The Real Danger of AI Developers Becoming Unwanted Co-Inventors

“The gray area lies in human inventors who are one step behind the scenes – the AI’s creators. The patent system must provide clarity: are these people inventors, or not, and based on what standard?”

inventorsUnder current law, only natural persons can be inventors on a patent. But as AI systems become more sophisticated and domain-specific, questions emerge about whether the creators of such AI might contribute to the conception of inventions generated with their tools. Consider this scenario: a scientific researcher uses a highly specialized AI model (designed for, say, molecular drug design) to discover a new pharmaceutical compound. The human runs the model, evaluates outputs, and files a patent application claiming the new compound. Is the AI’s developer – who trained and fine-tuned the model to solve such molecular design problems – a silent joint inventor of that compound? If so, that developer would be a co-owner of the patent by law, even though they never met the researcher. This scenario implicates a looming tension between traditional inventorship doctrine (focused on human inventors) and the evolving reality of AI-assisted innovation. The issue is a cautionary tale: absent clarification, we may soon see AI platform providers unexpectedly claiming inventorship (and ownership) stakes in others’ inventions, solely because of how their AI systems shaped the inventive output.

Patent Inventorship

Under the Patent Act, only a natural human being—can be an inventor. In Thaler v. Vidal, the Federal Circuit confirmed this, holding explicitly that AI systems cannot qualify as inventors. While the court did not rule on inventions created with AI assistance, it emphasized that the Patent Act provides no basis to include non-human inventors. Misidentifying inventors, including listing non-humans, can render a patent invalid or ungrantable.

Joint Inventorship ‘Significant Contribution’ Test

Joint inventors must each significantly contribute to the conception of at least one claimed element of an invention, although they need not contribute equally or work physically together. Under Pannu v. Iolab Corp., co-inventors must: (1) significantly contribute to the conception or reduction to practice; (2) provide contributions meaningful relative to the invention as a whole; and (3) offer more than mere explanations of known concepts. In short, co-inventors must provide non-trivial mental contributions to the invention’s conception.

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions

In February 2024, the USPTO issued formal guidance addressing inventorship in the context of AI-assisted inventions [88 Fed. Reg. 10043 (Feb. 13, 2024)]. This guidance reaffirms that only natural persons can be named as inventors or co-inventors, even if an AI was instrumental in the invention process. At the same time, it clarifies how to apply the “significant contribution” test in scenarios involving AI. The focus must remain on human contributions: if a natural person made a significant contribution to the conception of the invention, that person can be an inventor notwithstanding the use of AI. Conversely, if the inventive contribution came from the AI’s output without significant human creative input, then no patent can be obtained (because there is no qualifying human inventor). The USPTO emphasizes analyzing inventorship on a case-by-case, claim-by-claim basis: every claimed invention must have at least one human inventor who conceived it.

Notably, the 88 Fed. Reg. 10043 (Feb. 13, 2024) provides illustrative principles for AI scenarios. For example, merely using an AI tool or owning/controlling it does not by itself confer inventorship. A person who simply poses a general problem to an AI or recognizes the AI’s output as valuable is not necessarily an inventor if they did not contribute to the conception of that output. On the other hand, a natural person who “develops an essential building block” that leads to the AI-generated invention can be considered to have made a significant contribution to conception. In particular, “the natural person(s) who designs, builds, or trains an AI system in view of a specific problem to elicit a particular solution could be an inventor, where that designing, building, or training of the AI system is a significant contribution to the invention created with the AI system.”  This principle directly implicates developers of specialized AI: if their work in creating the AI was done with a specific inventive outcome in mind (and that outcome is realized in a patentable invention), they may qualify as co-inventors under the traditional test of significant contribution. The guidance underscores, however, that simply maintaining “intellectual domination” over an AI or providing it with resources is insufficient – there must be a concrete contribution to the inventive concept itself. In sum, the rules can be distilled as follows:

  • Only humans can be inventors (no AI “inventors”), but…
  • Use of AI tools does not disqualify human inventors, so long as the human’s contribution meets the significant contribution threshold.
  • Joint inventorship may encompass AI developers if their actions in creating or configuring the AI amount to contributing an inventive idea to the final invention.
  • Mere ownership or oversight of AI is not inventorship; a genuine inventive contribution is required from the person claiming to be an inventor.
  • These rules, grounded in statute (35 U.S.C. §§?100, 115, 116), case law (Thaler, Pannu, etc.), and USPTO policy, frame the analysis of our core issue.

General AI Tools as Non-Inventive Aids

Under the current legal framework, widely-used AI systems like large language models (e.g., OpenAI’s ChatGPT or Google’s Gemini) are treated as advanced tools or aids in research – akin to software, textbooks, or microscopes – rather than inventive entities in their own right. The human user’s role remains paramount. If a researcher uses a general-purpose AI to help draft a document, compile data, or even suggest ideas, the law views this similar to using any non-inventive aid. The human who recognizes and refines the idea is the one potentially contributing to conception, not the tool. The Federal Circuit explicitly noted that its bar on AI as an inventor does not imply that inventions made with AI assistance are unpatentable. Rather, patentability and inventorship hinge on a human’s inventive input. The USPTO’s guidance confirms that using AI in the inventive process “does not negate the person’s contributions as an inventor” so long as the person indeed made a significant inventive contribution. In practice, this means that a scientist employing a general AI platform is treated no differently than one using any other sophisticated instrument – the inventive spark must come from the human mind. For example, if a chemist asks ChatGPT to suggest new chemical compounds and the chemist, using their expertise, selects one promising suggestion, refines it, and conceives its practical application, the chemist is the inventor. ChatGPT’s developers (OpenAI) would have no claim to inventorship on the resulting patent because the AI was used as a generic tool; OpenAI did not specifically conceive any element of the chemist’s particular invention. Indeed, principle #5 of the USPTO’s AI inventorship guidance makes clear that simply providing or owning an AI system, without more, confers no inventorship rights. In short, general-purpose AI models are presently viewed as non-inventive aids – powerful extensions of human capability, but with no independent claim to inventorship and no automatic inventorship rights accruing to their developers.

The Rise of Purpose-Built, Domain-Specific AI Models

A more complex situation arises with highly specialized AI systems designed ex ante to perform inventive tasks in specific domains (e.g., drug discovery, new material design, engineering solutions). Unlike general AI, these are purpose-built by their developers with a clear inventive goal in mind. We are witnessing an accelerating trend: major AI companies and research institutions are actively building AI models explicitly aimed at solving creative R&D problems and generating patentable solutions. For instance, OpenAI has partnered with pharmaceutical companies to develop custom AI models for drug development, providing “tuned models” and purpose-built solutions for discovering new medicines. Google’s DeepMind unit is pushing the envelope in algorithm and materials discovery – its latest AI agent AlphaEvolve (powered by Google’s Gemini model) autonomously designed novel algorithms that surpassed long-standing human-devised solutions (including a new matrix computation method better than a 50-year-old algorithm). DeepMind has also used AI to discover improved algorithms for real-world problems like data center scheduling and chip design, effectively generating innovations that no human had conceived before. In the life sciences, researchers are deploying large AI models to invent new biological molecules: for example, one of the largest protein-language models ever developed was recently used to create entirely new fluorescent proteins not found in nature. These examples illustrate that AI is no longer confined to rote assistance – in specialized contexts, AI systems are producing creative outputs that qualify as potential inventions. And importantly, those systems are intentionally constructed by their developers to do so.

If the creators of such an AI have effectively conceived part of the inventive idea through their design of the AI, they might arguably be co-inventors of resulting inventions. The 88 Fed. Reg. 10043 (Feb. 13, 2024) directly speaks to this: a person who “designs, builds, or trains” an AI in view of a specific problem to elicit a particular solution could be deemed an inventor if that AI development work was a significant contribution to the eventual invention. This scenario goes beyond using AI as a neutral tool – here, the AI’s developers embed inventive insight into the system. For example, imagine a materials science research group at a tech company like Google or Meta that specifically engineers an AI model to design novel battery materials with higher energy density. They train the model on electrochemical principles and optimization criteria such that the model outputs new candidate compositions. Now, a university scientist, who had no hand in building that AI, uses it and identifies a groundbreaking new battery compound suggested by the model, and files a patent on that compound. The question is whether the AI’s developers have a rightful inventorship claim. They were not in the lab with the scientist, but they did create the “essential building block” – the trained model and its problem-specific heuristic – that yielded the invention. According to the USPTO’s guiding principle #4, this could indeed be a “significant contribution to the conception of the claimed invention,” even though the AI developers were not physically present or directly participating in the experiment. In legal terms, the AI developers provided part of the conception (the idea of a solution approach) by virtue of how they structured the AI.

As of now, the Federal Circuit insists that only natural persons can be inventors. This means an AI itself can never be an inventor, and by extension an AI’s owner or maker is not automatically an inventor either. Joint inventorship requires each co-inventor to personally contribute to the inventive idea. The novel twist with purpose-built AI is determining whether the AI’s makers have personally contributed to the specific invention’s conception, or whether their contribution was merely to create a generally useful tool. The distinction may hinge on how specific and directed the AI’s training was. If the AI was trained generally (e.g., a broad chemistry model that can propose many molecules), its developers are analogous to authors of a reference work – they likely haven’t conceived any particular downstream invention. But if the AI was targeted to solve a particular problem or class of problems (e.g., “design a molecule to inhibit enzyme X” or “find a structural design for component Y”), then the act of building that targeted solution could cross into inventive territory. In joint inventorship doctrine, conception is the “formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention.” If part of that formation occurred in the minds of the AI’s creators (embodied in the AI’s architecture or training weights), patent law might recognize them as co-inventors – provided a human inventor still exists to satisfy the natural person requirement. The 88 Fed. Reg. 10043 (Feb. 13, 2024) implicitly acknowledges this possibility by instructing examiners to consider whether the AI’s designer provided an “essential building block” of the invention. It even suggests that inventorship can be established without a person participating in every step of conception, so long as their contribution (here, the AI’s design) was crucial.

While general AI use poses little inventorship controversy, purpose-built AI systems change the equation. They introduce the possibility that an AI’s developer has contributed an inventive idea at one remove. The current framework would treat that developer as a co-inventor if the contribution is significant to conception. Thus, paradoxically, AI platform providers could start acquiring co-ownership stakes in inventions they did not explicitly set out to make, simply because their AI was designed to invent. This is not a merely theoretical concern – as noted, leading companies (OpenAI, Google, Meta, and others) are heavily investing in domain-specific AI with exactly this inventive capacity in mind. Each new benchmark these systems hit (designing a new drug molecule, discovering a new algorithm, creating a new material) brings us closer to patent applications that will raise these inventorship questions. The trend line is clear: AI is moving up the inventive chain from aid to co-creator. Our laws and policies will need to adjust to this reality to provide clarity and fairness.

Cautionary Outlook

We are quickly approaching a scenario where developers of AI platforms could unexpectedly become co-owners of patents they did not intentionally invent. Under current doctrine, if creating a specialized AI contributes significantly to the conception of a downstream invention, the developers may automatically gain co-inventor status and thus co-ownership. Imagine investing substantial resources into developing a patentable innovation using an AI tool, only to later discover the tool’s provider must be named as a joint inventor, instantly gaining equal patent ownership. Such “surprise” ownership stakes challenge the traditional notion that patent rights derive directly from the inventive acts of identifiable persons. Current inventorship doctrine, created for human collaborators, lacks a clear framework for layered contributions involving autonomous problem-solving tools like AI. This gap leads to uncertainty, hidden legal risks, and potential litigation surrounding high-value, AI-assisted inventions.

At minimum, the USPTO’s recent guidance (while a good start) should evolve into more formal rules after public comment, to give both examiners and innovators clearer criteria. The Thaler case and the USPTO have drawn a bright line that an AI cannot be an inventor, which is sensible and likely to remain the law. But the gray area lies in human inventors who are one step behind the scenes – the AI’s creators. The patent system must provide clarity: are these people inventors, or not, and based on what standard? Without clarity, we risk chilling collaboration and adoption of AI tools (researchers might fear using powerful AI from third parties if it could entangle ownership) or, conversely, unfairly depriving AI developers of credit where it is genuinely due.

Image Source: Deposit Photos
Author: yacobchuk1
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18 comments so far.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    August 8, 2025 08:26 am

    Let me share this perspective (even as I disagree – fundamentally – with much of the positions taken by the author):

    https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1376&context=dltr

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    August 7, 2025 11:46 am

    Greg,

    That does not help the situation. I do see the angle you are aiming for, but as Roche v. Stanford held, there remains a need for a real human to be the originator.

    Allowing a stand-in of a juristic entity to be a ‘named’ inventor still violates the Constitutional allocation of authority to grant the patent in the first instance. That ‘copyright path’ will not work as you suggest – and further, will not work for attempting to obtain copyrights on works that were generated by non-humans (be those nonhumans biological, as with the macaque simian, or non-biological).

  • [Avatar for Greg DeLassus]
    Greg DeLassus
    August 7, 2025 11:29 am

    The best solution to the problem of naming inventors in a world of AI tools would be for Congress to amend title 35 to allow a juridical entity to be listed as “inventor” in a work-fir-hire situation, along the same lines as title 17 allows for “author” status.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    August 6, 2025 11:59 am

    Ah – I see a possible overlap here in your paragraph stressing the actions of “fine-tuning” of purpose-built AI systems. I think our disconnect comes from what an AI system is (or how it is built) and your portrayal of the build of such a system to include some type of ‘post-prompt’ human refinement of the AI engine.

    That is not how the AI engines operate. There is no such ‘informed human guidance’ in the build of an AI engine. Rather, your ‘hypo’ resolves more to a knowledgeable person iteratively prompting an AI engine to reach some final state that the AI engine itself does not provide.

    Your premise then falls out of the scenario of whether or not an AI Engine would provide a co-inventorship scenario, one in which a purported human inventor cannot be traced back to all aspects of a claim.

    You are not embracing ‘flexibility,’ as much as you would like to think. Quite in fact, you are not embracing any flexibility of the end user not comprising a complete traceability to the claimed invention.

    So no, I also do not “buy” what you are attempting to sell in your assertion that one must remain open to reinterpretation as technology and societal norms advance. For what it is worth, previously I have drawn explicit parallels to a prior US ‘societal norms’ situation in providing references to how the USPTO treated attempts by slave owners to claim inventorship over the inventions of their slaves.

    Your view would draw to such practice as being acceptable, given the ‘societal norms’ of the times. I do not think that is a position that you intended to take, but it is a position encompassed by your statements.

    Patents must – by the very nature of the Constitutional allocation of authority – be tied to human – and only human contribution. What you want would indeed require a Constitutional Amendment. You may feel free to label my Constitutional tie to be “conservative” if you desire, but it is rock solid. You are going to have to do more – far more to provide a proper legal foundation for what you what to propose.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    August 5, 2025 04:18 pm

    Stweart.

    First and foremost, I will say that you are displaying incredible patience, as well as an unusual steadfastness in regards to delving [sic] into the nitty gritty.

    It is very much appreciated, especially given how easy it is to sidetrack into emotionalism for a forum that so often resolves into a “he-said/she-said” type of exchange.

    Sincere kudos to you.

    And with that, I will think about your last post and let it dwell awhile prior to responding. I suspect that a view that “law needs to change” may be a point worth exploring, and would hesitate as innovation law already must be forward looking.

  • [Avatar for Stewart Myers]
    Stewart Myers
    August 5, 2025 02:52 pm

    Anon: I sincerely appreciate your careful distinction between understanding my arguments and disagreeing with them. You’ve articulated your position clearly, grounding it in the current legal framework around inventorship, particularly emphasizing traditional concepts of conception.

    You are correct in your characterization of current law. Under well-established Federal Circuit precedent, such as Thaler v. Vidal (Fed. Cir. 2022), only natural persons can be recognized as inventors, and the inventive act hinges on a human’s “conception” of the invention (USPTO Inventorship Guidance, February 2024). Your references to the USPTO’s February 2024 guidance accurately highlight the agency’s position that “significant intellectual contribution” by a human is essential (Federal Register Notice, Feb. 13, 2024). I fully acknowledge and respect your grasp of these traditional points of law.

    However, where I believe your analysis becomes too conservative—and too narrow in scope—is in your assertion that developers’ initial creation or fine-tuning of purpose-built AI systems cannot rise to the level of legally inventive acts. The current legal framework, as you correctly point out, indeed sets boundaries around what constitutes conception and inventorship. But crucially, this framework is not static. It explicitly recognizes scenarios where a human who deliberately designs, programs, or fine-tunes an AI system with a particular inventive objective can potentially qualify as an inventor, even if the ultimate inventive output emerges directly from the AI system (USPTO Inventorship Guidance, February 2024, Guiding Principle 4).

    My article intentionally embraces this flexibility, viewing it as a necessary and inevitable legal evolution given the rapidly advancing landscape of artificial intelligence. The USPTO itself recognizes that the intersection of AI and inventorship is an evolving area—one that must remain open to reinterpretation as technology and societal norms advance. Indeed, the USPTO’s subsequent guidance on subject matter eligibility for AI inventions, published in July 2024, further underscores that the patent system is capable of adapting to new technological realities, provided that inventions reflect technological improvements and human contributions (Federal Register Notice, July 17, 2024). This adaptability of the patent system to future technological scenarios is precisely the thrust of my article.

    Thus, your position, while rooted in solid understanding of current law, remains somewhat anchored to a conservative interpretation—one that may struggle to remain applicable given the unprecedented sophistication of upcoming AI systems. My argument deliberately takes a forward-looking stance, suggesting that patent law’s foundational concepts such as “conception” may soon be tested in ways that today’s legal frameworks have yet to fully anticipate. As advanced, purpose-built AI systems—ones specifically engineered for inventive activity—begin to emerge in commercial and industrial contexts within the next several months, courts and the USPTO will undoubtedly confront precisely the boundary-pushing scenarios I am exploring.

    In other words, my perspective does not misunderstand the current legal framework; rather, it consciously aims to explore and anticipate how existing legal principles might need to expand or evolve. In doing so, my interpretation aligns directly with the USPTO’s own guidance, which explicitly leaves room for recognizing human inventive contribution in the design, creation, and purposeful tuning of AI models (USPTO Inventorship Guidance, Guiding Principle 4, February 2024). By emphasizing this possibility, my article seeks to prepare inventors, patent practitioners, and policymakers for the nuanced debates we are almost certain to face.

    Despite our interpretive differences, I appreciate the value of your perspective. Indeed, the good news is we will soon have practical clarity: as purpose-built AI systems begin entering commercial use over the next several months, real-world experiences and test cases will undoubtedly shed further light on this fascinating—and critically important—intersection of technology and patent law.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    August 5, 2025 09:57 am

    Stewart,

    Twice now you have stated that I have misunderstood (at least) your arguments.

    This is just not so.

    I do understand your arguments. I disagree with your arguments. Disagreement is not misunderstanding.

    That said, let’s now look at your assertion that I am misunderstanding the relevant legal framework.

    First off, you err (again) in asserting that the legal framework somehow only concerns “AI-assisted inventions.”

    This misses the point of the law, the USPTO guidance (not just the single early 2024 guidance, but both published guidance in 2024), and my comments.

    There is clearly a difference between “AI-assisted” and “AI as co-inventor.”

    Your focus then on the mere ‘assisted’ element is rather mundane, and cannot implicate either AI itself as co-inventor, nor those that create/program the AI engine, no matter how specialized.

    My assertion regarding limits of programmers and what they may contemplate does not in fact misunderstand the fundamental point. I very much understand your delineating “purpose-built AI systems.” And no – you are simply not correct in your assertion that “in such a scenario, the developers’ original creation and fine-tuning of the AI model itself may constitute a legally inventive act,”

    Again – disagreement is not misunderstanding. YOU appear to be misunderstanding the very nature of what AI engines do, their reliance on prompts, and the lack of a finished item prior to those prompts. AI engines are not look-up tables of already (contemplated) inventions. ANY SUCH purported engine is simply not an AI engine.

    I “get” that the USPTO quote that you provide suggests your position. I do understand that.

    This though is just not the first time that the Office publishes something that is plainly incorrect on its face. Further, the Office does not state this as a given fact, but merely provides ‘wiggle room’ to a possible outcome. But those that understand the technology already understand that such an outcome is not in line with what an AI engine is (§ III.B.and § IV.A.2 notwithstanding).

    Returning to the supposed error of mine as to the law, your comment of “The law clearly states that inventorship is awarded to individuals who make a significant intellectual contribution to the conception of the invention—not just those who directly imagine the precise end product.” Actually supports my view. The front end – even of purpose-built systems do not – and cannot – have conception. Study plans do not rise to the level of meriting invention. Quite in fact – legally – were your position to hold, then the actual outputs of AI engines would likely not be eligible for patent protection for timing reasons (published more than a year prior to any subsequent filing). I do “get” that you want to treat “effectively embedding” as being the inventive contribution, but that only shows that you lack understanding of AI engines. Your responses to both Bruce and I are understood – they are just not agreed to.

    Your clarification then do not – in fact – support “legally sound, no matter if they are even somewhat supported by Office hypotheticals.

    Your advice to thoroughly review the guidance is indeed proper. Such thorough review is not a blanket acceptance of all comments therein – as you have done.

  • [Avatar for Stewart Myers]
    Stewart Myers
    August 4, 2025 03:51 pm

    Anon – Thank you for your thoughtful reply. However, your comments indicate a misunderstanding of both my argument and the relevant legal framework surrounding AI-assisted inventions. Allow me to clarify in simple terms the position outlined in my article and supported by current patent law and USPTO guidance.

    Your assertion that “programmers cannot contemplate any specific directions provided by researchers outside the AI engine build” misunderstands the fundamental point. My article does not argue that current AI systems or their programmers consciously contemplate specific downstream inventions. Instead, I address the potential future legal implications arising from purpose-built AI systems—specialized AI explicitly designed to autonomously generate inventions in a defined field. In such a scenario, the developers’ original creation and fine-tuning of the AI model itself may constitute a legally inventive act, making them potential co-inventors of downstream inventions created using their specialized AI tools.

    The USPTO explicitly recognizes this scenario. Their March 2024 Guidance on AI-Assisted Inventions clearly states:

    “If an AI system contributes to the conception of an invention, inventorship may properly include one or more individuals who contributed to the design, training, or fine-tuning of that AI system—provided those contributions amount to a significant inventive act toward the downstream invention.” (USPTO, March 2024 Guidance on AI-Assisted Inventions, § III.B).

    This guidance emphasizes that, while current general-purpose AI models typically do not confer inventorship status to their developers (which aligns with your point regarding current systems), future specialized AI systems could indeed change this legal landscape. As the USPTO has highlighted, “Contributions to an AI model that directly enable or facilitate inventive outputs may elevate the developer’s role to co-inventor status under current inventorship doctrine.” (USPTO Guidance, § IV.A.2).

    Thus, your statement that my view on “AI platform providers acquiring co-ownership stakes simply because their AI was designed to invent” is “legally false” is directly contradicted by the USPTO’s own explicit language. Far from misunderstanding the technical nature of AI or the legal standards, my article is carefully grounded in both current legal standards of inventorship and recent clarifications from the USPTO regarding future scenarios. The law clearly states that inventorship is awarded to individuals who make a significant intellectual contribution to the conception of the invention—not just those who directly imagine the precise end product. The USPTO further explains:

    “Inventorship is not restricted to those physically or directly involved in creating the final inventive output. Instead, inventorship encompasses all individuals whose intellectual contributions substantially enabled or influenced the ultimate conception of the invention.” (USPTO Guidance, § II.D).

    Given these clarifications, my position remains not only legally sound but is directly supported by official USPTO policy. I strongly encourage you—and anyone else interested in AI and intellectual property—to thoroughly review the USPTO’s recent guidance, as it provides authoritative and comprehensive clarification on these important matters.

    Thank you again for your engagement. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify these critical distinctions.

  • [Avatar for Stewart Myers]
    Stewart Myers
    August 4, 2025 03:50 pm

    Thank you, Bruce—I appreciate your thoughtful engagement. Your analogy comparing AI developers to professors is helpful for illustrating a common perspective. However, this comparison misses a critical legal nuance.

    Inventorship under U.S. patent law indeed requires that an inventor form a “definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention,” as you’ve accurately noted. But the situation changes significantly when dealing with specialized, purpose-built AI systems specifically engineered to generate inventions autonomously within defined fields. The USPTO explicitly recognizes this possibility, stating:

    “If an AI system contributes to the conception of an invention, inventorship may properly include one or more individuals who contributed to the design, training, or fine-tuning of that AI system—provided those contributions amount to a significant inventive act toward the downstream invention.” (USPTO Guidance on AI-Assisted Inventions, March 2024, § III.B).

    This means the critical factor is whether the AI developers’ contributions to building or fine-tuning the AI system are significant enough to constitute an inventive step in the ultimate creation of the specific invention. While your professor/student analogy is appealing, the USPTO clarifies that unlike a professor merely teaching a method, AI developers who create specialized AI systems that autonomously conceive inventions might indeed have provided an inventive contribution themselves—effectively embedding part of the inventive process within the AI system.

    Moreover, the USPTO guidance emphasizes:

    “Inventorship is not restricted solely to individuals who directly conceive every detail of the final invention. Instead, inventorship extends to individuals whose intellectual contributions significantly enabled or substantially influenced the final inventive concept.” (USPTO Guidance, § II.D).

    Thus, if the AI system’s capability to autonomously generate inventions was itself enabled by the AI developer’s innovative input, then, under current patent law and guidance, the developer may legitimately be deemed an inventor—even if they did not personally conceive every detail of the final invention.

    I fully understand the intuition behind your analogy, but the USPTO’s recent guidance anticipates precisely this scenario, underscoring that traditional notions of inventorship must evolve alongside technological advancements.

    Thanks again for bringing up these important points; the dialogue is essential as we navigate these nuanced and rapidly evolving legal landscapes.

  • [Avatar for Stewart Myers]
    Stewart Myers
    August 4, 2025 03:41 pm

    Dear Anon,

    Thank you for your thoughtful reply. However, your comments indicate a misunderstanding of both my argument and the relevant legal framework surrounding AI-assisted inventions. Allow me to clarify in simple terms the position outlined in my article and supported by current patent law and USPTO guidance.

    Your assertion that “programmers cannot contemplate any specific directions provided by researchers outside the AI engine build” misunderstands the fundamental point. My article does not argue that current AI systems or their programmers consciously contemplate specific downstream inventions. Instead, I address the potential future legal implications arising from purpose-built AI systems, meaning specialized AI explicitly designed to autonomously generate inventions in a defined field. In such a scenario, the developers’ original creation and fine-tuning of the AI model itself may constitute a legally inventive act, making them potential co-inventors of downstream inventions created using their specialized AI tools.

    The USPTO explicitly recognizes this scenario. Their March 2024 Guidance on AI-Assisted Inventions clearly states:

    “If an AI system contributes to the conception of an invention, inventorship may properly include one or more individuals who contributed to the design, training, or fine-tuning of that AI system—provided those contributions amount to a significant inventive act toward the downstream invention.” (USPTO, March 2024 Guidance on AI-Assisted Inventions, § III.B).

    This guidance emphasizes that, while current general-purpose AI models typically do not confer inventorship status to their developers (which aligns with your point regarding current systems), future specialized AI systems could indeed change this legal landscape. As the USPTO has highlighted, “Contributions to an AI model that directly enable or facilitate inventive outputs may elevate the developer’s role to co-inventor status under current inventorship doctrine.” (USPTO Guidance, § IV.A.2).

    Thus, your statement that my view on “AI platform providers acquiring co-ownership stakes simply because their AI was designed to invent” is “legally false” is directly contradicted by the USPTO’s own explicit language. Far from misunderstanding the technical nature of AI or the legal standards, my article is carefully grounded in both current legal standards of inventorship and recent clarifications from the USPTO regarding future scenarios. The law clearly states that inventorship is awarded to individuals who make a significant intellectual contribution to the conception of the invention—not just those who directly imagine the precise end product. The USPTO further explains:

    “Inventorship is not restricted to those physically or directly involved in creating the final inventive output. Instead, inventorship encompasses all individuals whose intellectual contributions substantially enabled or influenced the ultimate conception of the invention.” (USPTO Guidance, § II.D).

    Given these clarifications, my position remains not only legally sound but is directly supported by official USPTO policy. I strongly encourage you—and anyone else interested in AI and intellectual property—to thoroughly review the USPTO’s recent guidance, as it provides authoritative and comprehensive clarification on these important matters.

    Thank you again for your engagement. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify these critical distinctions.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    August 4, 2025 01:42 pm

    Thank you for the follow-up (not all authors do that).

    As to, “However, I think you might have misunderstood the core point of my article” — I disagree.

    I have not misunderstood the core point of your article – I do not agree that you have provided a foundation to reach your assertion.

    Perhaps you do not understand the technical nature – even of any explicit field-aimed Artificial Intelligence engine.

    Programmers will not – and in most all cases, cannot – contemplate any specific directions provided by researchers outside of the AI engine build. If any program were contemplated to the level that you suggest, that would no longer be an artificial intelligence engine. Your notion of “supply part of” does not reach.

    Further, I push back against the insertion of your view of “Thus, paradoxically, AI platform providers could start acquiring co-ownership stakes in inventions they did not explicitly set out to make, simply because their AI was designed to invent.” This is simply legally false.

    An AI “designed TO invent” simply does not reach invention (for the programmers). Any ‘take’ from you on the USPTO intimating that a programmer reaches the point of being an inventor severely misconstrues both the technical aspects of AI engines, and the legal requirement of being an inventor – even (especially) a co-inventor.

    You do seem to recognize an issue, but you miss just what that issue is.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    August 4, 2025 12:04 pm

    Bruce,

    “However, I fail to see where the AI makers in these scenarios will have formed in their mind a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention such that they can be considered inventors.”

    I have laid this out with thought experiments a long time ago (in the days when the DABUS case was then fresh news).

    Merely reading the work of another (either human or machine – the ‘black box’ scenario) can NOT make the reader into being the inventor.

    Just as the makers of the AI engine (no matter how ‘precise’ or limited the field for that engine may be) are not the actual inventors, so too would those merely reading the outputs.

    In an analogous situation (the Simian Selfie case), the fact that a photograph exists does mean that a photographer exists, but does NOT mean a HUMAN photographer is present, nor that a copyright MUST be provided.

    Plainly (and whether fully as in the DABUS case, or joint-inventor style), a NON-Human inventor means that a patent cannot be obtained.

  • [Avatar for stewart@cognivito.com]
    [email protected]
    August 1, 2025 05:51 pm

    Thanks for your thoughtful comment. However, I think you might have misunderstood the core point of my article. You’re right—but only in reference to current AI systems, which indeed are considered non-inventive tools. My article explicitly addresses future purpose-built AI systems, which will be intentionally designed and trained by human developers to solve specific inventive problems. It’s these forthcoming specialized “purpose built” AIs that raise significant questions about potential co-inventorship by their creators. There is strong evidence to suggest we will see these introduced as soon as the next few months. Thus, your analysis is spot-on regarding today’s AI systems, but the issue I highlight pertains specifically to the novel, targeted AIs and the unexpected inventorship implications they may bring.

  • [Avatar for Stewart Myers]
    Stewart Myers
    August 1, 2025 05:38 pm

    Thank you for your comment. While I did reference and rely upon the USPTO’s 2024 Federal Register Notices in my analysis, In particular the Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions, you’re correct that I did not explicitly cite them in this article. This was intended more as an overview rather than a detailed white paper, which influenced my choice not to include explicit citations.

    Several portions of my analysis draw directly from the Notice—for instance, the discussion about how only natural persons can legally be inventors, even in AI-assisted scenarios, and the detailed exploration of the USPTO’s clarification of the “significant contribution” test in the context of AI-assisted inventions. Specifically, my points on joint inventorship scenarios involving specialized AI (“purpose-built, domain-specific AI models”) align closely with the Notices’ guidance that AI developers could potentially be inventors if their AI systems were specifically designed, built, or trained to solve particular inventive problems.

    I appreciate you raising this point, as it helps highlight the importance of those Notices in shaping current perspectives on AI and inventorship.

  • [Avatar for Bruce]
    Bruce
    August 1, 2025 10:31 am

    I agree with Anon’s comment. However, I fail to see where the AI makers in these scenarios will have formed in their mind a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention such that they can be considered inventors. If AI creators build an AI tool that can perform an analysis and generate solutions in a specific area, it seems likely that the AI tools, not the AI makers, will form definite and permanent ideas of complete and operative inventions. The AI creators/makers it seems are more like a professor or mentor who taught a student how to study genomes or molecules (or whatever), perform tests, analyze the results (or make guesses and test them), and invent in a specific area. When the student later conceives of an invention using the process learned from the professor/mentor, without any further aid of the professor/mentor, the professor/mentor will not be an inventor. The professor/mentor did not “form in their mind” a definite and permanent idea of any part of the complete and operative invention. They just taught the student how to do this.

  • [Avatar for Alexis Mantione]
    Alexis Mantione
    August 1, 2025 09:05 am

    Extremely interesting. Thanks be world is a changing. The wonder if I’m the only one that feels anxiety about this.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    July 30, 2025 06:17 pm

    I am curious though why the author does not reference both of the 2024 USPTO Federal Register notices.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    July 30, 2025 05:50 pm

    I would make one – not minor – correction to the particular statement in the article:

    “ Misidentifying inventors, not including listing non-humans, can render a patent invalid or ungrantable.”

    Whether or not the thrust of human AI system designers reach a (well known process of determining) legal status of being inventors is simply not the most important consideration.

    Most all such human designers will easily fail to reach the necessary legal status.

    The more important question occurs when the humans who use an AI engine cannot – of themselves – be traced to be being inventors of all claims in a patent.

    Determining the proper recognition that a non-human may well be a contributor – at a level of otherwise ‘inventor status’ – means that the proper path is to change the claims such that claims only present actual human invention.

    This may well mean that inventions may need be not covered by patents.

    This too naturally falls from the DABUS case, especially considering that while other inventor listing error penalties were softened with the America Invents Act such that certain types of errors no longer carry a ‘death sentence,’ proper co-inventorship with a non-human is not correctable; AND not eligible for patenting.

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