Posts Tagged: "Patent Litigation"

We analyzed all of the packages in our database to look at the use of the assets after receipt of the package by the broker. Because we used a better source of US litigation and inter partes review data this year, it makes it impossible to compare our results to our previous year’s analysis. Focusing on package-level analysis for packages received in the market years from 2012 to 2016, and looking for packages with at least one litigation or inter partes review as of October 2016, we found that the sold packages are litigated and inter partes reviewed to a greater degree than packages generally.

Rembrandt sued Samsung for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas and convinced a jury that Samsung infringed its two asserted patents, awarding $15.7 million in damages. Samsung appealed claim construction, denial of JMOL of obviousness, a Daubert motion on a damages expert, and the refusal to limit damages. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s claim construction and its denial of Samsung’s JMOL motions, affirming those decisions… The Federal Circuit vacated because allowing Rembrandt to “avoid the consequence of its failure to mark undermines the marking statute’s public notice function.” The Federal Circuit remanded to the district court to properly limit damages, and also remanded the question of whether the marking statute applies on a patent-by-patent or claim-by-claim basis because the parties had not squarely addressed the issue during the present appeal.

The Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) decision finding a patent owned by Novartis AG and Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma Corp. (collectively “Novartis”) to be unpatentable as obvious… Refusal by the Board to institute an IPR based on a particular reference does not necessarily preclude the Board from relying on that reference as additional support for a motivation to combine other references. Separate patentability arguments for dependent claims must be clearly argued lest they stand or fall with parent claims. A nexus for non-obviousness due to commercial success must clearly flow from the patented invention and not from subject matter known in the prior art.

A Federal Circuit Rule 36 judgment can be a valid and final judgment for purposes of preclusive effects. Additionally, district court findings affirmed by a Rule 36 judgment can have preclusive effect as long as each is “necessary” to the final appellate judgment. The Federal Circuit did not address the Circuit split regarding the preclusive effect of independent, alternative holdings.

Core Wireless sued Apple for infringing its patent directed to a cellular network system including a mobile station providing for improved transmission of data packets. The jury found that Apple did not infringe Core Wireless’ patent. At issue on appeal is whether the district court misapplied the magistrate judge’s pretrial claim construction and whether the claim construction adopted by the district court when ruling on Core Wireless’ JMOL was erroneous… Ultimately, the Court concluded that the district court correctly denied Core Wireless’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and properly upheld the jury’s verdict of noninfringement.

Because patent trolls prefer filing in the Eastern District of Texas, the thinking goes that it will be a significant blow to patent trolls if the Supreme Court does not agree with the Federal Circuit. In other words, the days will be numbered for patent trolls if the Supreme Court determines that Congress did not expanded patent venue with the 1988 amendment that made the statutory definition of corporate residence found in § 1391 applicable to patent cases. That conventional wisdom is wrong!… Reflection Code has brought patent infringement actions in the Eastern District of Texas, but on March 31, 2017, Reflection Code brought two separate patent infringement lawsuits in the Eastern District of Michigan — one against Bissell, Inc. and the other against Mattel, Inc.

If the patent owner intends claim terms to have a special meaning, the patent must provide a clear disavowal of ordinary meaning or an alternative lexicography. Otherwise, the patent owner can expect to obtain the full scope of the term’s plain and ordinary meaning. Ordinary meaning also may yield to context, as where “sequence” may include “one bit,” not “at least two.” The Court also stresses that anticipation requires that a single reference “describe the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.” Ambiguous references do not anticipate a claim.

On appeal, Novartis argued that the PTAB unlawfully reached different conclusions than the Federal Circuit and U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware in addressing the “same” arguments and the “same” evidence… The Court stated that “Novartis’s argument fails on factual and legal grounds.” First, the record in front of the PTAB differed from that of the prior litigation, meaning that Novartis’ argument rests on a “faulty factual predicate.”… “Nevertheless, even if the record were the same, Novartis’s argument would fail as a matter of law.” The PTAB reviews patentability under the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). District court litigation requires “clear and convincing” evidence. Therefore, “the PTAB may properly reach a different conclusion based on the same evidence.”

On April 6, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in The Medicines Company v. Mylan, Inc. (2015-1113, 2015-1151, and 2015-1181) that imports certain subject matter from the specification into the claims… This case provides some key takeaways for patent practitioners, some more obvious than others. First, as has been known for some time, referring to the “invention” in a patent’s specification can hurt, as can indicating that a particular process “includes all” of the embodiments the specification describes. This is why patents for inventions in the U.S. now curiously, if understandably, usually avoid using the word “invention”. Also, setting forth definitions in a specification can have unintended consequences not just for the term being defined but also for terms that are not explicitly defined even if unequivocally characterized in some other way. Prosecution history also matters too, particularly where an applicant distinguishes its invention during prosecution by explicitly characterizing “the invention” in terms divorced from the language of the claims themselves.

Tensions between Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”) and Acushnet Holdings Corp. (“Acushnet”), maker of the Titleist golf ball, have risen since Costco escalated matters last Friday by filing suit seeking a declaratory judgment in an ongoing dispute between the corporate heavyweights. The most recent in the series of intensifying clashes is over Acushnet’s claims that Costco’s Kirkland Signature (“KS”) golf ball infringes on some eleven (11) Acushnet patents, and that Costco is engaged in false advertising holding the KS golf ball against the Titleist.

The makers of TRX fitness and training equipment, was awarded more than $6.8 million in damages after a jury verdict finding willful patent infringement by San Carlos, CA-based Woss Enterprises LLC. The lawsuit surrounded allegations that Woss infringed upon patents covering Fitness Anywhere’s suspension trainer equipment. The jury verdict included a finding of willful infringement of patents asserted in the case. The case was tried and decided in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (N.D. Cal.).

The remaining vitality of estoppel as a defense against patent infringement after SCA Hygiene Products is also not a hypothetical question. Indeed, the issue of estoppel remains very much “alive and well” in SCA Hygiene Products. Besides laches, the accused infringer in SCA Hygiene Products, First Quality Baby Products, had moved (not surprisingly) for summary judgment based upon an estoppel defense, which was also granted by the district court. Also not too surprisingly, that portion of the ruling by the district court was reversed and remanded by the Federal Circuit panel on the ground that there were “genuine issues of material fact” to be resolved. The Federal Circuit majority in its en banc ruling also reinstated and preserved the Federal Circuit panel’s reversal and remand of the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the estoppel defense. Finally, in footnote 2, SCOTUS’ decision in SCA Hygiene Products expressly states: “We do not address the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the District Court’s equitable estoppel holding.”

Justices Kagan and Ginsburg seemed skeptical. Indeed, Congress has already passed a general venue statute that defined residency “for all venue places – all venue purposes,” as Justice Ginsburg put it. Justice Kagan chimed in, questioning the propriety of overturning the broader rule, which she called “the decision that the practice has conformed to” and the “practical backdrop” against which Congress was legislating. Next, Justice Breyer noted the many arguments and briefs discussing the Eastern District of Texas, but which he felt were not relevant.

On Monday, March 27th, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Group Brands LLC. The case, arising from allegations of patent infringement over liquid water enhancement products, will ask the court to decide whether 28 U.S.C. Section 1400(b), the patent venue statute which provides that judicial actions for patent suits take place in the district within which the defendant resides, is supplemented by 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(c), which provides that an entity may reside in multiple districts.

The Federal Circuit noted that precedent requires a prior art reference to disclose the invention without modification in order to anticipate. “[A] prior art reference that must be distorted from its obvious design does not anticipate a patent claim.” The Court applied that principle here and found that the first reference (Rambert) would only anticipate if one of its elements was removed. The Board failed to explain the removal of that element. The second reference (Bouttens) also required “significant and impermissible modification,” which was also unexplained. Consequently, the Board’s conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence.