Posts Tagged: "constitution"

Patlex, which dealt with reexamination of applications by an examiner — not by an Article I tribunal — could be considered a next step beyond McCormick. MCM, however, simply cannot be viewed as consistent with either Patlex or McCormick on any level. Indeed, the Supreme Court was abundantly clear in McCormick, which remains good law. The courts of the United States (i.e., Article III courts), not the department that issued the patent, is the only entity vested with the authority to set aside or annul a patent right. Since the PTAB is not a court of the United States, it has no authority to invalidate patent rights. It is just that simple.

For more than two centuries, the U.S. Constitution, black letter law and precedent construed a patent as a property right. This is important because it is the nature of property rights that enables investment in early stage startup companies, especially those with cutting edge technologies in highly competitive fields like pharmaceuticals, biotech, smart phones, enterprise software, internet, semiconductors and other technologies critical to our infrastructure, military and much more… The same agency that takes inventor money to grant patents takes infringer money to destroy them. This creates an appearance of double dealing, and inventor belief that the USPTO is breaching the “grand bargain” of the patent system. Inventor confidence is at an all-time low because inventors are lured away from using trade secrecy protection, but then given nothing in return for disclosure. The effect of PTAB on inventors is devastating. Since institution of PTAB, over 50% of inventors simply quit rather than suffer the financial and stressful indignation of post grant invalidation.

Each of the Covidien IPRs challenged the validity of a single patent owned by the University of Florida Research Foundation (UFRF) which the university had previously asserted against Covidien. The decisions made by the ALJs in these IPRs indicate that public research universities can find protection from review proceedings at PTAB by claiming rights afforded them by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution… In their final written decision, the PTAB ALJs note that deciding this case based on UFRF’s Eleventh Amendment defense could have wide-reaching implications for the future of validity challenges to patents held by public university research arms or “a monetization foundation affiliated with a state university.”

Congress sent H.R. 5, the House-passed Regulatory Accountability Separation of Powers Restoration Act, to the Senate’s Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee on January 12, 2017. When enacted it will overrule Chevron deference. This enactment will therefore shine the disinfecting sunlight of appellate review where it has not gone before…. Patent practitioners need to realize that the Act will eliminate stare decisis over earlier court approvals of specific Patent Office rules. First, after the Act, it will be an open question whether the Patent Office may use BRI within IPR proceedings. That is because the law will have changed over what deference a court must give Patent Office regulations. In Cuozzo, the Court cited Chevron in analyzing whether rulemaking imposing BRI on IPR proceedings constituted “a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking authority that Congress delegated to the Patent Office.” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. After walking through a collection of policy rationales that made BRI seem “reasonable” to the majority, the Court concluded by explicitly noting that the “Patent Office’s regulation, selecting the broadest reasonable construction standard, is reasonable in light of the rationales described above. . . .” Id. at 2146.

The Supreme Court has scheduled oral argument in Lee v. Tam for January 18… The genesis of the case is a Portland, Oregon all-Asian-American band called The Slants, founded by petitioner Simon Shiao Tam. An application for trademark was made and the USPTO said “NO” on the basis that “The Slants” is a highly disparaging term and therefore must be denied registration under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act… The cultural and societal value of the free flow of speech trumps government regulation. The Supreme Court should uphold the Constitution and confirm the importance of robust political debate, cultural discourse, and the right to use ANY words as part of a personal identity.

As more reports come out that patent filings for individuals and small businesses are down and a general recognition that real innovation does not come from large organizations, but rather small ones, it is becoming clearer that changes in our laws have decreased the previous standards that were in place to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.” As such, it seems to this author that our current patent laws are unconstitutional, or at the very least are thoroughly and completely frustrating the constitutional purpose for which they were created since our laws are promoting less and not “securing” our discoveries. We need to strengthen our patent laws to have a system that promotes the progress of science and useful arts by efficiently and affordably securing for inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries and innovations.

The USPTO, through its Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), denied a standard character mark for “The Slants” to be used with live music performance entertainment on the basis that the term is a highly disparaging reference to people of Asian-American descent. The writ of certiorari was issued for this case after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir.) issued a decision last December in In re Tam, an appeal filed by Simon Tam to overturn the TTAB decision. In that case, the Federal Circuit voted 9-to-3 to vacate the TTAB decision to deny the trademark to Tam because § 2(a) of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional “under the intermediate scrutiny traditionally applied to regulation of the commercial aspects of speech.” The majority opinion issued by Federal Circuit noted that the First Amendment protects even hurtful speech and that the federal government has offered no legitimate interests justifying § 2(a) of the Lanham Act.

If Congress, nevertheless, is unmoved by the constitutional arguments for reforming the IPR process, it should weigh the strong economic policy arguments supporting IPR reform, which are outlined in various amicus curiae briefs supporting certiorari. As pointed out in a brief filed on behalf of the Houston Inventors Association, the IPR system “has a great attraction to ‘patent pirates’, companies who [sic] infringe patents and then deny liability, because the IPR has a high rate of success for ‘patent pirates’ to invalidate patents.” In other words, the IPR system facilitates infringers who want to free ride on the fruits of patentees’ labors, thereby ineluctably diminishing marginal incentives for investment in patentable innovations. As a brief filed on behalf of the University of New Mexico explains, the threat of IPR (in particular its anti-patent “death star” reputation), and inconsistencies between PTAB and federal district court patent validity standards, devalue and harm university patents.

It is also important to recognize that the social, political and economic impact of strong protections for intellectual property cannot be overstated. In the social context, the incentive for disclosure and innovation is critical. Solutions for sustainability and climate change (whether natural, man-made or mutually/marginally intertwined) rely upon this premise. Likewise, as we are on the precipice of the ultimate convergence in technologies from the hi-tech digital world and life sciences space, capturing the ability to cure many diseases and fatal illnesses and providing the true promise of extended longevity in good health and well-being, that is meaningful, productive, and purposeful; this incentive must be preserved.

Cooper and MCM have submitted Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, asking it to consider the constitutionality of Article I final adjudication of issued patent claims, subject only to Article III appellate review. Importantly, the resolution of this question turns on the determination of (1) whether the claim of patent invalidity is a public or private right, and (2) if a private right, whether the claim may be delegated to an Article I tribunal for (a) advisory determination, requiring (b) enforcement by a federal district court, where (c) legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and (d) factual conclusions are reviewed for substantial evidence. As revealed during briefing by litigants and amici, in addition to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“CAFC”) precedential MCM opinion, ambiguity in the Court’s Stern decision has led to confusion, and the analysis required for question (2) has been improperly applied to the resolution of question (1). In light of this confusion—and the merits of the constitutional question aside—Cooper and MCM present the Court with a rare opportunity to clarify that questions (1) and (2) are in fact separate, and require, per its own decisional law, distinct modes of analysis.

A recent Barron’s editorial, however, has raised some eyebrows among those who are familiar with the effect of proper patent enforcement on financial fortunes. Published May 14th, “Patents Can Be Dangerous to Inventors’ Welfare” is a perfect example of how a rather odious point-of-view can be freshened and sweetened when some of the inconvenient truths are laid by the wayside.

Amici agree with Petitioner that this procedure was beyond Congress’s power to impose, and its underpinning rationale—that patents are a matter of administrative largesse, rather than the constitutionally protected property right—is constitutionally infirm. Amici write separately because this case presents an issue of enormous significance with far-reaching consequences for inventors, investors, and small-business owners. The institution of IPR review has made patents more expensive to obtain and defend, and has introduced uncertainty in patent rights that makes patents less valuable to their holders, less attractive to inventors, and less safe for investors. This devaluation of patent rights has measurably diminished the value of all patents.

This case presents an important constitutional question which the court below decided based on an incomplete analysis of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. In the case below, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that a patent is a “public right,” and that these Article I trial proceedings are not unconstitutional. Significantly, the Federal Circuit reached its conclusion without considering more than a century of precedent by this Court recognizing that an issued patent is a property right, at least for purposes of determining if a “taking” has happened. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882); see also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting with approval James).

A patent is a proprietary right granted by the Federal government pursuant to laws passed by Congress. The Congressional power to authorize patents is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the United States Constitution. exclusive rights are provided for a limited time as an incentive to inventors, entrepreneurs and corporations to engage in research and development, to spend the time, energy and capital resources necessary to create useful inventions; which will hopefully have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, including life saving treatments and cures. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).

The question presented in the petition for certiorari in Cooper v. Lee is whether 35 U.S.C. §318(b) violates Article III of the United States Constitution, to the extent that it empowers an executive agency tribunal to assert judicial power canceling private property rights amongst private parties embroiled in a private federal dispute of a type known in the common law courts of 1789, rather than merely issue an advisory opinion as an adjunct to a trial court. This case raises a constitutional challenge to new post-grant patent proceedings.