Posts Tagged: "standard essential patents"

Unlike other technologies (e.g. User interface) where the manufacturers have a choice to design around the technology of the patent, in case of SEPs, there is no possible way to avoid infringement and still comply with the standard. On the other hand, non-compliance with standard is a commercially non-viable option. This situation gives the SEPs holders a great leverage to assert their licensing terms. While there have been several cases and rulings in favor of SEP licensees that put some restrictions on the SEP holders regarding their FRAND licensing commitments as well as their abilities to exercise an injunction for infringement of SEPs, lack of clarity on FRAND terms still make the negotiations tough for a potential SEP licensee.

How can a patent that is deemed essential for a standard not be infringed in a product that implements that standard? One possible explanation could be that the claim of essentiality is incorrect. That’s why it is important to document essentiality with a claim chart and ask an independent expert to verify that infringement of the patent claim is prescribed by the standard. But an independent verification is still no guarantee that court will agree that such a patent is really infringed by a product. Another explanation is that the patent is essential for an option in the standard and that the product does not implement this particular option. Most technical specifications of interface standards have options, describing alternative methods to implement the standard. Manufacturers can choose one of the options and will not infringe patents that are essential for implementing another option.

When a standard faces competition, it is essential to be the first on the market with products and to establish the highest market share. The network effect will make it increasingly difficult for competing standards to get a foothold. Two competing standards will, therefore, be under pressure to gain market share in the early stages of adoption by getting to market first, with superior performance, and with the lowest price. In view of the network effect, getting to market first is usually the highest priority. But in the early stages of adoption, being a little bit later with superior performance is still viable.

The best patents are those that multiply an investment and actually generate money on their own… Standards essential patents are the holy grail of patents in today’s business landscape. Most startups are focused on getting a product to market quickly, getting validation, and starting a revenue stream. Once there, the startups begin to scale. If there is any chance that a startup’s technology – even a piece of it – could be incorporated into an industry standard, the patent needs to be investment-grade. In these situations, multiple patents would also be a good investment.

The debate on RAND terms and conditions is mostly about the reasonability of the royalty rate, less about non-discriminatory part. So, what is a “reasonable rate”? Companies that manufacture products based on a standard will demand lower rates or royalty-free licenses, claim harm from patent hold-ups and from royalty stacking. These companies will argue that it is unfair when companies that contribute technology to the standard benefit from the lock-in of the standard because it is now unavoidable to use the essential patents in their products. On the other hand, companies that participated in standards development, and own essential patents because of that investment, claim that lower royalty rates will remove the incentives for future investments in standard setting and will stifle innovation. In the confusion generated by these lobbying interest groups, it makes sense to go back to the one thing everyone seems to agree on: Standards are good.

This year our panel of industry insiders is quite diverse, with commentary from Bob Stoll (Drinker Biddle), Ashley Keller (Gerchen Keller), Paul Morinville (US Inventor), Alden Abbot (Heritage Foundation), Marla Grossman (American Continental Group) and Steve Kunin (Oblon). Unlike last year where there was near unanimous agreement that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice v. CLS Bank was the biggest moment of the year, this year our panel of industry experts focused on a variety of different matters. There was one recurring theme, however. The inability of patent reform to advance on Capitol Hill was undoubtedly one of the biggest stories of the year.

Both Korea and China are major players on the global patent stage, and the leading companies of these countries file and obtain thousands of patents annually. But it seems increasingly clear that the governments of these countries are attempting to support their domestic companies via antitrust enforcement to lower the price of access to patented technologies of foreign competitors.

It is important to emphasize that we are not claiming that the patent system as currently defined cannot be improved. Rather, we offer evidence on two interrelated predictions of the SEP hold-up hypothesis. First, if SEPs are holding up innovation, then products that are highly reliant upon SEPs should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than similar non-SEP-reliant products. Second, if SEPs are holding-up innovation, then changes in the legal system (eBay) that weaken the excessive negotiating strength of SEP holders should accelerate reductions in quality-adjusted prices in SEP-reliant industries relative to non-SEP-reliant industries. We find no evidence for either prediction.