Posts Tagged: "Patent Licensing"

The true agenda of those who support further reform of the U.S. patent system is as follows: to discriminate against entities which license technologies instead of manufacture; to increase the costs of asserting patent rights to the detriment of individuals and startups; and to stilt the conversations surrounding tech licensing in favor of the infringer bringing a product to market. “If you trip over our patent, you’re a thief. If we trip over your patent, you’re a troll,” Giancarlo said… “Let’s call patent reform for what it is: a blatant economic and power grab by tech firms to infringe on technology created by others,” Giancarlo said. In his opinion, the true trolls are the entities trolling Congress to get a competitive advantage over smaller entities.

On April 20, 2017, a group of auto and technology companies sent a letter to President Trump urging him to direct the Federal Trade Commission and other U.S. agencies to do something “to address patent abuse involving standardized technologies,” which the letter goes on to explain are vital to the “nation’s innovation and economic development.”… So what is going on that has these companies all hot and bothered? It is a contract issue, nothing more. It is merely paraded around as patent abuse in an attempt to both deceive, and to make it more likely the government will want to step in and tip the balance with an agency finger on the scale. After all, if it were a private contract matter it would be much more difficult to get the federal government to pick a side. So the decision is made to grossly misrepresent the heart of the problem and pretend it is something that it is not.

On March 3rd, Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson publicly announced its fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions for the licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs) for 5th Generation New Radio (5G/NR) as standardized by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The decision to announce these terms publicly may be an indication that Ericsson is looking to avoid the fate of other mobile wireless chip makers, which have come under fire in recent months for their own licensing practices.

Given the complexity of many technologies, the rapidly changing nature of global markets, and the legal complexities in establishing worldwide licensing programs, it should come as no surprise that IP licensing offers benefits. When this work succeeds, everyone benefits – from innovators and IP owners to the general population as companies around the world gain greater access to new and improved technologies. To avoid missing out on the tremendous rewards and benefits of innovation, we must take full advantage of R&D’s potential in the complex and fast-paced markets of today that offer up opportunities to aggregate and license technologies in new sectors, geographical areas and markets.

The springing license does offer at least some protection in the future against patent aggregators looking to monetize IP assets, but it wouldn’t stop any party, including an actual patent troll, from sending a demand letter asserting rights to a patent outside of the Azure IP Advantage portfolio. But, how those in the program can be use one of Microsoft’s patents to defend against a patent troll seems rather questionable. By definition a patent gives the owner the right to do nothing other than exclude. So even if you have lawfully acquired rights through the owner you’ve acquired no affirmative rights, just a promise from the owner that they won’t exclude you from what it is that you are doing. Therefore, you cannot defend a patent litigation against a patent troll or any patent owner by pointing to a patent you have rights to use because that isn’t how a patent works.

Activist Supreme Court decisions in the last decade have been principally responsible for these changes, stimulated by aggressive technology company incumbent lobbying. The combination of these decisions has had a far greater effect on the patent system and the economy than the Court originally intended. The U.S. is now in a compulsory licensing regime in which large technology incumbents that control at least 80% of collective market share employ an “efficient infringement” model of ignoring patents and forcing patent holders to enforce patent rights in the courts.

The fine on Qualcomm is for allegedly refusing to license standard essential patents to competing companies on fair and reasonable terms. According to the Korean authorities, Qualcomm’s actions amounted to coercion for the purpose of strengthening its monopolistic power in the patent license market and chipset market… Not surprisingly, Qualcomm vehemently disagrees with the assertions made in the press release, has pointed out that a final written decision is not generally expected after an announcement like this for another 4 to 6 months, and promises to aggressively appeal… Rosenberg explained that Qualcomm was repeatedly denied access to documents and the right question witnesses, rights that are guaranteed to U.S. companies under the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

What is the best way to assess the potential value or use of a patent portfolio? Before we examine this, it’s important to clarify that a patent only has value in the context of its place in a portfolio and in how the portfolio is used to support the organization’s business strategy. Let’s look at two examples. A Patent Assertion Entity will evaluate patent value based solely on the potential revenue that will come from a licensing program. On the other hand, an operating company typically places a higher value on patents that provide protection. This can be the ability to defend leadership in a profitable market category or the ability to offer protection as a sole-sourced product’s revenue stream.

Anyone who has followed recent developments in the U.S. patent landscape, however, might note something interesting occurring in this particular case. According to the recent patent assertion entity (PAE) report put out by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Network-1’s business activities would seem to put it in the category of what the FTC calls a “litigation PAE.”… Unfortunately for the FTC, Network-1’s license agreement with Polycom is horribly inconsistent with the agency’s findings on the exact business model that Network-1 seems to employ.

Why should the costs of the tortfeasing infringer be relevant in determining whether the extracted value from a settlement is fair? The fact that law firms charge a lot of money to defend patent infringement cases, and don’t particularly have any incentive to settle cases early, somehow translates into certain settlements being for nuisance value without any consideration of whether the settlement is a fair value for the rights trampled upon by the infringer? The FTC has quite a lot of explaining to do, because it seems they picked an arbitrary number that is a function of what attorneys ordinarily charge infringing defendants through discovery. I don’t see how that is a function of the value of the innovation, or how it says anything about the merits of the infringement case, the damages case, or the tactics of the patent owner. In fact, it seems as if the $300,000 figure is completely irrelevant.

Another incursion into research university governance and operations is now underway. And this time all research universities are affected. Led by the DC Based Electronic Frontier Foundation, a leftist anti-patent activist coalition that has initiated a 50-state legislative campaign to shrink research university patent licensing rights at the state level. (See) The measure’s purported objective is to prevent publicly funded university research patents from being licensed to so-called “Patent Assertion Entities” (PAEs, also known by the pejorative term “patent trolls”). The draft legislation is imprecise, making it even more dangerous than first appears.

The validity of secondary markets for a variety of goods and services is never questioned. Securities are sold and resold many times after their initial offering, homes and buildings and built and resold many times, as are automobiles. A quick review of the products listed an eBay leaves little doubt that a robust secondary market exists for many goods and services across the American economy. However, not everyone is in agreement that a secondary patent market is beneficial. For some reason, many people villainize companies that practice patent licensing. Even resorting to the use of pejorative terms such as “patent troll” to describe these businesses. These detractors fail to account for the fact that inventors may not be the most efficient licensors. In addition, they don’t take into account that, just as a builder generates revenue to build more buildings by selling their current ones, companies that sell or license patents help fund further R&D with the proceeds.

What causes operating companies to sell their patents? Our intuition tells us that patent sales take place when the seller is in financial distress or the company is underperforming. We asked ourselves whether data aligned with our intuition… 71% of the sales occurred when the seller underperformed the overall market by more than 5 percentage points.

The IP Licensing Guidelines, which state the agencies’ antitrust enforcement policy with respect to the licensing of intellectual property protected by patent, copyright, and trade secret law and of know-how, were issued in 1995 and are now being updated. In the agencies’ view, the IP Licensing Guidelines remain soundly grounded, as a matter of antitrust law and economics. Nevertheless, the agencies have determined that some revisions are in order because the IP Licensing Guidelines should accurately reflect intervening changes in statutory and case law.

The focus of the political advocates pushing march-in may be lower drug costs. But the long-term costs of ripping apart IP rights are far higher and more fundamental than advocates acknowledge. The long-term price of exercising these exceptional prerogatives could include creating a crisis in confidence over use of federally funded research discoveries, dried-up private investments where basic research has federally funded fingerprints, hesitation to commercialize university research, and a corresponding drop in start-ups, new products, economic development and technological advancements. March-in could effectively repeal Bayh-Dole.