Closing the PTAB Loophole: Targeting Real Threats to U.S. Innovation Without Overreaching

“The United States must protect its innovators from foreign entities that seek to undermine American IP for competitive or strategic advantage without broadly attacking entire nations’ patent owners.”

PTABProtecting American innovation from foreign threats is a national priority—particularly in strategic sectors like semiconductors, AI, and defense technologies. The United States has long relied on robust economic sanctions and export controls to protect national security and safeguard intellectual property (IP) from foreign adversaries. Despite these measures, a significant vulnerability persists: entities from sanctioned or embargoed nations can exploit a critical loophole to access the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), an administrative body that plays a pivotal role in challenging the validity of U.S. patents.

Although agencies like the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) impose strict restrictions on interactions with hostile foreign entities, the PTAB remains accessible—even to those tied to adversarial governments. This loophole exposes U.S. technological leadership to potential foreign threats. If we are to defend U.S. IP effectively, we must avoid sweeping measures that could provoke unnecessary retaliation and harm U.S. innovators.

Rather than broadly blocking entire nations from the U.S. patent system, we should focus on restricting only those entities with proven ties to national security threats—based on evidence and established designations like the U.S. Entities List and OFAC sanctions.

What We Need: Precision, Not Overreach

As recent congressional hearings have highlighted, there is broad consensus that foreign intellectual property theft—particularly by China—poses a grave threat to U.S. competitiveness. Congressman Darrell Issa (CA-48) has been clear:

“Our longstanding, broad-based science and technology collaboration with the PRC has failed to further our national interests and has instead promoted the advantage of our top global competitor. The United States has no use for a partnership where technology shared means technology stolen, and that’s why we need answers as we weigh the future of this one-sided relationship that has put our national security at risk and allowed for the exploitation of both our legal system and innovators.”

Congressman Issa is right to highlight the risks. Recent legislative efforts reflect growing recognition of the need for precision in addressing these threats. The Prohibiting Adversarial Patents Act, introduced in 2023 by Congressman Scott Fitzgerald (WI-05), alongside Chairmen Mike Gallagher (WI-08), Darrell Issa (CA-48), and Blaine Luetkemeyer (MO-03), directly targets patent protections for entities posing national security threats. This legislation would prohibit the issuance of U.S. patents to individuals or entities identified on key national security watch lists, including the U.S. Entity List, the Non-SDN CMIC List, and the FCC’s Section 2 List, while also rendering previously granted patents to these entities unenforceable. Furthermore, it introduces new transparency measures, requiring disclosure of state-sponsored affiliations in patent applications.

This legislative approach aligns with the broader effort to close PTAB loopholes without overreach, ensuring that national security threats are addressed while preserving the integrity of the U.S. innovation system.

The PREVAIL Act: An Opportunity for Smart Reform

The bipartisan PREVAIL Act offers an opportunity to strengthen U.S. patent law and better protect national security. Initially focused on improving fairness and efficiency at the PTAB, the Act can—and should—address the specific issue of PTAB access by hostile foreign actors.

However, any new restrictions should target entities that are already recognized as threats (See the Comprehensive List of U.S. Federal Sanctions and Watch Lists appendix below), including:

  • Entities on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List
  • Entities on the Commerce Department’s Entity List
  • Entities restricted under Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
  • Entities restricted by legislative authority, such as TikTok Divestment Legislation (Passed in 2024/2025), and the Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology Act, if passed into law.

This evidence-based approach ensures that we are targeting those who pose real, documented risks—without alienating legitimate foreign patent holders or sparking unnecessary retaliation against U.S. companies operating abroad.

Why a Tailored Approach Is Best for Protecting U.S. Innovation

  1. Prevents Weaponized Patent Challenges by Bad Actors

Entities that have been identified as security threats should not be able to use the PTAB to undermine U.S. patents. A targeted restriction would prevent hostile foreign firms from strategically attacking American IP in critical sectors like AI, biotech, and 5G.

  1. Closes the PTAB Loophole Consistent with U.S. Sanctions and Trade Policy

If a company is barred from accessing U.S. technology through export controls, they should not be able to use the PTAB to attack the patents that protect those very technologies. Aligning PTAB access rules with existing national security designations closes this dangerous gap.

  1. Focusing on Real Threats Avoids Retaliation

By limiting PTAB access based on verified designations, we avoid unnecessary, broad attacks on entire countries’ innovators—many of whom do not pose a national security risk. Overreaching could invite retaliatory measures against U.S. companies and weaken our global IP leadership.

Specific Examples of the Threat—and Why Precision Matters

Chinese-backed companies like ByteDance, Huawei, and ZTE have used the PTAB to challenge U.S. patents, including in high-stakes fields like telecommunications and AI. These companies have known ties to the Chinese state and military, and many are already on U.S. sanctions or restricted lists (See Appendix 2 below showing Timeline of Huawei & ZTE Sanctions/Watch List Status vs. PTAB Activity). Targeting such entities is logical and necessary.

However, lumping all Chinese or foreign innovators into one category would be a mistake. Not every foreign patent holder is a national security risk—and treating them as such could lead to dangerous retaliation, damaging U.S. businesses and innovation efforts globally.

Addressing Legal and Constitutional Concerns Thoughtfully

Some may raise due process concerns about excluding foreign entities from the PTAB. But as an administrative, not judicial, body, the PTAB does not grant constitutional protections like a court of law. Just as we limit access to U.S. markets or technologies for sanctioned entities, we can—and should—limit PTAB access when national security is at stake.

A measured, evidence-based approach also reduces the risk of legal challenges. If we align PTAB restrictions with existing designations already upheld in U.S. law, we stand on strong constitutional and policy ground.

Recommendations for the PREVAIL Act

To strike the right balance—being tough on real threats but not reckless—Congress should consider adding these targeted reforms within the PREVAIL Act:

  • Prohibit PTAB petitions from entities on the OFAC SDN List, the Commerce Entity List, and other sanctioned lists.
  • Bar proxy entities from filing on behalf of these sanctioned companies.
  • Clarify that national security-based PTAB denials are final and not subject to APA challenges.
  • Mandate coordination between the USPTO, BIS, and OFAC to maintain an up-to-date list of barred entities.

A Strong, Smart Path Forward

The United States must protect its innovators from foreign entities that seek to undermine American IP for competitive or strategic advantage without broadly attacking entire nations’ patent owners—which risks harming the very innovation ecosystem we aim to protect and could invite damaging retaliation.

Instead, we should focus on those entities already identified as national security risks—using evidence, due process, and existing legal frameworks. This targeted approach strengthens U.S. IP protections without compromising our leadership as a global innovation hub.

Congress has a critical opportunity with the PREVAIL Act to close this loophole the right way—smartly, surgically, and in alignment with national security priorities. Let’s make sure we do it right.

Appendix 1.  Comprehensive List of U.S. Federal Sanctions and Watch Lists

  1. Department of the Treasury – Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
List Name Description Link
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List Sanctioned individuals, entities, vessels under various authorities (terrorism, narcotics, etc.) https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-list-sdn-human-readable-lists
Consolidated Non-SDN List Entities/individuals under sanctions not on SDN List https://ofac.treasury.gov/consolidated-sanctions-list-non-sdn-lists
Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List Entities in Russian economic sectors subject to limited sanctions https://ofac.treasury.gov/ofac-sanctions-lists-sectoral-sanctions-identifications-ssi-list
Foreign Sanctions Evaders (FSE) List Sanctioned for evading U.S. sanctions https://ofac.treasury.gov/ofac-sanctions-lists-foreign-sanctions-evaders-fse-list
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) List Blocked members under Executive Order https://ofac.treasury.gov/
  1. Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
List Name Description Link
Entity List Entities engaged in activities contrary to U.S. national interests https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list
Denied Persons List Individuals/entities denied export privileges https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/denied-persons-list
Unverified List (UVL) Parties with unverifiable legitimacy https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/unverified-list
  1. Department of State
List Name Description Link
Nonproliferation Sanctions Lists Entities sanctioned for WMD proliferation https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation-sanctions/
Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) Organizations barred from U.S. entry for terrorism https://www.state.gov/terrorist-exclusion-list/
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) List Designated terrorist organizations https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/
State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) List Countries supporting terrorism https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/
  1. Department of Defense (DoD)
List Name Description Link
Chinese Military Companies (CMCs) List Companies linked to Chinese military https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/consolidated-sanctions-list/ns-cmic-list
  1. General Services Administration (GSA)
List Name Description Link
System for Award Management (SAM) Exclusions Entities/individuals excluded from federal contracting https://sam.gov/content/exclusions
  1. Department of Justice (DOJ)
List Name Description Link
NSD Export Control & Sanctions Enforcement Public enforcement actions (sanctions-related) https://www.justice.gov/nsd
  1. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
List Name Description Link (Non-Public)
Known and Suspected Terrorist (KST) List (TSDB) Database of suspected terrorists (non-public) Not publicly available
  1. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
List Name Description Link
Most Wanted Terrorists Individuals wanted for terrorism-related offenses https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorism
Seeking Information – Terrorism Individuals of interest for terrorism investigations https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/seeking-information
  1. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
List Name Description Link
FinCEN Advisories Guidance on jurisdictions/persons involved in illicit finance https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories

Consolidated Resource

Tool Name Description Link
Consolidated Screening List (CSL) Unified search of multiple U.S. sanctions/watch lists https://www.trade.gov/consolidated-screening-list

Appendix 2.  Timeline of Huawei & ZTE Sanctions/Watch List Status vs. PTAB Activity

Image Source: Deposit Photos
Author: stuartmiles
Image ID: 207301958 

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3 comments so far.

  • [Avatar for Brad Baker]
    Brad Baker
    May 9, 2025 06:02 am

    Can you imagine your USPTO practitioner from Ni, Wang and Associates had a different Attorney from Dykema Gossett, together filed malicious Filings to either destroy or assign your rights. My Chinese Attorney files over 6,000 Trademark Applications mainly for Chinese Applicants but does not know the correct Class for goods. They file forged POA’ and 37 CFR 3.73(c) documents. And you have no clue of the filings . Strange how one examiner examined all my Applications. I did not know they could file restriction requirements to an existing patent, using incorrect definitions of classification codes. Having three Foreign Filing license receipts, with the Priority application number for filing applications abroad under the Paris Convention. Unfortunately nobody ever informed me. The Attorney from Dykema Gossett used the Ni, Wang & Associates contract information on the Applications so it would not be seen at his firm. Recently I just found a Copyright Registration with the Attorney as the legal owner of the Copyright by a written agreement transfer.FYI, the patent application was issued to the filing Attorney. The method is to have a POA filed so it removes the Attorney information so he can have your invention patented in China. But I thought I was safe because I hired another Attorney from Howison and Arnott to file multiple inventions and if he did do the same thing. Get different Attorney from Munck Wilson Mandala to forge a POA and remove him so he could go have my invention patented in a Foreign Country. The Developer, cousin of the Attorney from India And his crew was just as brutal. They needed my Apple Developer Account and ID, Domain name, Website and email address, DUN number and my identity. At the end of the day when I found out they put malicious code in my website, took down the servers and continued business as usual. Three inventions , Copyright, Trademark Registration filing for a Wordmark /E-TOURNAMENT POKER, The Tournament Director or TD Client and the ETP game client. By the time they were done I ended up with a Patent that I chased as evidence of the collusion between the USPTO Practitioners and Examiner. OED did nothing . The examiner put the other two inventions in the restriction requirement, Method for authorizing mobile devices at a server and Method for sending authorization request to a server, the only problem is he must not know how to read Classification Codes because these are not even close. Maybe it was because they needed to remove a Priority Application which they did. Could of been to remove the Customer 25883 that enables 8 Attorneys access to the data. That number is the graveyard for inventors patents. My point is when we have a problem this country with IP theft it originates in many cases in the US. I wish I would of knew about the Chinese issue because they are stone cold thieves. Not all just this firm. Now look at all the Law suits they file. Never a defendent, but must be doing well to have 26 LLC’s. Nothing more dangerous than a Pirate /Troll. If any of these firms have an issue then let’s get into a jury. Dykema Gossett has no issue in this, they just happen to where this individual was registered with at the USPTO. The Developer or Mr. Pokemon Go is living a lie. He did not create the multiplayer platform that decentralized Poker. I can prove it and will very soon. The investigation is finally over and I am so thankful that our President Donald J Trump is against Trade theft , Economic Esponiage, RICO etc. by a Chinese Attorney targeting a US inventor.. This is the method they use and in Dallas it’s a Cabal. Future inventors should not be limited by the USPTO practitioner. How do we protect our inventions when we are required to file applications for protection with the very people we need protection from. Respectfully Brad Baker

  • [Avatar for Julie Burke]
    Julie Burke
    March 28, 2025 10:09 pm

    I agree, watchlisted and sanctioned adversarial entities should not be allowed to use the PTAB IPR process to undermine US patents.

    And it can be difficult to ascertain real party of interest when actions are taken by proxy and entities protected by shell-companies.

    Meanwhile, why is the US patent corps examining applications filed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)?

    See US Patent No 10,039,729 entitled use of kukoamine A and kukoamine B issued to the First Affiliated Hospital, Third Military Medical University, PLA.

    See US SN 18/575,710 drawn to an image registration method and system for navigation in femora neck fracture surgery filed by the First Medical Center of PLA Medical Hospital.

    See US SN 17/378,415 titled use of substituted aminopropinate compounds in treatment of SARS-COV-2 infection filed by Academy of Military Medical Sciences PLA.

    See a light examination of US SN 17/907,256 which is directed to an intravertebral distraction reducer. Applicants filed no information disclosure statement.

    The examiner loaded the 892 form with 12 prior art documents but did not explain any relevance for the documents. The first office action contained no prior art rejections and did not distinguish the claims over any piece of prior art. The drawings were objected to for being difficult to understand. The specification as objected to for being a direct translation of a foreign language document. “In general, the claims appear to be a direct translation of a foreign document and are written as run on sentences without clear recitation of structure.”

    “The closest prior art cited in the attached PTO-892 discloses some features of
    Applicant’s claimed invention, either singly or in combination. However, no references or a reasonable combination thereof, could be found which disclose all the elements of Applicant’s claimed invention.”

    Looks like an easy next action allowance for the Fourth Medical Center of the General Hospital of the People’s Liberation Army.

    Isn’t it time to close this examination loophole?

  • [Avatar for Pro Say]
    Pro Say
    March 28, 2025 02:41 pm

    A reasonable, legally-defensible approach Laura.

    Thank you for your time, research, and superb analysis.

    My only concern is this: How to insure that proxies of these patent-attacking companies and entities don’t continue to do other’s dirty work at the PTAB?

    It’s not like proxies are going to raise their hands and reveal who they’re working for.

    Perhaps your excellent approach should include a provision barring U.S. law firms and attorneys from knowingly representing such companies / proxies before the PTAB? That would certainly help.

    And I’ll also note that it’s shocking that Issa — a successful, patented inventor himself — fights so hard to prevent and take away the same patenting rights from other American inventors and patent owners that he himself relied on to become financially secure.

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