Federal Circuit Affirms 101 Dismissal for Google in Distracted Driving Patent Suit

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a decision today in TJTM Technologies, LLC v. Google LLC, affirming the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California’s dismissal of a patent infringement lawsuit and holding that the asserted patent claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The nonprecedential decision was authored by Judge Chen and joined by Judges Dyk and Stark.

TJTM Technologies, LLC owns U.S. Patent No. 8,958,853, which is directed to a mobile device that can suppress incoming notifications, such as calls, texts, and emails, when placed in an “inactive mode,” while automatically transmitting an away message to the sender. The patent describes a scenario in which the inactive mode is automatically triggered when the phone pairs with a vehicle, which effectively functions as a hands-free and do-not-disturb feature to prevent distracted driving.

TJTM filed a  February 2024 complaint alleging that certain distracted driving prevention features built into Google Android phones infringed the ‘853 patent. Google moved to dismiss, and the district court applied the two-step framework established in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank International. Under Alice step one, the district court found that representative claim 1 was directed to the abstract idea of “screening notifications.” The court granted TJTM leave to amend its pleadings to address Alice’s step two but concluded that an amendment as to step one would be futile.

A first amended complaint followed in September 2024, and after revisiting its step two analysis, the district court agreed with Google that each component recited in claim 1 was generic, well-known, and combined in a conventional fashion. The court dismissed TJTM’s infringement action, and TJTM timely appealed.

On appeal, TJTM argued the district court erred in its step one analysis, contending that mobile devices in normal operation can contribute to distracted driving and that the patent addressed this technological problem with a technological solution. TJTM drew comparisons to Contour IP Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc., and similar Federal Circuit decisions where claims directed to a technological solution to a technological problem were found eligible, however the CAFC was unpersuaded.

Writing for the court, Judge Chen observed that claim 1 describes a different mode of operation for a mobile phone without reciting any change to the underlying mobile phone technology itself. While the claimed invention may benefit a user by automatically entering an inactive mode, the court held that “that extra user benefit alone does not amount to a ‘technological improvement’ under our precedent.” The CAFC distinguished the ‘853 patent from cases such as Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., where the claimed invention was directed to a specific structural improvement to computer functionality. TJTM’s claims, the court concluded, went no further than adding a communication-suppression function to an otherwise conventional phone, placing them squarely in abstract idea territory.

Turning to Alice step two, TJTM contended the district court incorrectly found that the specific sequence of claim limitations was ordered in a conventional fashion. TJTM argued that its particular combination of steps, placing a device in inactive mode, detecting an incoming communication, suppressing a notification, and transmitting an away message, constituted a non-routine and inventive concept. The CAFC disagreed, agreeing in full with the district court’s analysis.

The court found that TJTM’s step two arguments amounted to nothing more than conclusory assertions. Citing Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc. the CAFC noted that conclusory allegations regarding a patent claim’s inventive concept are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the sequence of steps described in the patent is “a description of the abstract idea of suppressing notifications on a cell phone,” and that “merely applying an abstract idea to a ‘particular technological environment’…[i]s not enough to transform the underlying idea into something patent eligible.”

In a footnote, the court observed that at oral argument, TJTM effectively conceded that vehicle-to-phone pairing was not an inventive aspect of the patent. Although TJTM’s briefs had pointed to that pairing functionality as a potential inventive concept under step two, counsel agreed during argument that methods of pairing were known in the field and were not a necessary part of the asserted claim. The CAFC thus agreed that the claims are directed to an abstract idea and lack an inventive concept, and affirmed the dismissal of TJTM’s infringement action against Google.

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