Posts in Courts

At the beginning of this decade the United States Supreme Court embarked on a path that would ultimately result in a significant re-writing of the law of patent eligibility in America. While this Supreme Court first became intrigued with patent eligibility in Bilski v. Kappos in 2010, it wasn’t until Mayo v. Prometheus (2012), AMP v. Myriad (2013) and Alice v. CLS Bank (2014) that the law became a chaotic mess that no longer resembled the well-established view of patent eligibility that dates back to at least the 1952 Patent Act… Is this Supreme Court really content with the subjective, extra-statutory test they have foisted upon the industry while changing the law? Does the Supreme Court even appreciate the chaos they have created?

REAL argued in its petition that step two of the Alice test used to determine invalidity under Section 101 requires questions of fact that were never asked by the lower court. To invalidate without asking those questions contradicts the Federal Circuit’s recent holdings in Berkheimer v. HP and Aatrix Software v. Green Shades Software. REAL’s appeal to the Federal Circuit was decided by a panel including Circuit Judges Alan Lourie, Evan Wallach and Kara Stoll, a trio where the majority has held that step two of Alice is a pure question of law, which is a misapplication of the Alice standard. REAL further contended that both the district court and the Federal Circuit disregarded the factual record in their Alice analysis; that the patents-in-suit claim patentable improvements to computer user interface technology; and that the district court found that there were material facts in dispute while also finding that the claims were well-understood, routine and conventional.

On Friday, November 2nd, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued a decision in Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., et. al. which reversed various parts of the lower court’s decision in the trademark infringement case brought by Sturgis, which claimed to own trademarks covering merchandise related to a well-known motorcycle rally which has taken place in Sturgis, SD, going back to 1938. While the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial as a matter of law to the defendants’ as to Sturgis’ claims of deceptive trade practices, false advertising and trademark infringement claims, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court’s findings that various marks asserted by Sturgis were valid because it found that Sturgis didn’t provide the jury with sufficient proof regarding validity.

An administrative law judge at the U.S. International Trade Commission recently found patent infringement in Qualcomm’s case against Apple, but then inexplicably refused to recommend that the commission issue an exclusion order against infringer Apple. Is there some new standard that “established and profitable companies” are no longer deserving of ITC action?  The International Trade Commission is in danger of causing the same harm to patent rights as the U.S. Supreme Court has inflicted on patent owners with the court’s lame-brained eBay decision.

To date the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not explicitly required district courts to conduct a formal claim construction prior to determining whether a patent claim is directed to patent eligible subject matter. How one can know whether a patent claim is directed to patent eligible or patent ineligible subject matter without a full-blown claim interpretation is a mystery. It is axiomatic that one cannot know what a claim actually covers unless and until a proper analysis is conducted. Yet, district court judges somehow know with certitude what a claim covers while doing nothing more than a facial review of the claim that would be considered a defective and reversible claim construction if done at a later stage of the proceedings when actually attempting to define the metes an bounds of the claim.

In early October, the British luxury goods brand Alfred Dunhill announced that it had secured a major victory in a long-running trademark battle in Chinese courts against a domestic menswear firm. Alfred Dunhill was awarded 10 million RMB ($1.47 million USD) by the Foshan Intermediate People’s Court, Guangdong Province, against Chinese menswear brand Danhouli for infringing upon Alfred Dunhill’s well-known…

The Alice/Mayo framework does not mandate a conclusion, it tolerates – even enables – whatever conclusion the decision maker prefers. This is allowed because of a universe of irreconcilable opinions from the Supreme Court. So bad is the situation that you can’t hope to know the likely result unless you know which precedential opinions the decision maker will apply… The constellation of the problems that lead to the demise of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test are again present, this time it is a Supreme Court test that has led us into the morass. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court cannot be depended upon to come to their collective senses. The Justices actually believe their patent jurisprudence is consistent (which it isn’t) and they seem simply incapable of appreciating the havoc they have wrought.

Some courts have characterized this final inquiry as “the hunt for the inventive concept.” That would make some logical sense if and only if a claimed invention that is novel and non-obvious would be necessarily found to have satisfied the inventive concept requirement. Alas, that is not the case. Under the ridiculously bastardized law of patent eligibility foisted upon us by the Supreme Court it is actually possible for a claimed invention to be both new and non-obvious and to somehow not exhibit an inventive concept under what is considered a proper patent eligibility analysis. Of course, it is a logical impossibility for a claimed invention to be both novel and non-obvious while simultaneously not exhibiting an inventive concept. If something is new and non-obvious it is by definition inventive. This disconnect merely demonstrates the objective absurdity of the Alice/Mayoframework.

The case will ask the highest court in the nation to determine whether the federal government is a person who may petition the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to institute patent validity review proceedings under the terms of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).

A recent Federal Circuit decision demonstrates that for priority claims and patent term, the phrase “specific reference” is key. For example, amongst three related applications, to get the benefit of priority of an earlier U.S. patent application 1, application 3 in a priority claim has to have a “specific reference” to earlier application 1. A mere priority claim in application 3 to application 2, even though application 2 specifically “incorporates by reference” application 1, is not sufficient to allow application 3 to rely on the filing date of application 1. Rather, the priority chain is broken between applications 2 and 1, leaving application 3, at best, with a priority date of application 2 for purposes of patentability… From the Federal Circuit in Droplets, practitioners are reminded that both priority claims and incorporation by reference are very specific tools that should not be relied on during prosecution without careful consideration and deliberate use. Certainly, incorporation by reference does not trump “specific reference” and may lead to a break in the priority chain for purposes of patentability.

An analysis of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated led the appellate court to find that the annotations, while not having the force of law, are part and parcel of the law. First, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Georgia General Assembly was the driving force behind the annotations in the OCGA. Although the annotations were prepared by LexisNexis, those annotations were drafted based upon highly detailed instructions contained within its publishing agreement with the Code Revision Commission, making Georgia’s legislators the creators of the annotations.

The Federal Circuit recently issued a nonprecedential decision in BASF Corporation v. Enthone, Inc. which vacated an earlier decision stemming from an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) which had upheld a patent owned by Enthone as valid over an obviousness challenge asserted by BASF. The Federal Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Timothy Dyk, Evan Wallach and Richard Taranto remanded the case to the PTAB after holding that certain findings made by the PTAB were inadequately supported or explained.

Judge Kara Stoll: ‘As somebody who has worked in patents for a long time I realize it can be very difficult for clients where you’ve invested in your intellectual property under one set of rules only to have the rules completely change and your intellectual property is then of no value or of uncertain value. And on 101 I also think it is important not to confuse Sections 102 and 103, but that said to the extend there is any need for change that would be for Congress or the Supreme Court.’

On Monday, October 22nd, U.S. District Judge J. Paul Oetken of the Southern District of New York entered an opinion and order in a trademark case brought by Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba against a group of companies operating in Dubai and Belarus involved in marketing a cryptocurrency known as AlibabaCoin. Judge Oetken’s order granted Alibaba’s motion enjoining the defendants from using Alibaba’s protected marks in the U.S., including in connection with goods and services provided over the Internet to U.S. consumers. Another motion filed by Alibaba to compel documents from the defendants was denied as moot.

The Federal Circuit recently issued a non-precedential decision in LiquidPower Specialty Products v. Baker Hughes, vacating and remanding a final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), which had invalidated claims of a LiquidPower patent in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding. In a nutshell, the Federal Circuit found there to be substantial evidence supporting PTAB determinations relating to specifically what the prior art taught, and what the prior art motivated those of skill in the art to do vis-a-vis motivation to combine. However, the panel, made up of Chief Judge Sharon Prost and Circuit Judges Todd Hughes and Kimberly Moore, determined that substantial evidence did not support the PTAB’s finding that the patent owner failed to establish a nexus between the claimed invention and objective evidence of nonobviousness, or secondary considerations as they are sometimes called.  The case is now remanded to the PTAB for proper consideration of the objective evidence of nonobviousness presented by the patent owner.