Posts Tagged: "post grant proceedings"

I represent MCM Portfolio LLC, which is seeking Supreme Court review of a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upholding the constitutionality of the inter partes review (IPR) procedures created by the America Invents Act (AIA). The petition is available here. Amicus briefs in support of the petition are being filed May 31. We argue that IPR violates Article III of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power in the federal courts, and also the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees a right to a jury in civil litigation.

Don’t let the Patent Office fool you. If they wanted to offer patent owners procedural opportunities to fully and fairly engage in an amendment process for patents under review by the PTAB they could. The truth is they don’t want to offer patent owners such a full and fair opportunity to amend claims, so they don’t.

A good argument can be made that a given panel of PTAB judges will construe claims in the manner that makes most sense to them, regardless of the legal rubric they are assigned. Indeed, we can draw a direct analogy from the experience following the Supreme Court’s decision in Teva v. Sandoz on the degree of appellate deference to be accorded to a district court’s claim construction. Notwithstanding decades of anticipation surrounding that issue, there has been little practical effect on the outcomes of litigations or appeals as a result of Teva. District court judges and Federal Circuit panels still approach claim construction issues in essentially the same way they did before. It seems likely that the use of BRI versus plain and ordinary meaning in inter partes review proceedings will also turn out to be much ado about nothing.

On Monday, April 25, 2016, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, the first case in which the Supreme Court will decide issues relating to inter partes review (IPR) proceedings conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). With the oral arguments now behind us, I once again reached out to a panel of experts who are closely watching the case to ask for their reactions. Once again, I posed the question: What do you expect the Supreme Court to do in Cuozzo? This time, with the benefit of having listened to the oral arguments, the reactions and predictions of our panel of experts follows.

Perhaps the best question of the entire oral argument was asked by Chief Justice Roberts: “So why ­­should we be so wedded to the way they do business in the PTO with respect to the broadest possible construction when the ­­point is not to replicate PTO procedures? It’s supposed to take the place of district court procedures.” Gannon’s response pointed to the difference in the burden of proof between the district court (i.e., clear and convincing) and the PTAB (i.e., preponderance). Chief Justice Roberts responded, “it’s a very extraordinary animal in legal culture to have two different proceedings addressing the same question that lead to different results.” Gannon replied that there are “multiple reasons” why different results could be achieved, to which Roberts said: “there’s a problem here, and so we should accept another problem that’s presented where we don’t have to do it.”

While I would never go into business handicapping the outcome of SCOTUS deliberations, I do have an opinion about what they should do in this case, at least on the claim construction issue. Judge Newman had it exactly right in her panel dissent and her concise dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. The “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard is useful during the examination phase, ensuring that no conceivably relevant art is overlooked and that the applicant’s opportunity to amend is well informed. But it’s silly, and ultimately damaging to the system, to apply the same standard in a post-issuance process that is directed at determining exactly what issued claims mean and where amendments are seriously restricted. Just as in district court, IPRs benefit from contested advocacy about the meaning of claim terms. In that adjudicative phase there is no place for the artificial construct of “broadest reasonable interpretation” in place of “most reasonable interpretation.”

If the Supreme Court’s recent track record in patent cases is a guide to the potential outcome in this case, it seems quite likely that the Court will not simply affirm the Federal Circuit’s decision. While the Government has set out some reasonably compelling points in support of its position, I believe the Court will agree in large part with Cuozzo and the overwhelming support of the many amici in the case that have set out significant problems and negative long term consequences to the patent system if the PTO’s current approach of using BRI in IPRs is not altered. I also believe the Court will reign in the PTO with regard to its position on reviewability of the PTAB’s institution decisions. A prohibition on judicial review in this context arguably would allow a U.S. government agency to exceed its explicit statutory authority granted by Congress.

After much public comment and debate, new changes to rules for post-grant administrative trials before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) go into effect on May 2, 2016. These final rule changes, which are the second set of changes since the America Invents Act (AIA) went into effect, are the culmination of a series of PTAB listening tours and public comments to the rule change proposals published in August 2015. Among other things, the new rules are intended to address concerns that patent owners were at a disadvantage in responding to patent challenges, particularly during the pre-institution stage of a PTAB proceeding. The rule changes also introduce certification requirements for documents filed with the PTAB, confirm the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard, as well as exceptions to the BRI standard for expiring patents, and adopt an appellate-style word count limit for major briefs.

Disappointing some (i.e., Patent Owners) who were looking for a more significant changes to the rules governing inter partes review, post grant review, and/or covered business method review, on April 1, 2016, the Patent Office issued its Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. About one year earlier, the Office hinted at the possibility of more sweeping proposals for change, but many of the more major proposals were not implemented and only more incremental change was adopted. Here are the five things every Patent Owner and Petitioner must know about the new ground rules governing the most seismic change in patent law in several generations – post grant administrative trials.

Finjan Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: FNJN), the parent of wholly-owned subsidiary Finjan, Inc., announced several weeks ago that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) issued the final rulings on attempts by Symantec Corporation’s (NASDAQ: SYMC) to invalidate 8 different Finjan’s patents through inter partes review (“IPR”). In total, Symantec filed 11…

In the Introduction to the Unified Patents’ brief the following statement is made: “The phrase ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ describes the same procedure applied in both the PTO and by the courts.” That statement is unequivocally incorrect. Federal district courts do not apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of an issued claim when performing a claim construction in patent litigation. Quite the opposite, district courts narrowly interpret claims in an attempt to find a true and correct construction of the claims. The law is unequivocally clear: district courts do not apply the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. It is so axiomatic that district courts use a different standard than does the USPTO when interpreting claims it is almost difficult to figure out where to begin to unravel this falsehood.

Michelle Lee talks about transparency, but the PTO is hiding behind redacted pages and claims of privilege to deny a legitimate FOIA request from Kyle Bass. “I don’t want to be embarrassed” is not a grounds for privilege and improperly asserting privilege is not being transparent… On page 407 there’s an email to Michelle Lee with briefing materials for the BIO meeting that were prepared by BIO. Not only are the many pages of the BIO briefing materials themselves redacted, but in the email the list of what’s included is redacted. We don’t even know what’s missing. How can materials prepared by BIO and shared with Ms. Lee be privileged?

In CBM2015-00161, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) recently instituted a Covered Business Method (CBM) review on a non-business method patent with a clear and unambiguous technological aspect. This institution decision is in direct contravention of the statute, which is by its express terms prevents CBM review from anything with a technical aspect. In short, only covered business methods, which are financial related business method patents without a technological aspect, are supposed to be subject to this special form of post grant review. Even more troubling, the patent in question has been found to be directed to technological improvements by both the European Patent Office and the United States Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Nevertheless, the PTAB still instituted a CBM.

One major takeaway from this PTAB trends report is that, despite claims of high rates of patent invalidation, the reality is that many patents escape the PTAB petitioning process unscathed. To be fair, 18 percent of all PTAB trials lead to an invalidation of every claim challenged in the patent, but one-fifth of all trials are terminated because the petitioning party is denied institution. Thus, the most common result of an inter partes (IPR) or covered business method (CBM) review is that the petitioner is told that they did not make a good enough case for the challenge to progress beyond a hearing before a panel of administrative patent judges (APJs).

The question presented in the petition for certiorari in Cooper v. Lee is whether 35 U.S.C. §318(b) violates Article III of the United States Constitution, to the extent that it empowers an executive agency tribunal to assert judicial power canceling private property rights amongst private parties embroiled in a private federal dispute of a type known in the common law courts of 1789, rather than merely issue an advisory opinion as an adjunct to a trial court. This case raises a constitutional challenge to new post-grant patent proceedings.