Posts in Litigation

On February 1, Amazon.com, Inc. filed a Form 10-K annual report with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Along with reporting its year-end earnings for the 2018 fiscal year, this particular SEC filing was notable because Amazon officially acknowledged to shareholders that the company’s online sales platforms face the risk of being found liable for fraudulent or unlawful activities of sellers on those platforms. This includes the company’s first-ever concession that Amazon may be unable to prevent sellers trafficking counterfeit and pirated goods. “The law relating to the liability of online service providers is currently unsettled,” Amazon’s Form 10-K filing reads. Along with the specter of counterfeit sales, Amazon noted that its seller programs may render the company unable to stop sellers from collecting payments when buyers never receive products they ordered or when products received by buyers are materially different than the sellers’ description of those products at the point of purchase. While information regarding a corporation’s potential risk of liability is a regular feature of SEC filings, news reports indicate that this is the first time that Amazon used the word “counterfeit” in an annual report.

The United Stated Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently held that a district court erred in its claim construction and vacated the district court’s judgment of noninfringement, which the parties stipulated to based on the erroneous construction. See Continental Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 2018-1076, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3920, 2019 WL 489069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2019) (Before Lourie, Linn, and Taranto, J.) (Opinion for the court, Lourie, J.). The Court highlighted that the first step in claim construction should always be to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the claims. Further, the specification should serve to limit the plain and ordinary meaning only when it includes a definition for a claim term or a clear disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope.

Mission Product Holdings v. Tempnology was argued last week at the Supreme Court and seeks to solve a circuit split regarding the effects of bankruptcy proceedings on trademark licenses. The case asks the nation’s highest court to determine if the rejection of a license in bankruptcy terminates the licensee’s right to to the trademarks or whether that license rejection only constitutes a breach by the licensor, in which case the licensee can still use the marks. The International Trademark Association (INTA) has dubbed the issue presented as “the most significant unresolved legal issue in trademark licensing.” Following our in-depth guest report on the oral argument, IPWatchdog asked those following the case to provide their take on the import of the case, the oral argument, and potential implications of the justices’ questioning.

On February 19, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Return Mail Inc. v. United States Postal Service—one of two IP cases the Court heard that week. The courtroom for the Return Mail hearing was particularly full of press because it was Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s first hearing following a recent hiatus to have nodules on her lungs removed. The case asks whether the federal government constitutes a “person” for the purposes of instituting post grant review proceedings at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). As reported earlier this week, the justices appeared to be dissatisfied with arguments from counsel on both sides—and skeptical that Congress had any view on the issue to begin with—but they arguably pushed back more against the government’s position. As always, IPWatchdog reached out to the patent bar for their take on the arguments. Like the questioning, the predictions were mixed and reveal no clear path, but a narrow holding in favor of Return Mail could be likely.

This week in Other Barks & Bites: the Chinese and U.S. governments hash out intellectual property issues; a prominent New York City politician joins the effort to break the patent on Gilead’s Truvada; Qualcomm tells the ITC that Apple’s design around undermines the agency’s finding that an exclusion order shouldn’t be entered against infringing iPhones; the Fortnite copyright cases take a new turn; Babybel loses the trademark on its red wax cheese coating in the UK; Fisker & Paykel and ResMed settle their worldwide patent dispute; Facebook could face major FTC fines for payments from children playing video games on the platform; and reports indicate that Pinterest is pursuing an initial public offering.

On Wednesday, February 20, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, where the Court was asked to address one of the most important issues at the intersection of trademark law and bankruptcy law: whether a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark license terminates the rights of the licensee to use that trademark. Taking seriously the language of the question presented, and generally acknowledging that 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) provides that rejection constitutes a “breach” of the contract, the justices focused on the remedies for breach outside of bankruptcy law and whether, because trademarks (and quality control issues) are involved, deviation from ordinary, contract law principles is warranted. Both the advocates and the justices returned to whether analogies, including with respect to breaches of apartment and photocopier leases, are apposite. The question of whether the case was moot also received some attention, though it seems unlikely that the case will be dismissed on that ground.

It seemed like a trade secret trifecta when Congress in 2011 passed the America Invents Act (AIA). Although the statute was aimed at patent reform, it made three helpful changes in how trade secrets are treated. First, companies could hold onto secret information about an invention without risking invalidation of their patents for failing to disclose the “best mode” of implementing it. Second, the “prior user right” that guarantees continuing use of a secret invention, even if someone else later patents it, was extended to cover all technologies. And third, the law would no longer deny a patent simply because the inventor had already commercialized the invention in a way that didn’t reveal it to the public. Or so we thought. That last change depended on how you read the legislation. The long-standing requirement that an invention could not be “on sale” or “in public use” more than a year before filing a patent application was still there. But Congress added a qualifier to 35 U.S.C. §102: there would be no patent if the invention had been “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public . . . .”

The Federal Circuit recently elected not to decide en banc “whether servers are a regular and established place of business, such that venue is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b). In re: Google LLC, No. 2018-152 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2019) (Before Prost, Chief Judge, Newman, Lourie, Dyk, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, and Stoll, Circuit Judges) (Dissent by Reyna, Circuit Judge, joined by Newman and Lourie, Circuit Judges). SEVEN Networks, LLC’s (SEVEN) patent infringement suit against Google arose in the Eastern District of Texas. SEVEN alleged Google’s servers, stored in a third-party ISP’s facility, where the allegedly infringing activities occurred, were a regular and established place of business, such that venue is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 1400(b). The district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss for improper venue. As a result, Google petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss or transfer the case for improper venue. On appeal, the panel majority found mandamus relief inappropriate because “it is not known if the district court’s ruling involves the kind of broad and fundamental legal questions relevant to § 1400(b),” and “it would be appropriate to allow the issue to percolate in the district courts so as to more clearly define the importance, scope, and nature of the issue for us to review.”

On Tuesday, February 19, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Return Mail Inc. v. United States Postal Service, a case that asks the nation’s highest court to determine whether the federal government constitutes a “person” for the purposes of instituting review proceedings at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Although the Supreme Court Justices appeared to be dissatisfied with arguments from counsel for either side, they arguably pushed back more against the USPS’ position. All Justices apart from Justice Clarence Thomas played an active role in questioning.

Marshall, Texas has been, and will likely continue to be, one of the major patent litigation cities in the United States. But, Waco, Texas is quickly becoming the new mecca for patent infringement lawsuits due to recent case law and the arrival of a patent-savvy district judge. In the world of patent litigation, we all know Marshall, Texas. The Eastern District of Texas—which includes the Marshall Division—is known to be one of the largest as far as numbers of patent litigation lawsuit filings in the U.S. The economic impact on the region has been significant, as service industries such as hotels, temporary offices, restaurants and catering companies grew to serve the regular flow of litigators and their clients coming to Marshall for hearings and trials from around the country. Several national and regional law firms specializing in patent litigation opened satellite offices in and around Marshall to serve their frequent needs for access to the busy courthouse.

The Federal Circuit recently issued an opinion affirming the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which held that Athena’s medical diagnostic methods were directed toward laws of nature and patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, No. 17-2508, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3645 (Fed Cir. Feb. 6, 2019) (Before Newman, Lourie, and Stoll, Circuit Judges) (Opinion for the Court, Lourie, Circuit Judge) (Dissenting Opinion, Newman, Circuit Judge).
The inventors of U.S. Patent 7,267,820 (the 820 Patent) discovered that about 20% of patients with the neurological disorder myasthenia gravis (MG) generate autoantibodies to a membrane protein called MuSK. Until their discovery, no disease had ever been associated with the protein. The ‘820 patent disclosed and claimed methods for diagnosing neurological disorders by detecting antibodies that bind to MuSK. Athena Diagnostics (Athena), the ‘820 Patent’s exclusive licensee, sued Mayo Collaborative Services (Mayo) for infringement. Mayo moved to dismiss, and the district court granted Mayo’s motion, concluding that the patent claimed ineligible subject matter and was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Athena appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.

This week in Other Barks & Bites: the USPTO appoints a new Chief Information Officer; Apple uses Qualcomm chips in Germany while American professors urge the ITC to deny exclusion of iPhones found to infringe Qualcomm patent claims; two important IP cases will be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court next week; the EU approves copyright reforms, including the hotly-debated Article 13; Fresh Prince of Bel-Air star Alfonso Ribeiro runs into issues at U.S. Copyright Office; Facebook could owe billions in fines for consumer data practices; a jury verdict dings Walmart for nearly $100 million in trademark infringement case; and Google announces multi-billion dollar plan to expand offices and data centers across the United States.

Is an invention arrived at by multiple inventors within a short space of time necessarily obvious? If not, how far may the evidence of simultaneous or contemporaneous invention go toward proving obviousness? Simultaneous invention is not common, but evidence of such invention, when present, can be important for reaching a conclusion of obviousness. Simultaneous invention can sometimes occur in the aftermath of the introduction of an enabling or foundational technology, when multiple groups working independently solve a problem, which, but for the foundational technology, would not have been possible. A recent example of this scenario can be found in the litigation related to the CRISPR-Cas9 technology, which culminated in a decision by the Federal Circuit in September 2018. University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018) (UC v. Broad).

On the morning of February 14, the New Hampshire Supreme Court will hear what could be one of this year’s most important set of arguments related to patent ownership taking place outside of the federal judiciary. At 10:30 AM that morning, the Court will listen to oral arguments in Automated Transactions, LLC and David Barcelou v. American Bankers Association et. al. to determine whether the New Hampshire Superior Court erred by dismissing a defamation case after finding that the term “patent troll” isn’t necessarily pejorative. Automated Transactions and David Barcelou alleged that the defendants in the action made defamatory statements by referring to them as a “patent troll.” This exposed them to hatred, ridicule and contempt, which caused them to be ignored by automated transaction machine (ATM) operators across the country and injured their legitimate business of licensing patents that they developed and that were issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The appeal argues that the Superior Court did not examine the full context of the reference to the term “patent troll” when making its determination, dismissing the action before the plaintiffs were able to present any evidence or proof and depriving them of their rights to a trial on the merits.

Here we go again! Another patent whose claims have been invalidated at the Federal Circuit—predictably, another medical diagnostic patent. Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2019). This is getting old, tired and fundamentally ridiculous. The statute, which is all of one-sentence long, specifically lists discoveries as patent eligible. So why are discoveries being declared patent ineligible? To the extent these decisions are mandated by the Supreme Court, they directly contradict the easy to understand and very direct language of the statute. The Federal Circuit is wrong, period. Perhaps they are so close to these cases and trying so hard to do what they think is right that they have lost perspective, but these rulings are fundamentally saying that discoveries are not patent eligible. We are told repeatedly that they are mandated by Supreme Court precedent. Obviously, that cannot be correct. The statute says: “Whoever invents or discovers… may obtain a patent…” Clearly, Congress wants discoveries to be patented, and in our system of governance, Congress has supremacy over the Supreme Court with respect to setting the law unless the law is unconstitutional. 35 U.S.C. 101 has never been declared unconstitutional, so discoveries must be patent eligible, period. It is time to face the facts—the Supreme Court has considered only bad cases, with bad facts, where there was really no innovation presented in the claims, or even in the patent application as a whole. These decisions have absolutely no meaning or proper application with respect to any inventions, let alone inventions of monumental complexity such as true artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, or new medical diagnostics that allow risk-free testing of common ailments, where previously existing tests required potentially catastrophic risk.