents that would be as broad as possible (which an AI ‘assistant’ could also help to ensure).
The savings of time and money resulting from a true AI-based, 21st century patent system, would be tremendous and in the many billions of dollars per year (including by preventing rampant IP theft). It would also make possible 100% valid patents in as little as a week, for perhaps just a few hundred dollars, instead of the thousands and later millions that our current system can require (so that only millions can afford to use it).
What wouldn’t be to like about an actual ‘working’ and ‘cost efficient’ system like that?! YEARS of often futile and frustrating prosecution and expense, could then be turned into “smooth as silk” WEEKS costing – at most – a few hundred dollars. Sign me up!
Doreen Trujillo
June 30, 2025 10:57 amCarrie raises an excellent point about the technical knowledge of PTAB judges versus examiners. The latter are more immersed in the technology on a daily basis. The former are more similar to District Court Judges in that respect. Which is yet another reason why the burden of proof should be clear and convincing evidence.
Reexaminations are done by examiners. If an alleged infringer wants to get the preponderance of the evidence standard of review, they can always choose reexamination.
Sally Egan
June 27, 2025 09:30 amHere Here. Someone who speaks truth to shenanigans.
Yucel Yilmaz
June 27, 2025 04:16 amCongratulations on your article. In my opinion, it would be an incomplete assessment to evaluate the decision quality of an institution by only looking at the invalidation decisions. Similarly, the positive decisions of the examiners should also be evaluated. For example, the change in the success rates of the lawsuits filed for the cancellation of patents that have been granted over time can contribute to the evaluation of the overall performance.
In addition, the individual performances of the examiners can also be a meaningful criterion. Experts who produce negative or positive decisions far beyond the average can affect the decision quality.
F22strike
June 26, 2025 10:05 pmCarrie –
I can only imagine the trials and tribulations you have experienced with the US patent system.
My clients experienced what I can only call “negative patentability bias” many times at the USPTO. Initially the examiner apparently formed a subjective opinion that the invention was not patentable without considering 35 USC Sections 102 and 103 and before conducting a prior art search. Then followed years of moving target rejections. Each time my client overcame a prior art rejection, the examiner performed a new search, made new rejections, and collected quota points. Even the APJs at the USPTO did this in my experience. Never mind that the MPEP specifically states that moving target rejections are improper, especially where no claim amendments have been made, which was not infrequently the case with my clients.
Occasionally USPTO examiners will comment on this blog that they don’t game the quota system. Of course they do.
Lets say the IPR statistics were somehow reversed. Imagine if only 10-20% of IPR petitions were successful. How many APJs would still be employed by the USPTO? The system is corrupt and unfair. It overwhelming favors granting IPR petitions and cancelling patent claims.
The mystery to me is why inventors and companies even bother filing US patent applications except in special circumstances, like those involving pharmaceutical inventions. I guess the real story about the worthlessness of most US patents has never gotten out.
Rarely does anyone on this blog attempt to counter the substance of my arguments. They are based on forty years of prosecuting US patent applications and litigating US patent infringement cases.
During the first 20 years of my career as a patent attorney, I filed approximately a dozen appeals from final rejections. After USPTO Director Dudas was confirmed I began filing one appeal per month. The USPTO backlog of appeals went from something like 3,000 to 30,000. It was the era of nothing is patentable. Dudas had a bachelors degree in finance. IMO he was clueless on technology and patent law and may have been a shill for Big-Tech unfortunately appointed by President Bush.
I have counseled law students not to go into patent law. US patent prosecution is a dying profession. However, there are still huge fees to be billed in the IPR shenanigans if you work in a big law firm.
mike
June 26, 2025 09:52 pmI hear you Carrie. It appears the only ones who say that there are low quality patents are defendants, their lobbyists, and their defense firms. Why is it that only “a person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute [a review] of the patent”? 35 USC § 311/321. It’s set up that way because the crafters of the AIA didn’t genuinely care about improving patent quality. Otherwise, they would have allowed patent owners to challenge their own patents under this regime. So that’s just one example that this was a way for the PTO to fix “bad patents” was a lie. It was set up so defendants could bully patent owners, because that is what has played out since its inception. Fortunately, the administration under Stewart is swiftly establishing “proper intent”. Many of it will still require Congress, however.
Harmonizing the song here by Mr. Mehall, we have the Sunwater Institute’s Policy Report:
“the Sunwater Institute released a new policy report on patent quality in the United States. The report found that, while current policy dialogue often centers on an alleged epidemic of ‘low quality’ patents, the quality of patents issued by the USPTO is actually quite high, comparing favorably to the quality of patents issued by other major patent offices. In fact, if there is an issue of quality to be discussed, it is that valid patents are improperly denied far more often than invalid patents are inappropriately granted.”
– C4IP Statement on 2024 Sunwater Institute Study
Carrie Hafeman
June 26, 2025 08:41 pmI AM TIRED of this assumption that PTAB judges always know more than the patent examiner. That is not what happened in my case. I have heard other inventors that also found that their PTAB judges did not have the expertise that their examiner did.
My examiner had me go back and forth for 11 years before allowing me my first patent! He looked hard for prior art and found a Broyles patent as prior art that allowed someone with a computer to change the display screen of another remote computer if the user assisted by touching a key on the remote computer.
So, we added ‘without user assistance’ to my claims before he would allow my patent. This also makes sense because my invention was to recover stolen and lost laptops and we would not have wanted a thief to help by logging into the Internet. Back in 2002 (and the PTAB judges were old enough to remember), a user had to manually log onto a computer with their username and password to access the Internet first to allow it to communicate.
Anyone that wants to follow my case (Hafeman v. Google, Microsoft, as a party for LG) will clearly see that the PTAB judges made eye opening and devastating mistakes with my case. The Jenne patent application filed on Dec 31, 2001 describes their product working with the Windows operating system at the time and showing how the Jenne invention did not work until the user with the remote computer logged onto the Internet in order to have the remote computer send display ads to the remote laptop memory. Without this communication established the Jenne patent application would just rotate thru old ads when the laptop booted up and could not get any new information to display. Laptops didn’t automatically connect like they do now. The PTAB judges ignored this requirement shown in Block 55 of Figure 1 in the Jenne patent application. And they ignored that the description describing that the user had to go on-line. That’s how the Jenne patent application worked back in 2001!
Not only did the PTAB judges totally not seem to understand why the Jenne patent application required user assistance, but they also completely ignored secondary evidence (multiple marketing declarations filed and a copying declaration) all in the file wrapper. They also completely ignored that the Microsoft and Google Petitioners had violated the Sotera agreement they used to institute the IPRs and did not address it in the final written decision.
Please everyone stop assuming that PTAB judges are always smarter than USPTO examiners. That is not the case. It’s nonsense. I hope the new director of the USPTO suppports the patent examiner over the PTAB judges if a case clearly shows that the patent examiner is smarter than the PTAB judges decision and that the patents actually are very high quality. I am appealing the PTAB judges decision. Wish me luck.
Yes, I am saying it. Many of the patents coming out of the USPTO are actually high quality. Don’t let some PTAB judge tell you otherwise.
Anon
June 26, 2025 07:13 pmNo mike, not from Canada, and not “trying to get the last word.”
At all.
In case this has not dawned on you, I am trying to engage with you and obtain information from you.
You seem to not want to engage.
Why would that be?
mike
June 26, 2025 04:59 pmSo Anon (perhaps from Canada) is still seeking the last word.
Gonna sprinkle some more of this delicious salt on these perfectly popped kernels.
Anon
June 26, 2025 04:45 pmmike,
Without more, your munching illuminates nothing.
Maybe provide an actual point, eh?
mike
June 26, 2025 03:15 pmF22strike also gets it.
[nom nom nom] This popcorn is goooood. [nom nom nom]
Anon
June 26, 2025 02:10 pmmike,
“Again, misreading my words Anon. And you’re wrong. I’ll let you figure it out, lest I be misinterpreted again.”
How about you share just what you think that I have misinterpreted.
Re-reading the exchange, there is no error in what I have written.
F22strike
June 26, 2025 10:34 amThe APJs of the PTAB are greatly incentivized to grant IPR petitions to maintain the PTAB’s workload and their own lucrative employment. In addition, they are aware of the substantial fee revenue that IPR proceedings generate for the USPTO. The APJs are also incentivized to cancel claims in IPR decisions to induce more accused infringers to file IPR petitions. They know that even if their decisions are appealed, the CAFC will affirm in a Rule 36 “decision” in a significant percentage of such appeals due to the anti-patent bias of the CAFC. Moreover, APJs face no personal monetary or adverse government career consequences if their decisions to cancel patent claims are overturned by the CAFC. I doubt that the USPTO Director could legally set an artificial limit on the number of IPR petitions that are granted.
The USPTO has a huge conflict of interest. Each year it receives billions of dollars in fees to both issue patents and cancel patent claims. Adding insult to injury, none of the USPTO’s patent fees that have been paid, including maintenance fees, are refundable when there is a final legal determination that patent claims were supposedly erroneously allowed.
Big-Tech lobbied Congress to pass the AIA that created IPRs. It is happy with the outcome that allows it to pursue the efficient infringement model. Under that model valuable patented technology of others is freely commercialized by Big-Tech without licensing the same. This is because is less expensive to litigate, companies will rarely, if ever, be enjoined, and they only face reasonable royalty damages in a worst case scenario. Big-Tech knows that there at least an 80% chance that an IPR petition will result in the cancellation of the troublesome patent claims.
Most US patents are worthless due to the following:
1) removal of the presumption of validity;
2) elimination of the clear and convincing evidentiary burden to prove invalidity of a patent claim;
3) allowance of serial IPR petitions (e.g., at least 17 in the case of Caltech’s WiFi patents);
4) no requirement for standing to file an IPR petition; and
5) the near impossibility of obtaining injunctive relief due to the eBay decision by the SCOTUS.
mike
June 26, 2025 10:27 amSchreiner gets it.
Again, misreading my words Anon. And you’re wrong. I’ll let you figure it out, lest I be misinterpreted again.
You troll these comments so hard to prove everyone wrong (even when they agree with you) and to get in the last word that you misread their words. You can’t resist.
Lord Anon … of the comments section … of a website. Sad.
Grabbing my popcorn.
Stephen Schreiner
June 26, 2025 09:48 amNice article, Clint. A comprehensive dive and good explication of why the cost/benefit analysis tells us that examiners should not spend 150 hrs for each application.
The presumption of validity does not apply in IPRs–but it should. Justice Gorsuch was correct in SAS that IPRs are more like litigation than an extension of prosecution. Indeed, IPRs were designed to be an alternative to litigation under the AIA. Just as in district court, the patent should not be invalidated unless the petitioner proves it to a clear and convincing evidentiary standard.
Of course, that change would require the help of Congress.
Anon
June 26, 2025 09:42 amMr. Zall,
That sounds rather European.
Michael Zall
June 26, 2025 06:07 amI am of the opinion that examination should only deal with novelty and formalities. If someone wants to assert their patent, defend it in litigation, or even license the invention, they would be permitted to go back to the USPTO and the patent examined on the obviousness issue, with amendments permitted. ‘Obviously” the procedure needs to be worked out, but very few patents are challenged, litigated or even asserted in the real world. Why waste all this time and money in determining the patentability of an invention when no one raises the issue.
Anon
June 25, 2025 05:39 pm“ but I would also say that this presumption was removed upon passage of the AIA and it’s application.”
That would be incorrect. The AIA did not touch – nor even indicate – that section of law to be changed.
The grant of a patent very much still includes those aspects in the bundle of legal rights.
mike
June 25, 2025 04:42 pmAnon,
>> the reasoning must be for the explicit combination as opposed to any ‘reasoning’ of advantage that any single piece of art provides all on its own.
Do note that I said “Reasoning to combine prior art references…”. I didn’t say “Any ‘reasoning’…”.
>> the presumption of validity (both presence and level) ARE REMOVED from the bundle of property rights of a granted patent — AT — the institution decision point, prior to any actual adjudication on the merits.
Also agree, but I would also say that this presumption was removed upon passage of the AIA and it’s application.
Anon
June 25, 2025 03:14 pmmike,
“Reasoning to combine prior art references must be spelled out in the prior art. Otherwise, it’s just speculation. The evidentiary burden should be higher, especially considering that the public expects that a patent is presumed valid following its examination and issuance from the USPTO, and the integrity and trust of the USPTO is at stake”
Yes and no — but the distinction that I would draw to is that the reasoning must be for the explicit combination as opposed to any ‘reasoning’ of advantage that any single piece of art provides all on its own.
One is simply not as likely to find prior art that spells out combinations within the prior art. That confuses novelty and obviousness, as if the prior art frankly discusses any such combination of features, than that prior art would be available for the combination of features – being a novelty item as opposed to being an obviousness item.
The larger issue though is that combinations are “reasoned” merely on a piece-part advantage. This is legal error and enlarges the obviousness inquiry to be basically “being obvious to combine ANYTHING that has any value individually” and that is not the proper test.
Anon
June 25, 2025 02:52 pmOK Clint, I have seen your inputs now across several instance of IPWatchdog vehicles, and have a few comments.
First, I appreciate the fact that you are getting involved, rolling up your sleeves as it were, and actually discussing things.
That should always be encouraged (Heavens knows that having actual engagements on the merits of issues is beyond difficult, given the tendencies of people to step up on their soapboxes, give their spiel, and then disappear).
As for ‘screaming truth,’ though you have some hits and misses here.
I get the overall thrust of your view to be one of dispelling the notion that ‘Exacting Quality‘ is an absolute requirement to be expected from the patent examination process.
Others have written on how to gauge some rational basis for whatever level of examination quality that is – or should be – expected.
And certainly, any such level of examination quality should also account for both Type I and Type II errors (not a part of this writing, but clearly any aspect of Reject Reject Reject as being ‘the’ quality indicator should be severely beaten down. Far too many people have that view (and this ‘far’ includes a vast majority of ‘lifers’ within the Patent Office).
That being said though, there is — and again, should be — an expectation that a patent granted after examination has been examined under the law.
I wholesale reject your notion tying quality of examination to the internal management aspect of time spent by an examiner for examining any one application. The proper amount of time is whatever time it actually takes per application. These are not assembly line widgets, and treating them so sets a very wrong expectation.
None of my clients pay for ‘x’ hours of examination time, and there is absolutely zero legal inclination that a patent grant ‘gets’ a certain amount of time only to be examined.
The legal authority is quite clear: 35 U.S.C. 131 Examination of application.
The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor.
Your attempt to use the internal metric as if that metric is necessarily binding on what my clients pay for is an error of the first order.
I do “get” that you may have been attempting a mere comparison of level of effort (leading to grant or leading to challenge) by different parties, but that has nothing to do with the fact that my clients expect a fully valid patent upon grant. There is no such thing as a “well, this granted patent only had ‘x’ hours, so we should expect less.”
Also along that line of thought, it is absolutely immaterial what ‘backgrounds’ examiners have, other than that they are capable of understanding the written submissions and the art to which they may use for their legal processing.
Separately, and more of a minor point, I do not agree with your cut-n-dried categories of whether or not coverage of products in the market is – or should be – determinative. Many of my clients have been advised – by me – of valuable patent coverage explicitly NOT on products in the market place, but still having substantial value to keep others away from products that are in the marketplace.
Please, let’s not fall into the “must make” trap that seems to infect the Efficient Infringers mantra.
I also have a ‘technical’ problem with your statement of, “ Such a do-over removes the presumption of validity from a valuable patent based on subjective argumentation from a highly incentivized party.”
The technicality is that the presumption of validity (both presence and level) ARE REMOVED from the bundle of property rights of a granted patent — AT — the institution decision point, prior to any actual adjudication on the merits.
This is a (legislative) taking, and not a small one. I had advised the late Ned Heller that he should have included this in his arguments on the Oil States case, and his refusal to do so still haunts the patent world.
mike
June 25, 2025 02:27 pm>> If a patent was granted years ago on a technology that is now valuable, the natural instinct is to skeptically view its inventiveness.
I’ll add: And yet, the correct instinct is to ask is to understand this question: If it were obvious and there was such value to be gained (as demonstrated by the evidence before us), then why didn’t anyone do this before? Thus, not obvious. The more financially valuable a patent, the less obvious it was to construct it. This is because it is understood that there has always, since the history of money, been a long-felt need for people to make money. Motivation to combine has always been there, so the value of a patent should be a standard factor against obviousness. More valuable = less obvious.
>> If I was redesigning the PTAB, I would start by removing the expert witnesses from PTAB trials.
Yes. Because we all know that “expert witnesses” say what they are paid to say.
>> I would also require more objective evidentiary support for proving obviousness by changing the standard for PTAB trials to the teaching, suggestion, motivation (TSM) test … the TSM test requires prior art evidence to support reasoning alleging that it would have been obvious to have combined prior art references to obtain a claimed invention. If the USPTO is taking away a patent right that has considerable value in the market, based on assertions by an aggressive and skilled advocate, the evidentiary burden should be higher than that required for a neutral patent examiner.
Agree 100%. Reasoning to combine prior art references must be spelled out in the prior art. Otherwise, it’s just speculation. The evidentiary burden should be higher, especially considering that the public expects that a patent is presumed valid following its examination and issuance from the USPTO, and the integrity and trust of the USPTO is at stake. Inventors put up houses, take out loans, and sell properties based on this trust. Investors depend on patents to invest in and create start ups and jobs. This is important to our innovation and startup economy.