Posts Tagged: "Judge Jimmie Reyna"

Claimed methods incidental or complimentary to financial services are not necessarily reviewable as CBM patents. The claims as they were written must be directed to methods and apparatuses that have particular uses in connection with a financial product or service. For a patent to be a CBM patent, “[i]t is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the specification speculates such a potential sale might occur.”

How patent claims can be invalidated without a proper and thorough claim construction is baffling. It flies in the face of everything patent law stands for and does nothing but encourage patent examiners, PTAB judges and district courts to do a facial check based on a gut feeling, nothing more… That type of subjective, half-baked analysis is antithetical to the patent process and the Federal Circuit should be ashamed for engaging in such a review. The only way to competently determine what a claim is directed to and whether the claim adds significantly more, whatever that means, is to do a proper, thorough and competent claim construction, period. Seriously, if the Court is going to publish a decision like this that is heavy on conclusions, non-existent on analysis, and almost certainly drafted by an intern or Staff Attorney, then why even make it a non-precedential opinion?

The PTAB used the wrong standard to institute the CBM proceeding in the first place, which lead the Federal Circuit to vacate the PTAB decision and remand the case for further consideration by the PTAB – namely the application of the proper standard… As the Federal Circuit would point out later: “All patents, at some level, relate to potential sale of a good or service.” To allow this PTAB created standard that has no textual support in the statute to be applied would be to allow virtually any patent to be the subject of a CBM. That was clearly was not the intent of Congress and it would fly directly and unambiguously in the face of the explicit language of the statute. The PTAB is significantly limited in their power to institute a CBM.

The Federal Circuit reversed the cancellation of two trademarks by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) and remanded for further consideration… “Use in commerce” under the Lanham Act encompasses any activity that falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, including in-state sales to an out-of-state resident. Activities that are within such regulatory authority are unlikely to be disqualified as merely “de minimis,” e.g. in economic impact.

The Federal Circuit denied appellant SAS’s petition for rehearing en banc from a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, without an explanatory opinion. Judge Newman dissented. Without discussing the facts of the case, she undertook to review the statutory provisions for inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings under the America Invents Act (“AIA”). According to Newman, the Court should have granted the petition, in order to correct the Patent Office position that “the final order of the [Patent Trial and Appeal] Board need not address every claim raised in the petition for review.” According to Judge Newman, a review of the statutory provisions of the AIA makes it clear that, if the PTAB decides to institute review, it should do so for all of the challenged claims, not just some of the challenged claims.

The ’510, ‘984, and ‘797 patents were each held eligible for similar reasons. Again, the court found that even if the claims were directed to an abstract idea, they would be eligible under step two of the Alice framework. The Court again relied on the unique and unconventional distributed architecture found in the specification and construed into the claim in the previous proceeding. This architecture allowed for load distribution – a technological and unconventional solution to a technological problem. While the ‘984 claims contained generic components and functions, the overall ordered combination of the limitations were unconventional and solved the technological problem.

Amdocs (Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., Appeal No. 2015-1180, is a precedential case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that reverses a judgment on the pleadings that certain asserted software claims directed to gathering network information were patent-ineligible. In so doing, Step One of Alice/Mayo is not clarified at all, because the majority accepted “for argument’s sake” the district court’s view of the disqualifying abstract ideas, and in each instance then explained why the claims seen in their entirety are not disqualified under Step two… The Federal Circuit concluded that the claim is “much closer to those in BASCOM and DDR Holdings than those in Digitech, Content Extraction, and In re TLI Commc’ns. The Court explained that even if it were to agree that claim 1 is directed to an ineligible abstract idea under step one, the claim is eligible under step two because it contains a sufficient ‘inventive concept.’

Claim differentiation does not broaden claims beyond their meaning in light of the patent as a whole, and cannot override clear statements of claim scope found the specification and prosecution history… Disavowal can occur when the specification plainly describes “the present invention” as having that feature. Here, the specification states that an important characteristic of the present invention is a “reduction in upper width … resulting from the extended short seals.” Disavowal can also occur when the specification distinguishes or disparages prior art based on a specified feature. The specification did that here, by stating that prior art bags are difficult to secure over trash receptacle lips and explaining how the described short seals solve this problem.

The Court found substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of infringement. While Samsung’s expert offered conflicting testimony, a reasonable jury could have credited Apple’s expert. Thus, there was no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial evidence supported the jury verdict of infringement… Note that the underlying dispute in this case does not concern design patents that were also asserted against Samsung, and which are currently being reviewed by the Supreme Court.

This decision reestablishes what should always have been the case; namely that the Federal Circuit is an appellate court that does not consider evidence outside the record or engage in fact finding on their own. The Federal Circuit has been increasingly out of control for years, acting as a trial court and jury rather than an appellate court. Hopefully that will end today.

The Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to meet the pleading standards for joint patent infringement, holding that Form 18, from the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does not apply to a claim of joint infringement… Form 18 is not sufficient per se, and pleadings must adhere to the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, and must do so for each element of the allegedly infringed patent claim. This is particularly true for pleading joint infringement.

Under the doctrine of inherent disclosure, it is not necessary for an earlier application to explicitly describe the later patent. There is adequate written description to support a later patent where it is undisputed that the invention inherently described in an earlier application was the same subject matter included in the claims of the later patent.

Lifenet’s patent is for plasticized soft tissue grafts used for transplantation in humans. The specification discloses that plasticizers can be removed before implantation, although they need not be, as claim 1 discloses three options for the implanting technician, one option being direct implantation without removing plasticizers. LifeCell’s accused grafts are preserved in a solution prior to implantation, and it is undisputed that significant amounts of plasticizers are removed during this soaking process. During claim construction, the parties disputed the meaning of the term “non-removal.” The district court concluded that construction of this term was unnecessary because it was easily understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art to have its plain meaning.

In a September 13, 2016 decision relating to subject matter eligibility of software patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), and held that McRO’s patents were eligible for protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The disputed patent claims recited a method for “automatically . . . producing accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters.” The McRO patents identified that a problem in the prior art was that animators, even using the assistance of computers, had to manually manipulate the character model for lip movement. The McRO patents solved this problem by using rules to automatically depict more realistic synchronization of lip movements and speech.

It is hard to ignore the fact that the Federal Circuit again continued to point out that the innovation at issued was an improvement. This should give patent practitioners important clues into how to characterize software related innovations so as to maximize the likelihood of prevailing in Alice inspired challenges and rejections. Hopefully the United States Patent and Trademark Office will not ignore McRo and will issue guidance to patent examiners. Taking a “nothing to see here” approach to this case would be inexcusable.