Posts in Patents

The American system of justice is built upon transparency. Transparency is mandatory for there to be a truly fair, balanced, open, honest and equal system where no party has a real or perceived advantage over the other… If the PTAB is going to operate without even a modicum of transparency there is no reason why spoliation of evidence presumptions should not apply to their unexplained actions. The most egregious and nefarious inference should be drawn given the history of this overreaching tribunal. After all, even the Supreme Court has noticed what they have referred to as the “shenanigans” of the Board.

The Federal Circuit, however, found the district court’s enforceability finding to be unsupported by evidence. The rejection of Nokia’s proposal did not obviate Nokia’s requirement to disclose inventions that might be essential to the standard. Dr. Walker’s uncontroverted testimony explained that patent applications are to be disclosed at the time proposals are presented. “[A]n ETSI member’s duty to disclose a patent application on particular technology attaches at the time of the proposal and is not contingent on ETSI ultimately deciding to include that technology in an ETSI standard,” Bryson explained. Notwithstanding, the Federal Circuit elected to vacate this ruling rather than electing to reverse the district court because the existence of an implied waiver is an equitable defense.

In order to establish that the commercial success factor supports a non-obviousness finding, the patentee must establish that a connection (or nexus) exists between the novel aspects of the patent claim(s) and the alleged commercial success. Id.; WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In other words, the patentee must show that the novel aspects of the claim(s) are driving sales and not aspects of the claim(s) that were known in the prior art. In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2011); WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1330. In cases brought pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, while there are exceptions, it is most common that patent challengers’ arguments focus predominantly or entirely on an alleged lack of nexus given the substantial sales typically enjoyed by the brand-name drug products that are the subject of such litigation. Though it bears noting that the mere fact that a company is pursuing a generic version of a brand-name drug, by itself, does not support a “commercial success” finding. Galderma Labs., Inc. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 737, 740 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

After dissenting APJ James Arpin was mysteriously and without explanation removed from the case, replaced by APJ Thomas Giannetti. Perhaps there is an innocent explanation for what happened here, but in the secretive, backroom world of the PTAB innocent explanations are becoming harder and harder to envision. And, frankly, given how the PTAB has run amok for so long the tribunal has lost any legitimate claim to the benefit of doubt. If there is nothing nefarious going on, then why is it that the patent owner always seems to be on the wrong end of these procedural irregularities? Why is it that the invisible hand of the PTAB always winds up on the side of the scale that takes patent rights away?

Narrowly construing the § 101 eligibility exception for abstract ideas is not only suggested by Supreme Court guidance, but also could potentially allow for increased coherence and consistency while simultaneously serving to solicit further Supreme Court guidance on eligibility. Even if the bright-line eligibility prohibition is construed narrowly, § 101 can still serve to police claiming at a level of abstraction that results in overbroad claiming.

The focus of the appeal is the need for clarity with respect to hopelessly irreconcilable caselaw on the issue of single reference obviousness… Decisions from the Federal Circuit have created an irreconcilable split within the Federal Circuit itself regarding the proper approach to obviousness determinations, American Vehicular Sciences argues. Indeed, many commentators (ourselves included) have noticed that now more than ever on a variety of issues the outcome of a decision at the Federal Circuit is completely dependent on the panel assigned to the case. While that has been a criticism of the Federal Circuit for some time, it increasingly seems outcomes are arbitrary, capricious and wholly unpredictable— at least until you know who the judges are who will decide the case.

The University of California (“UC”) and The Broad Institute, Inc. (“Broad”) are among the leaders in the development of CRISPR technology.  Both UC and Broad filed patent applications for claims broadly drawn to CRISPR-Cas9 systems and methods of DNA editing.  These parties are currently engaged in litigation over patents concerning the potentially most lucrative application of CRISPR technology – the use of CRISPR-Cas9 in plant and animal (eukaryotic) cells.  The outcome of this litigation will affect control of the CRISPR platform and development of the technology.

I note that the ‘911 patent claims are novel and inventive because they are directed to never before made liquid formulations of highly enriched extracts of plant cannabinoids. While I believe all thirty-six claims of the ‘911 patent are valid and enforceable, as did the patent examiner who issued the patent, the number and breadth of our claims gives United Cannabis safety in numbers if and when it should become necessary to defend our rights.

On Wednesday, August 15th, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc. which upheld a decision by the district court to invalidate patent claims owned by BSG Tech as patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Jimmie Reyna, Evan Wallach and Todd Hughes found that the district court correctly determined that patent claim asserted by BSG Tech were invalid as abstract ideas lacking any inventive step under the Alice/Mayo framework… The only allegedly unconventional feature of BSG Tech’s claims was the requirement that users are guided by summary comparison usage information, which was simply a restatement of the abstract idea identified under the first step of Alice/Mayo

It is no secret to anyone in the industry; the unauthorized practice of law is rampant, and OED does nothing to stop it… If charging dues to patent practitioners will allow OED to put an end to the unauthorized practice of law many, if not most, practitioners would undoubtedly support the initiative. If OED plans to continue with a docket full of reciprocal discipline and only enforce ethics rules against registered practitioners, practitioners should loudly protest the imposition of annual dues.

It seems clear that the Supreme Court did not intend to categorically prohibit patenting of everything which can be characterized as an abstract idea at some level because the Court indicated that there are at least some abstract ideas that are sufficient to confer patent eligibility: namely, inventive concepts.  The Court’s bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature and mathematical formulas clearly was not intended to categorically prohibit patenting of everything which can be characterized as an abstract idea because such a bright-line extension would bar patenting of inventive concepts, which by definition are capable of characterization as abstract ideas but which the Court explicitly acknowledged are sufficient to signal eligibility.

MPEP 2141 actually cites to Arendi, but then quotes the case entirely out of context. This is a worrisome problem that can be found in many parts of the MPEP, which makes the MPEP a useful reference tool to find relevant cases, but as useful as an opponent’s brief when it comes to accurately characterizing the holdings of decisions. For example, MPEP 2141 actually cites Arendi for the proposition that common sense can be used to supply a missing limitation from the prior art in an obviousness rejection. That, however, is the exact opposite proposition for which the case actually stands.

There is an alternative route is available to stay true to Supreme Court eligibility jurisprudence: Apply the Supreme Court’s standard approach of narrowly construing statutory exceptions to narrowly construe the implicit statutory exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101 for abstract ideas… In accordance with Supreme Court guidance regarding construction of statutory exceptions, the implicit statutory exception for abstract ideas should be construed “narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision” of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739 (citing Phillips, 324 U. S. at 493).  To do otherwise would risk “frustrat[ing] the announced will of the people.” Phillips, 324 U. S. at 493.

Writing a patent application is not as easy as many think. Indeed, the concept of usefully describing the invention, which on its face seems easy enough to understand, is not as straight forward as it might seem, and why you cannot simply file an abbreviate description of an invention and think that suffices to protect anything really. This article looks at the most common parts of a patent application, and provides discussion about what each section needs to include.

British patent data insights firm Cipher recently released an IP strategy report that provides a look at how many firms are patenting technologies in the hopes of disrupting various industry sectors. Among the various highlights of the report include a look at fintech patents, which shows that tech companies and not banks are leading the way in obtaining patents that cover the future of banking.