Federal Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Pro Se Inventors’ Suit Challenging USPTO Micro-Entity Denial

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a decision today affirming the dismissal of a pro se lawsuit brought by three inventors who contested the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) refusal to grant them reduced filing fees. The CAFC found that the inventors failed to adequately plead Article III standing, as their own representations to the USPTO undermined any claim of ownership in the disputed application.

Ashlesha, Anika, and Abhijit Nesarikar are named inventors on U.S. Patent Application No. 18/069,288, filed in late December 2022. When submitting that application, the Nesarikars certified that they qualified as a “micro entity” under 35 U.S.C. § 123, a status that, at the time, entitled qualifying applicants to an 80% reduction in certain filing fees. Micro-entity status is available only to applicants who have not been named as inventors on more than four previously filed patent applications. However, applicants are not counted against that threshold for applications they were obligated to assign due to prior employment.

The USPTO notified the Nesarikars in April 2024 that their micro-entity certification appeared erroneous because they were named on at least five earlier applications. In response, the Nesarikars invoked the employment-based assignment exception, asserting they had been obligated to assign rights in earlier applications, as well as the ‘288 application itself, as a result of prior employment. Despite multiple follow-up requests from the USPTO over several months, the Nesarikars did not produce the actual assignment agreement, any contractual language, or any other supporting evidence. The USPTO ultimately refused to accept their representations as sufficient proof of micro-entity eligibility, suspended examination of the ‘288 application pending payment of the correct fees, and eventually issued a notice of abandonment in February 2025 after the Nesarikars did not pay.

The Nesarikars then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, asserting that the USPTO had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and raising claims under the Paperwork Reduction Act. They sought injunctive relief compelling the USPTO to recognize their micro-entity status. The USPTO moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that the Nesarikars’ complaint and attached exhibits, in which they repeatedly represented an obligation to assign the ‘288 application, neglected any demonstration of the ownership interest needed to establish Article III standing.

The district court agreed, and found that the Nesarikars had “failed to carry their burden that they maintained any…rights to the ‘288 application,” and dismissed the complaint without prejudice in October 2025. The Nesarikars appealed to the Federal Circuit, which unanimously affirmed.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge court, Circuit Judges Taranto, Hughes, and Cunningham held that the Nesarikars had not met their burden at the pleading stage. Since the exhibits attached to the complaint were considered part of the pleading, the court reviewed those documents alongside the complaint itself, finding that the Nesarikars’ repeated assertions of an obligation to assign the ‘288 application were important to their standing claim. The court explained that the Nesarikars had made “only conclusory statements about the nature of the supposed assignment obligation,” unsupported by any evidence and without even purporting to identify the assignment’s terms, the assignee, or when the agreement took effect or was executed.

On the question of the inventors’ presumption of ownership, the CAFC acknowledged the general principle that named inventors are presumed to own their applications, but declined to give it effect here. The Supreme Court has “recognized that unless there is an agreement to the contrary, an employer does not have rights in an invention” of an employee. That default presumption, the court reasoned, did not apply where the Nesarikars themselves had affirmatively represented, in their own words to the USPTO, that such a contrary agreement existed.

The Nesarikars also argued that ownership interests in other patent applications, or non-ownership interests such as reputational harm, could independently support standing, and ultimately the CAFC rejected both arguments. Ownership of other applications was not raised in the complaint itself, and so the district court committed no error in declining to consider it. The reputational-interest theory was not advanced until after the magistrate judge issued his report and recommendation, meaning it was forfeited. The court noted that while a concrete, reputational interest with economic consequences can support standing for an inventor seeking correction of inventorship, the Nesarikars had alleged no such concrete interest in this context.

Although the court acknowledged some doubt about whether a private right of action exists under the relevant provision and whether the USPTO’s deficiency notice even fell within the statute’s scope, it did not resolve those questions. Instead, the court found the claim failed for the same foundational reason. Without a cognizable interest in the ‘288 application, the Nesarikars could not establish a concrete injury necessary for Article III standing, as they had been subject to no independent penalty separate from the application fee dispute.

The CAFC also addressed the Nesarikars’ procedural complaints, rejecting suggestions that the district court or the magistrate judge had ignored portions of the record. On de novo review, the court reached the same conclusion, finding that “the Nesarikars’ complaint inadequately alleges their Article III standing to sue, so dismissal was warranted.” The dismissal was without prejudice, preserving the possibility of refiling if the Nesarikars can plead their ownership interest with sufficient specificity.