Posts Tagged: "Judge Richard Taranto"

The Federal Circuit affirmed a patentee’s burden included showing patentability over prior art from the patent’s original prosecution history. Prolitec failed to show that its amended claim would still be patentable (non-obvious) over the combination of an original prior art reference and Benalikhoudja. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board’s finding of anticipation and obviousness. In her dissent, Judge Newman argued that the PTAB erred in denying Prolitec’s motion to amend, explaining the motion should have been granted because refusing to enter a proposed amendment that would resolve a dispositive aspect of claim breadth contradicted the America Invents Act.

On remand, the Federal Circuit used the de novo standard. Teva’s deferential “clear error” standard did not apply, because the district court did not make any factual findings based on extrinsic evidence in connection with its claim construction. Although extrinsic evidence may be used at trial, a district court must rely on subsidiary factual findings from that evidence to reach its claim construction, in order for any deference to arise on appeal. In this case, the Federal Circuit held that the intrinsic evidence led to a de novo conclusion that the district court conflated the claimed virtual machine with applications written to run on the virtual machine.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) cancelled the claims of the patent, finding them anticipated or obvious over several references. The Board construed “is connected” to mean that the computer be “active and online at registration,” even if the connection server’s database record was inaccurate, and the computer was no longer online. The Court reversed this construction, holding that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “is connected” requires that the computer be connected to the network at the time the query is sent. The term “is” has a plain meaning, which requires concurrency. Where the claim language has a plain meaning that leaves no uncertainty, the specification generally cannot be used to infer a different meaning, absent clear redefinition or disavowal.

On appeal, Ariosa challenged the Board’s refusal to consider the background reference because it was not identified as a piece of prior art “defining a combination for obviousness.” The Federal Circuit agreed with Ariosa’s position that the background reference should have been considered by the Board, stating that background art must be considered even though such art is not true “prior art” presented as the basis of obviousness grounds for review. While the Court did agree that Ariosa’s articulation of the background reference’s impact on motivation to combine prior art references was lacking, the Court found the Board’s explanation for its failure to consider the reference equally lacking and thus warranting remand.

The district court erred by relying entirely on the plain meaning of the claim where context-based interpretations were necessary. The Court held that the plural terms “intervals” and “remotes” in isolation could mean what must occur during each interval and what was applicable to all the remotes, but there was no requirement indicated in the remaining claim language or specification that at least one remote transmit and receive frames during at least one interval. The Court held that this evidence, together with other language in claim 21, and teachings in the specification, showed that each cycle in the claims must have intervals in which remotes were allowed to transmit.

The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s claim construction, and held that the claim language does not require that the start and duration of remote-transmission intervals be communicated prior to the beginning of the cycle. St. Jude had not explained why, in accordance with the specification, it was not sufficient that a remote know roughly when to expect an upcoming cycle to begin, rather than its exact starting time, and why such interval information could not be communicated during a cycle. The Court postulated that a remote unit could power up its communications equipment for the entirety of a first cycle, receive interval information whenever it was transmitted, then only power up that equipment during its assigned interval for subsequent cycles.

Despite the Supreme Court ruling that laches is no defense to a copyright infringement action brought during the statute of limitations, the Federal Circuit ruled laches can bar recovery of legal remedies in patent infringement. The Federal Circuit explained that the 1952 Patent Act codified the common law rule, meaning that laches was codified as a defense under 35 U.S.C. 282.
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, followed the common law principle that, ”[w]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law, [the Court] must presume that Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.” The Federal Circuit also ruled that laches does not preclude an ongoing royalty.

Astornet sued NCR Government Systems, MorphoTrust, and BAE Systems Inc., alleging that they supplied the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) with certain boarding pass scanning systems, and that TSA’s use of the equipment infringed or would infringe its patent. The complaints alleged that the defendants “induced (and contributed to) direct infringement by TSA by virtue of TSA’s use of equipment supplied by the defendants.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal based on 28 U.S.C. § 1498 barring the suits by limiting Astornet’s remedy to an action against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that “record evidence establishe[d] a genuine dispute over whether a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to add a vent to Hoang’s disinfecting cap.” The Court also held that “the tradeoff between the desire to retain cleaning agent and the patents’ disclosure regarding drying is a factual matter left to the factfinder.”