“To date, a direct Jarkesy challenge in the context of an ITC enforcement action has yet to materialize….But the arguments are there, and the constitutional groundwork has been laid.”
Practitioners in the high-stakes world of the International Trade Commission (ITC) are familiar with the formidable power of a Section 337 remedial order. The threat of a cease-and-desist order, backed by civil penalties of up to $100,000 a day or twice the value of imported goods, is a powerful deterrent. For years, the process for enforcing these penalties has been a settled feature of ITC practice. But a recent Supreme Court decision, Jarkesy v. SEC, has introduced a new constitutional question that ITC litigators might want to watch out for.
The Question
The question is this: Does a respondent facing civil penalties in an ITC enforcement action have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial?
For respondents, this poses more than an academic exercise. The Supreme Court’s holding in Jarkesy—that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) in-house adjudication of civil fraud penalties violated the Seventh Amendment—provides a new arrow in the quiver for challenging the Commission’s enforcement authority. At first blush, the parallel is compelling: an administrative agency, through an internal proceeding, is assessing significant monetary penalties. This feels precisely like the scenario the Supreme Court just addressed.
However, as with all things at the ITC, the analysis isn’t that simple. Before we rush to file motions, we must consider the ITC’s powerful counterargument: the public rights doctrine.
The Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial for “suits at common law” has long been understood not to apply to disputes involving “public rights”—that is, rights between the government and private individuals. The ITC’s entire mandate is rooted in regulating international trade, a function historically understood as a core sovereign power. As was noted in the Jarkesy opinion itself, proceedings before customs—the ITC’s close cousin in the trade regulation sphere—are a classic example of a public rights matter where a jury trial was never required at common law. The Commission’s argument will be that an enforcement action to protect the U.S. market from unfair trade practices is a quintessential public rights dispute, placing it squarely outside the scope of Jarkesy.
For the vast majority of ITC cases, which are patent-based, this defense becomes even stronger. The Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States Energy Services—the case that upheld the constitutionality of IPR proceedings—explicitly characterized patents not as private property, but as a “public franchise.” If the underlying right being adjudicated is a public right, then an action to enforce an order based on that right is almost certainly a public rights matter as well. For any respondent accused of violating a cease-and-desist order in a patent case, a Jarkesy challenge will be an uphill battle.
Beyond Patents
But what about the ITC’s non-patent jurisdiction? Consider an enforcement action stemming from the misappropriation of trade secrets or the infringement of a common law trademark. These causes of action don’t originate from a government-issued “public franchise” like a patent. They are classic common law claims, pitting one private party against another to remedy a private wrong. An argument could be made that when the ITC adjudicates civil penalties for violating an order in a trade secret case, it is acting in a capacity much closer to that of a common law court. In such a case, a respondent might have a far more compelling argument that the right being adjudicated is private, and thus the assessment of penalties requires the verdict of a jury.
A Tool to Consider
To date, a direct Jarkesy challenge in the context of an ITC enforcement action has yet to materialize. Given that such proceedings are rare, it may be some time before we see a test case. But the arguments are there, and the constitutional groundwork has been laid. While the public rights doctrine will provide a robust shield for the Commission, particularly in patent cases, its defense may be less certain in the context of common law unfair competition claims. For now, it’s a tool for ITC practitioners to keep in their back pocket.
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4 comments so far.
Anon
November 26, 2025 10:41 amThanks Joseph,
Food for thought (read that as I have not validated this), but Google AI responds to a prompt asking about the difference between a legislative court and a constitutional court as (my emphasis added):
Constitutional courts (Article III) exercise the full judicial power of the United States, while legislative courts (Article I) are specialized tribunals created by Congress to handle specific, non-traditional judicial functions. The primary differences concern their foundation, the tenure and protections of their judges, and their jurisdiction.
Establishment & Authority: Constitutional courts are established under Article III of the U.S. Constitution (e.g., Supreme Court, District Courts, Courts of Appeals). Legislative courts are established by Congress under its Article I legislative powers.
Judicial Tenure & Protections: Judges in constitutional courts have lifetime appointments (serving “during good behavior”) and their salaries cannot be reduced by Congress, ensuring independence from political pressure. Judges in legislative courts serve for fixed terms set by statute (e.g., 12 or 15 years) and lack salary protection, making them less independent.
Jurisdiction & Function: Constitutional courts have broad jurisdiction over all cases and controversies arising under the Constitution and federal law, and they can exercise full judicial review. Legislative courts have limited, specialized jurisdiction over “public rights” or specific administrative matters, such as tax disputes (U.S. Tax Court) or claims against the government (U.S. Court of Federal Claims). Their decisions are often subject to review by a constitutional court.
Thing is, there is a clear difference before grant and after grant. This distinction was obscured in the Oil States case – and then counsel Ned Heller, for whatever reason, refused to understand and stress this, even after repeated admonitions from me that he was missing this critical factor.
The result is that we have ‘bad law.’
Joseph Rios
November 25, 2025 01:09 pmOil States Energy Services states in relevant part:
“the grant of a patent involves a matter “arising between the government and others.” Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451, 49 S.Ct. 411.”
It is worth noting that the court only spoke on IPRs as an extension of then grant procedure and thus fell under the public rights doctrine. It did not state that all patent actions are matters of the public rights doctrine, only the granting of patents.
For further discussion, see section III of the case.
Anon
November 21, 2025 08:40 am…by the way, a surface view into property yields that personal is viewed as comprising tangible and intangible movable property, distinguished from real estate (and certain items affixed thereon).
As opposed to private, which is contrasted with public, and this legal set is based on ownership.
Note that this is not merely ‘interest in effects,” which appears to have ‘informed’ (misinformed) the Oil States case.
Note as well that any patent, ever meant to be fully alienable, clearly is (as a universal baseline) untethered to the owner. At no time in US history, have the substantive rights of the bundle of rights of a granted patent been dependent on who the (transitory) owner might be.
Anon
November 19, 2025 01:51 pmThis:
“For the vast majority of ITC cases, which are patent-based, this defense becomes even stronger. The Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States Energy Services—the case that upheld the constitutionality of IPR proceedings—explicitly characterized patents not as private property, but as a ‘public franchise.’”
Draws to mind the question of what is a distinction between personal property and private property.
As Greg DeLassus explained in conversations after Oil States, the ‘public franchise’ aspect is still a form of personal property.