CAFC Affirms Dismissal of Pro Se Inventor’s Suit Against USPTO For Rejected Wearable Thermal Device Application

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a decision today in Sansone v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, affirming the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s dismissal of a pro se inventor’s lawsuit and denial of his motion for summary judgment.

Stanley Sansone filed U.S. Patent Application No. 16/255,511 on January 23, 2019, seeking a patent for a wearable thermal device, but a patent examiner rejected all claims. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) affirmed the rejection, after which Sansone sought continued examination. During continued examination, the examiner issued a second non-final rejection of all claims. Sansone amended the ‘511 application on January 3, 2022, but the examiner issued a second final rejection, and the PTAB again affirmed on July 19, 2023.

Sansone then filed suit against the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and its Director in the Eastern District of Virginia and subsequently filed two amended pleadings without seeking leave to amend. The district court accepted both filings, given his pro se status, treating them collectively as the operative complaints. On June 17, 2024, the USPTO moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Sansone opposed and shortly after moved for summary judgment.

The court later granted the motion to dismiss on March 4, 2025. The court construed the complaints as asserting civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985, as well as claims under various criminal statutes and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). It also interpreted the complaints to raise constitutional claims and a claim for contractual damages. The district court concluded the complaints failed to adequately state a claim for relief, denied the motion for summary judgment as premature, and dismissed the complaints without leave to amend.

On appeal, Sansone argued the USPTO’s motion to dismiss was untimely and that he was entitled to summary judgment. He claimed the Department of Justice was served on April 11, 2024, but moved to dismiss on June 1, 2024, and the CAFC rejected the argument as inconsistent with the record. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1), service in the United States requires the Attorney General and the local U.S. Attorney’s office. While the Attorney General was served on April 11, 2024, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia was not served until April 17. The 60-day deadline therefore ran from April 17 to June 16, 2024, and was extended to June 17 because June 16 was on a Sunday. The USPTO’s motion was thus timely. Since Sansone’s summary judgment motion relied solely on timeliness, the CAFC also affirmed the denial.

Sansone also argued that his references to various statutes were not meant to assert independent causes of action, but were included as “evidence that the agency’s actions were ultra vires, void, or taken without statutory authority.” His complaints, he argued, alleged “ultra vires administrative acts, violations of non-discretionary duties, and constitutional deprivations,” and the district court’s alleged mischaracterization caused it to apply incorrect legal frameworks to dismiss his allegations.

The CAFC found no reversible error in the district court’s interpretation. While courts must liberally construe pro se filings, “this does not mean, however, that courts are required to attempt to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff nor explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff that are not readily apparent from the allegations.” Since Sansone’s intent to use the cited statutes only as evidence of ultra vires conduct was not apparent from the face of the complaints, the district court’s reading was reasonable.

Moreover, the court held that any error in framing the allegations was harmless because the claims failed under any interpretation. It agreed that the cited federal criminal statutes provided no private right of action and no waiver of sovereign immunity, and it affirmed dismissal of the civil rights, FTCA, constitutional, and contractual claims.

Sansone further alleged that USPTO examiners unlawfully conspired to falsify the administrative record to reject his application. The CAFC rejected that claim, concluding that the alleged falsification consisted solely of examiners’ factual findings concerning prior art that Sansone disputed. His allegations, grounded in 35 U.S.C. Section 103, were found to rest on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” based on misunderstandings of Section 103 and patent law.

Furthermore, Sansone requested a writ of certiorari and argued that portions of the Patent Act of 1836 and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 were unconstitutional. The CAFC declined to address those arguments because Sansone had not raised them in his complaints below. Sansone also sought a writ of mandamus directing the USPTO Director to allow the ‘511 application and grant a patent with a 5.5-year extension. The court denied that request, finding Sansone “has not made the showing required to qualify for mandamus relief, which is a drastic remedy that must be reserved for extraordinary situations.”

The CAFC affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Sansone’s complaints and denial of summary judgment in full, with no costs awarded.