Posts Tagged: "Writ of Certiorari"

On December 3rd, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in TVEyes, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, declining the opportunity to decide what would have been the Court’s first case on fair use in a copyright context in 20 years. Denying the petition, the Supreme Court declined to answer whether a transformative use of a copyrighted work causes a cognizable market harm under 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) if it is used in connection with a commercially successful business that the author is unlikely to enter or authorize.

Why in the world would the federal government want to be an active participant in invalidating patents that the USPTO grants? Does the federal government believe that an insufficient number of patents are challenged through inter partes reviews, that there is insufficient gang tackling (which occurs when another petitioner requests joinder using a near-photocopy of the original petition), or that there are insufficient serial attacks on the same patents? To put the last issue in other words, does the federal government really believe that nine attacks against some patents are needed?

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC on appeal from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The case will ask the nation’s highest court to determine whether 11 U.S.C. § 365, the statute in U.S. bankruptcy code regarding executory contracts and unexpired leases, requires that a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark license agreement in bankruptcy terminates rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable non-bankruptcy law. The Supreme Court declined to take up a second question presented on whether an exclusive right to sell certain products practicing a patent in a particular geographic territory is a “right to intellectual property” within Section 365(n) of U.S. bankruptcy code.

The case will ask the highest court in the nation to determine whether the federal government is a person who may petition the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to institute patent validity review proceedings under the terms of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).

The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, refusing to hear yet another appeal in a case involving a question of patent eligibility… Simply put, the answer to the first question asked by Two-Way Media in its Petition for Certiorari is absolutely not. There never has been a requirement that a patent claim must be — or even should be or can appropriately be — read in isolation. In fact, decisions that purport to ascertain the meaning of claim languagewithout the pomp and circumstance of Markman are openly violating the clear dictates of the Supreme Court. 

On September 7, 2018, the government filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the case relating to Eric Brunetti’s clothing brand, called FUCT. Although Brunetti has marketed various apparel under the FUCT mark since the early 1990s, the application at issue in this case was filed in 2011. The examiner rejected the application under Section 2(a), finding that FUCT “is the past tense of F*CK,” and “is scandalous because it is disparaging and [] total[ly] vulgar.” The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board agreed, finding that “the Trademark Examining Attorney has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial composite of the general public would find this designation vulgar.” If the U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear the Brunetti case, it could have a substantial impact on “shock value” marks in commerce.

On Friday, July 20, 2018, the New York Intellectual Property Association (“NYIPLA”) filed an amicus brief arguing that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted in RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, No. 17-1686. See the NYIPLA’s website for the full Brief of New York Intellectual Property  Law Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, No. 17-1686 (July 20, 2018). This case raises the important question of whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) can refuse to hear an appeal by a petitioner from an adverse final written decision in an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding, on the basis of a lack of a patent-inflicted injury-in-fact, when Congress has statutorily created the right for dissatisfied parties to appeal to the Federal Circuit.

The Supreme Court will hear WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., which asks whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)… Because lost profits damages were awarded for lost contracts for services to be performed on the high seas, outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. patent law, the Federal Circuit reversed that $93.4 million award… In December 2017, the office of Solicitor General Noel Francisco filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. The Solicitor General argued that WesternGeco’s entitlement to damages should be informed by the traditional common-law rule that a victim of a tort should be returned to the position that victim would have occupied if not for the defendant’s legal wrong.

The equitable defense of laches has been a useful tool for defendants in intellectual property litigation for over a hundred years, but a recent case in the U.S. Supreme Court could potentially remove the defense in patent infringement cases. In SCA Hygiene Products AB v. First Quality Baby Products LLC, the Supreme Court must decide whether the doctrine of laches bars patent infringement claims filed within the six-year statutory limitation period established under 35 U.S.C. § 286 of the Patent Act… Based on oral arguments, it is expected the Court will reverse the Federal Circuit’s decision and conclude that laches do not apply to patent infringement cases brought within the six-year damages period.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to review a Federal Circuit ruling that held unconstitutional a law prohibiting registration of trademarks that “may disparage” people or groups. In a case involving an Asian-American dance band’s bid to register its name THE SLANTS as a trademark, the court will consider whether the bar on registering disparaging marks in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), violates the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. In the meantime, the Court is expected to rule soon on the Washington Redskins’ cert petition in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 15-1874, challenging a decision of the Eastern District of Virginia upholding the PTO’s cancellation of the REDSKINS trademarks under that same provision.

The USPTO, through its Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), denied a standard character mark for “The Slants” to be used with live music performance entertainment on the basis that the term is a highly disparaging reference to people of Asian-American descent. The writ of certiorari was issued for this case after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir.) issued a decision last December in In re Tam, an appeal filed by Simon Tam to overturn the TTAB decision. In that case, the Federal Circuit voted 9-to-3 to vacate the TTAB decision to deny the trademark to Tam because § 2(a) of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional “under the intermediate scrutiny traditionally applied to regulation of the commercial aspects of speech.” The majority opinion issued by Federal Circuit noted that the First Amendment protects even hurtful speech and that the federal government has offered no legitimate interests justifying § 2(a) of the Lanham Act.

Stryker Corporation was awarded $70 million in lost profits after a jury found that Stryker’s patents were valid and willfully infringed by Zimmer. The district court affirmed the jury’s verdict, awarded Stryker treble damages for willful infringement, and awarded Stryker attorney’s fees. Stryker’s patents concerned portable, battery-powered, and handheld pulsed lavage devices used in orthopedic procedures to deliver pressurized irrigation for medical therapies, including cleaning wounds.

The Federal Circuit again addressed whether Pulse’s domestic sales activities were either a sale or an offer for sale in the U.S. While the patent statute does not define “sale,” the Court has previously held that it carries its ordinary meaning, including the transfer of title or property. Further, a “sale” must be understood in view of the strong policy against extraterritorial liability for patent infringement. Here, no sale occurred in the U.S., because the final formation of a contract and all elements of performing the contract occurred outside the U.S.

Cooper and MCM have submitted Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, asking it to consider the constitutionality of Article I final adjudication of issued patent claims, subject only to Article III appellate review. Importantly, the resolution of this question turns on the determination of (1) whether the claim of patent invalidity is a public or private right, and (2) if a private right, whether the claim may be delegated to an Article I tribunal for (a) advisory determination, requiring (b) enforcement by a federal district court, where (c) legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and (d) factual conclusions are reviewed for substantial evidence. As revealed during briefing by litigants and amici, in addition to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“CAFC”) precedential MCM opinion, ambiguity in the Court’s Stern decision has led to confusion, and the analysis required for question (2) has been improperly applied to the resolution of question (1). In light of this confusion—and the merits of the constitutional question aside—Cooper and MCM present the Court with a rare opportunity to clarify that questions (1) and (2) are in fact separate, and require, per its own decisional law, distinct modes of analysis.