Posts Tagged: "Section 101"

Earlier today, in cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part and dismissed-in-part a decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in which the CAFC doubled down on its past contention that the USPTO’s Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance is not binding on the court’s analysis. The panel included Chief Judge Prost and Judges Lourie and Hughes. The opinion was authored by Prost.  

Recently, the Day One Project, an initiative of the Federation of American Scientists, released a transition document drafted by a collection of veteran policymakers discussing a range of policy ideas to be implemented at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) starting from the earliest days of the Biden Administration. The ideas advocated by the Day One Project focus on a mix of policies related to diversity, international IP systems, patent quality, agency budgeting and governance and ways that the USPTO can contribute to broader administrative policy initiatives. While there are many sound policy positions advocated by the Day One Project, patent owners may want to be aware of the document’s stance on the “public benefit of PTAB review of a patent” as well as the agency’s role in developing policy on patentable subject matter reform. Interestingly, the policy document indicates that there is broad consensus for continuing policies from the Trump Administration relating to China’s influence on the world of intellectual property.

Last year was an active one at the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) for software eligibility. It also was a brutal year for patent owners, as the CAFC invalidated almost every software patent on appeal for eligibility. Despite the many cases decided last year, there is still some uncertainty about what passes muster under the Alice two-step framework promulgated by the Supreme Court in 2014. But one thing that has become increasingly clear is that the CAFC wants to see how a particular result is achieved or how a problem is solved. This desire for a “how” or rule set from the claims creates an evident tension with the traditional notion that patent claims should recite structure, not functional language. These recent CAFC cases have also made it clear that courts will look to the specification for implementation details, even if these details do not emerge in the claims. This analysis has previously been reserved for the written description requirement under Section 112 but found its way into the Alice two-step.

American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court on December 28, 2020, asking it to review the Federal Circuit’s July 31, 2020 modified judgment and October 2019 panel opinion in a closely-watched Section 101 patent eligibility case involving driveshaft automotive technology. The Federal Circuit has been sharply divided by the issues presented, leading Judge Moore to refer to the original panel’s analysis as “validity goulash” and to state that the “majority’s Nothing More test, like the great American work The Raven from which it is surely borrowing, will, as in the poem, lead to insanity.”

If you’re looking for some positive patent news from 2020, count the heightened civic awareness of our intellectual-property/innovation policies, as a result of the global pandemic, as a silver lining. But our present task is to report on the 2020 highlights from the Federal Circuit; unfortunately, it’s all downhill from here. If 2019 had Section 101 law as its defining issue, given the Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court’s slate of rulings and non-rulings, 2020 only seemed to make the Section101 exclusions even broader. The capstone was AAM, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 966 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the Federal Circuit’s denial of en-banc consideration (again) of Section 101 rulings that, all judicial protests aside, seemed to plainly expand a reviewing court’s power under Section 101 (again). And in ways many would’ve thought unimaginable just six-to-eight years ago, when Mayo-Alice emerged from the Supreme Court with only “inventive-concept” tests ringing about. Neapco’s panel ruling in the fall of 2019 was the proverbial shot across the Section112 bow.

On December 14, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed a decision of the United States District Court for the Central District of California in Adaptive Streaming Inc. v. Netflix, Inc., holding that that claims of Adaptive Streaming Inc.’s patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In particular, the CAFC agreed with the district court that the claims of the patent in suit were directed to the abstract idea of “collecting information and transcoding it into multiple formats” and that the claims did not incorporate anything more that would transform the claimed subject matter into an eligible application of the abstract idea.

On October 13, 2020, Cybergenetics filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit from a decision of the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, that held the patent claims asserted by Cybergenetics invalid under 35 U.S.C. 101, and granting the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Cybergenetics’ brief on appeal is due December 28, 2020.

On November 16, the U.S. Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in two cases from the Federal Circuit: IYM Technologies LLC v. RPX Corporation and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. and WhitServe LLC v. Donuts Inc. IYM asked the Supreme Court to grant review “to determine whether the Arthrex decision applies to all appeals that were pending when [the Arthrex decision] issued.” In the WhitServe petition, WhitServe asserted that a determination of patent ineligibility “necessitates impermissible fact-weighing at the pleading stage and eviscerates the statutory presumption of validity.”

On November 6, the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted a motion to dismiss an infringement suit on the grounds that the patents in suit were directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 in Karamelion LLC v. Intermatic, Inc. The court explained that although Karamelion’s solution may be a novel application of network communication to a particular problem, “no matter how novel or groundbreaking the advance, the abstract idea cannot supply the inventive concept.”

Consumer 2.0, Inc. d/b/a Rently has filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court asking it to review a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision holding its patent claims ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The claims are directed to “the use of lockboxes able to recognize time-limited codes and coordination of those codes with software to facilitate secure automated entry.” Rently’s petition was filed just as the High Court kicked off its new term by denying certiorari yesterday in Chamberlain v. Techtronic, which also sought review of a Section 101 eligibility decision.

In Part I of this article, we briefly summarized how O’Reilly v. Morse was relied upon in the denial for rehearing in the recent case of AAM v. Neapco to assert that a patent claim to a method of making a motor vehicle axle failed to qualify as patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The concurring opinions concluded that claim 22 of the patent at issue, U.S. 7,774,911, “merely invoked” natural law, and did not describe what had been obtained in the patent. Consequently, as in O’Reilly v. Morse, the claim was “too broad, and not warranted by law.”  We also noted an apparent paradox in that, while claims cannot preempt natural law and must be supported by an enabling specification, they necessarily must be able to read on embodiments that incorporate later-developed technology. The key to resolving this dilemma is the notion of invention, which was the basis for the holding by the Court of the King’s Bench in Hornblower v. Boulton.

With its recent opinion in AAM, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings, LLC, No. 18-1763 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 2020), and a 6-6 stalemate by the court’s active judges on whether to take the case en banc, the Federal Circuit has now adopted—under the rubric of 35 U.S.C. §101—a formalized set of enablement-like requirements for patent claims. For a simple “threshold” eligibility test, section 101 has grown remarkably complex. Indeed, since the Supreme Court’s 2012 Mayo and 2014 Alice decisions re-cast patent eligibility into a “two-step framework,” the Section 101 test adjudges not just subject-matter eligibility and the three “limited” exceptions thereto, but also patentability or “inventive-concept” challenges predicated on comparisons to the prior art, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103. And now the enablement-type requirements imposed by AAM v. Neapco.

On Friday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued Orders granting a request for panel rehearing and denying a request for rehearing en banc in response to a joint petition filed by American Axle & Manufacturing (AAM). The CAFC also issued a precedential modified opinion of its October 3, 2019 opinion in American Axle & Manufacturing v. Neapco Holdings. In the Order Denying Rehearing En Banc, Judges Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, Lourie and Stoll dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. Each of Dyk, Chen, Newman, Stoll and O’Malley wrote separately.

On July 14, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with Judge Lourie writing for the majority, affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Packet Intelligence, LLC v. NetScout Systems, Inc. The CAFC affirmed the district court’s judgments on the issues of infringement, invalidity, and willfulness, but reversed with respect to pre-suit damages. Judge Reyna wrote separately, dissenting on the issue of patent eligibility under Section 101.

The most dominant, divisive issue in patent law over the last decade—Section101-eligibility and the Supreme Court’s Mayo-Alice framework—appears to have just become more divisive. Indeed, at least part of the reason for the controversy is that, with Mayo-Alice as the governing test, courts as a preliminary matter can decide Section101-eligibility based on considerations of an “inventive concept” and patentability—issues the Court once declared were “not relevant” to the separate eligibility provision of the Patent Act. Be that as it may, the Federal Circuit has recently issued certain decisions indicating that Section 101 now incorporates another vast area of invalidity; viz., the requirements for “enablement” under 35 U.S.C. §112(a). See, e.g., Customedia Technologies, LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 2020). In this article, we examine how this new requirement for Section 101 has emerged, the recent precedent on the issue, and the Patent Act’s requirements that undermine such Section 112(a) considerations for a Section 101-eligibilty test.