Posts Tagged: "obviousness"

In 2013, Google, Inc. (“Google”) filed inter partes review and covered business method petitions challenging the validity of Unwired Planet, LLC’s (“Unwired”) patent, at issue on appeal. The patent describes a prioritization of search results based upon the location of a mobile device and including prioritization of “preferred providers” within those search results, in turn providing a “farther-over-nearer” ordering of the results. The Board invalidated all of the challenged claims as obvious. The Federal Circuit concluded, “[b]ecause the use of alphabetical order as prioritization information would sometimes meet the farther-over-nearer claim elements, the Board was correct to conclude that the proposed combination” rendered claim 1 obvious.

A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s rejection of all pending claims as obvious in an appeal arising from a method for treating or preventing influenza by oral inhalation of zanamivir. The teaching here seems to be that references can be combined to show that it would have been obvious to zero in on one of a few options disclosed in the prior art. Judge Newman filed a dissenting opinion.

It is well known that hindsight reconstruction is an insidious error that infects patent prosecution. The Federal Circuit has noted that it is a difficult task to avoid “subconscious reliance on hindsight” and tools are available to “inoculate the obviousness analysis against hindsight”. However, it is well known that practitioners could benefit in countering the pernicious problem of subconscious hindsight directed analysis with additional tools. This article is intended to provide an additional tool outlining a new analytical approach to detecting hindsight: 1) identification of a proxy problem upon which an “obvious” advantage is predicated, and 2) showing that either a) the proxy problem is secondary to the problem solved by the inventor and would have been insufficient to drive advancement of the art, and that the examiner has failed to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have regarded the proxy problem as sufficiently significant so as to require solution, or b) a showing that the proxy problem posed to POSITA presupposes the problem and its solution as solved by the inventor and is derivative. Once it is shown that the proxy problem is subsidiary or presupposes the problem solved by the inventor it becomes a less difficult task to show that the invention was not considered as a whole or that the problem was improperly phrased.

The Court found substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of infringement. While Samsung’s expert offered conflicting testimony, a reasonable jury could have credited Apple’s expert. Thus, there was no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial evidence supported the jury verdict of infringement… Note that the underlying dispute in this case does not concern design patents that were also asserted against Samsung, and which are currently being reviewed by the Supreme Court.

There are several major statutory rejections that an applicant can receive during the course of patent prosecution at the USPTO, each one corresponding to the relevant section of the Patent Act: § 101 (subject matter), § 102 (novelty), § 103 (non-obviousness), § 112(a) (specification), and§ 112(b) (definiteness). Any application can receive any one of these rejections, but some are more common than others, especially when considering technology center and the type of technology involved. For example, § 101 rejections are very common in TC 3600 due to the presence of the§ 112(a) Alice-heavy e-commerce art units, while fairly simple inventions are more likely to receive § 102 rejections. In addition to prevalence based on technology type, the type of rejection an applicant can receive can also depend upon where their application is in the prosecution process. When it comes to first final rejections, § 103 rejections are the most common.

In re: Natural Alternatives, LLC, 2015-1911 (opinion and errata) is a non-precedential but still notable case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that finds the claims of a patent that was in reexamination to be patentable, despite the examiner and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board finding that the claims were obvious. While the examiner had cobbled together various references to make an obviousness rejection, the examiner failed to set forth “sufficient facts” supporting his position that the prior art disclosed the limitations of Natural’s claims in a manner that renders the claimed invention obvious.

The Court affirmed the Board’s finding that two previous patents render the ‘695 Patent obvious. The Court rejected ClassCo’s argument that “[a] basic characteristic of a KSR combination is that it only unites old elements with no change in their respective function.” Slip op. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court instead emphasized KSR’s flexible approach to a § 103 analysis.

Rather than the drastic measure of abolishing § 101, such as that proposed by previous USPTO Director Kappos, we think that a simple change to § 101 that removes the confusing notion of “inventiveness” from statutory interpretation would do the trick. Our proposal strikes a middle ground, in that, while removing “inventiveness” concepts from § 101 analysis, it retains the historical exceptions rooted in pre-emption that were reiterated in the Triad.

The Court recognized that “‘[c]ommon sense has long been recognized to inform the analysis of obviousness if explained with sufficient reasoning.’” However, “there are at least three caveats to note in applying ‘common sense’ in an obviousness analysis.” First, common sense is typically invoked to provide a known motivation to combine, and not to supply a missing claim limitation. Second, while some cases have allowed use of common sense to supply a missing claim limitation, “the limitation in question was unusually simple and the technology particularly straightforward.” Third, common sense “cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified.”

O’Malley recognized that in Perfect Web the Federal Circuit did authorize the use of common sense to supply a missing claim limitation, but she pointed out that this was the only case where that has been done. O’Malley further explained that in Perfect Web that which was missing was “unusually simple and the technology particularly straightforward.” In fact, in Perfect Web, which dealt with sending e-mail to an e-mail list, the missing claim limitation was nothing more than merely repeating the step of resending e-mails in accordance with the claim. Thus, O’Malley explained that Perfect Web is properly considered an exception to allowing common sense to supply a missing claim limitation, rather than the rule.

Amongst the appeals involving patent-eligibility rejections, the most recently filed appeal brief was filed in November 2015. Thus, all of the appeal briefs and most of the PTAB decisions were filed prior to the development of more recent case law that has further illustrated why and how various software technologies can be patent eligible. Further, most of the eligibility-involved PTAB decisions were issued prior to these recent cases, which may further have disadvantaged the appellants. Continued assessment of PTAB decisions on post-Alice appeals will provide further insight as to the Board’s interpretation of this area of law fraught with uncertainty and applicant frustration.

Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC (Fed. Cir. June 15, 2016) (Before Dyk, Wallach, and Newman, J.) (Opinion for the court, Wallach, J.). The test for obviousness is not whether the devices disclosed in various references are physically combinable, but whether a person of ordinary skill, in possession of teachings of the references, could arrive at the claimed invention. Further, the modification of Caterpillar would be minimal, as it would simply require replicating the mechanism for moving the first jaw to move the second jaw.

The Court noted that decisions related to compliance with the Board’s procedures are reviewed for abuse of discretion. As far as the “reasonable expectation of success” requirement, the Court noted that the Board improperly looked to whether one would reasonably expect the references to operate as those references intended once combined. The Court held that this was the incorrect standard, and instead one must have the motivation to combine with the expectation of achieving what is claimed in the patent-at-issue. The Court held, however, that while the Board conflated the reasonable expectation of success standard and motivation to combine, it nonetheless made sufficient factual findings to support its judgment that the claims at issue were not invalid.

The Court affirmed the obviousness rejection, noting that even under the proper claim construction, substantial evidence supported the Board’s factual findings underlying its obviousness determination. The examiner properly relied on evidence from the request for reexamination showing a motivation to combine prior art, by combining a base system combined with a known improvement. , Man Machine did not introduce any objective indicia of nonobviousness. Thus, the Court affirmed the finding of obviousness.

The Court held that dealing “physical playing cards” did not constitute patent eligible territory. This constituted a “purely conventional” activity, like the conventional computer implementation that fell short in Alice. The Court found there was no inventive concept sufficient to transform the subject matter into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.