Posts Tagged: "Judge Kara Stoll"

Practitioners dealing with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation should be sure to preserve objections for appeal, since failing to object may lead to a more deferential, plain error standard of review, depending on the applicable circuit law. Further, in seeking a preliminary injunction, evidence of harm from pre-issuance of the asserted patent is relevant to show likelihood of irreparable harm from similar injuries in the future.

In a December 22, 2016 decision, the Federal Circuit vacated a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“The Board”) in two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. The Court reversed the Board’s decision that the claims at issue were unpatentable for anticipation and obviousness… The broadest reasonable interpretation of a patent claim does not extend to a legally incorrect interpretation. When the claim as a whole expressly excludes a particular result, a claim term cannot be interpreted so broadly as to encompass that result.

It is inappropriate for a trial court to discount material expert testimony so as to weigh the evidence in favor of a party seeking summary judgment. The presence of a genuine dispute precludes summary judgment in such cases. … Failure to disclose arguments concerning claims of a different scope in a different patent application was not inequitable conduct when differences were apparent to the Examiner.

Tile Tech argued that a default judgment was not appropriate because the district court did not find that Tile Tech acted in bad faith. However, the Court identified the full test for default, in the Ninth Circuit, as “willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Tile Tech failed to present evidence that its dilatory actions were not its fault, i.e. outside of its attorney’s control. Therefore, the Court upheld the judgment… The Court also found the requirement to surrender “any mold, or other device, by which any [component] utilized with the [patent] was made” an acceptable means of preventing future infringement.

The Federal Circuit vacated the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (“Board”) cancellation of two JobDiva service mark registrations—one in whole and the other in part—and remanded for further consideration. As the Court pointed out in its opinion, JobDiva could have avoided the issues in this case by initially registering “marks to identify both software and services performed by software.” Practitioners should take care to register a mark for all goods and services for which the mark may be used.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision to invalidate certain claims in three patents owned by Ameranth. The Court relied heavily on Ameranth’s concessions within the specification that certain aspects of the invention were “typical” or “commonly known.” Practitioners should be wary of using such language and should take steps to identify specific technological improvements.

As a threshold matter, the Court considered whether it had jurisdiction over the writ of mandamus. The Court noted the America Invents Act broadened its jurisdiction to cases including compulsory counterclaims “arising under” patent. Here, the Court found that the patent infringement counterclaims were compulsory because Rearden’s infringement counterclaim shared a critical factual dispute with its claims regarding ownership and rightful use of the technology claimed in the MOVA patents. Therefore, the Court found it did have jurisdiction over the writ of mandamus.

The Federal Circuit reversed the cancellation of two trademarks by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) and remanded for further consideration… “Use in commerce” under the Lanham Act encompasses any activity that falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, including in-state sales to an out-of-state resident. Activities that are within such regulatory authority are unlikely to be disqualified as merely “de minimis,” e.g. in economic impact.

The Federal Circuit denied appellant SAS’s petition for rehearing en banc from a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, without an explanatory opinion. Judge Newman dissented. Without discussing the facts of the case, she undertook to review the statutory provisions for inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings under the America Invents Act (“AIA”). According to Newman, the Court should have granted the petition, in order to correct the Patent Office position that “the final order of the [Patent Trial and Appeal] Board need not address every claim raised in the petition for review.” According to Judge Newman, a review of the statutory provisions of the AIA makes it clear that, if the PTAB decides to institute review, it should do so for all of the challenged claims, not just some of the challenged claims.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that this evidence did not demonstrate a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer in claim scope. The Court emphasized that disavowals must be evaluated in the context of the entire prosecution history. Thus, the term “cells derived from a vascularized tissue” included both parenchymal (organ) and non-parenchymal cells. The file history statements did not amount to an unmistakable disclaimer of non-parenchymal cells, in light of the full prosecution history and the claim language pending at the time of the alleged disavowal.

The Court found substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of infringement. While Samsung’s expert offered conflicting testimony, a reasonable jury could have credited Apple’s expert. Thus, there was no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial evidence supported the jury verdict of infringement… Note that the underlying dispute in this case does not concern design patents that were also asserted against Samsung, and which are currently being reviewed by the Supreme Court.

what is particularly interesting about this case is that Smith, who had prevailed at the district court and was awarded about $322,500 in damages, thought he could not challenge the correctness of a claim construction made by the district court. While Smith could not have filed a cross appeal in this case concerning the claim construction, Smith could have asserted ‘alternative grounds in the record for affirming the judgment.’ Because Smith did not raise any such alternate grounds on appeal, the Federal Circuit could not address the correctness of the district court’s claim construction.

In vacating the district court’s summary judgment order, the Federal Circuit noted first that statements made by Micron’s expert regarding what the anticipatory reference disclosed were not actually supported by the anticipatory reference itself… These kinds of procedural safeguards are commonly applied by other regional circuits, but have seemed to be missing from Federal Circuit case law of late, with the Federal Circuit seeming to be rather eager to address the substance of a given dispute. Perhaps with the overwhelming caseload now at the Federal Circuit, and its need to resort to both Rule 36 and non-precedential opinions, the court seems to finally be coming to terms with the fact that it is an appeals court and not a court of first instance that should always decide cases de novo.

This decision reestablishes what should always have been the case; namely that the Federal Circuit is an appellate court that does not consider evidence outside the record or engage in fact finding on their own. The Federal Circuit has been increasingly out of control for years, acting as a trial court and jury rather than an appellate court. Hopefully that will end today.

The Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to meet the pleading standards for joint patent infringement, holding that Form 18, from the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does not apply to a claim of joint infringement… Form 18 is not sufficient per se, and pleadings must adhere to the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, and must do so for each element of the allegedly infringed patent claim. This is particularly true for pleading joint infringement.