Posts Tagged: "estoppel"

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit last week affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in the long-running case of VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc. The case relates to three inter partes reexaminations maintained by Apple and Cisco. The PTAB found that Apple could proceed with its reexaminations under the America Invents Act (AIA) and held that claims of VirnetX’s patent numbers 7,418,504 (“the ’504 patent”) and 7,921,211 (“the ’211 patent”) were unpatentable as anticipated/obvious. These patents were directed to methods for “establishing a secure communication link between [computers] over a computer network, such as the Internet” and are “built on top of the existing Internet protocol.” Basically, the patents claim a way to create secure communication links via domain name service (DNS) systems.

Today marks the return of our Other Barks & Bites feature, which will profile a collection of news headlines from around the IP world and across practice areas every Friday. This week, the patent spat between Apple and Qualcomm heats up at the PTAB; China’s intellectual property court at Beijing shows signs of heightened requirements in trademark appeals for foreign entities; and the European Union delays debate on copyright reforms that would affect major tech firms that aggregate news and videos online.

The doctrine of assignor estoppel has been around for over a century and most often applied in the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and U.S. district courts to prevent a first party assigning a patent to a second party from then challenging the validity of the patent they had just assigned. In a November 9, 2018 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the doctrine of assignor estoppel does not apply in the inter partes review (IPR) context (see Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., (Fed. Cir. 2018). This raises intriguing possibilities regarding how companies might be able to protect themselves. One possibility might be to revise their employment agreements for signing by new employees.

The Federal Circuit recently found that assignor estoppel has “no place in IPR proceedings,” affirming a holding of the Patent Trials and Appeal Board (“Board”) that assignor estoppel did not bar Arista Networks (“Arista”) from attempting to invalidate a patent belonging to Cisco Systems (“Cisco”).  Arista’s founder, Dr. David Cheriton, was the inventor on the patent Arista wanted to invalidate and had previously assigned the patent to Cisco while employed by Cisco. See Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Nos. 2017-1525, 2017-1577, 2018  (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2018) (Before Prost, Schall, and Chen, J.) (Opinion for the court, Prost, J.).

JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., No. 2017-1828 (Fed. Cir. 2018) raises the important question of whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit can refuse to hear an appeal by a non-defendant petitioner from an adverse final written decision in an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding, on the basis of a lack of a patent-inflicted injury-in-fact, when Congress has statutorily created the right for “dissatisfied” parties to appeal to the Federal Circuit.

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) provides invalidity tools via inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR), but which route is better? …  PGRs are estimated to cost more because of their broader discovery rules.  If cost is a major factor, IPRs are a less-expensive option due to restricted allowance of discovery, the most expensive aspect of patent litigation… If the invalidating arguments or art are not strong, an IPR may be a better option due to its lower threshold for institution.  The same prior art arguments that failed in a petition for a PGR may have succeeded in an IPR petition due to the lower standard.

After TCL lost its IPRs against Ericsson in a written decision at PTAB, it was barred from filing subsequent IPRs against the ‘510 patent.  TCL was then hit with a very large verdict for infringement of the patent in court. Then, four months after the verdict the same patent is challenged at the PTAB again by a consortium that has some relationships to TCL.

A disclaimer of challenged patent claims before an IPR is instituted may result in a final adverse judgment against the patent owner, triggering estoppel provisions that preclude the assertion of other claims that are not patentably distinct from those disclaimed… Judge Newman dissented, explaining that because no trial occurred, the Board had no authority to issue an adverse judgment.

A new study of proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) shows that, despite the initial reputation of Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceedings being that of patent killers, patent owners are winning more cases than ever. The study, conducted by law firm Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto, shows that the rate at which patent claims were found unpatentable by the PTAB fell significantly in 2016, while the volume of claims in dispute rose dramatically. The study found that in every quarter of 2016, the reviewed final written decisions resulted in more than half of the claims originally challenged in IPR proceedings surviving. By contrast, in the previous two years, the survival rate of such claims exceeded 50 percent only once. In the first quarter of 2014, in fact, less than 20 percent of such claims survived challenge.

However, what if the Board refuses to terminate an IPR despite a joint request by both parties based on a settlement and proceeds to a final written decision? As indicated in Section 317, a joint request for termination may not be granted if the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed. Although the section does not specifically list or explain the criteria for determining the merits of the proceeding to a final written decision, there are cases providing us with a number of considerations… From the cases above, it can be seen that even when the Board terminates an IPR as to a petitioner, it may nevertheless proceed to a final written decision when the trial issues have been fully briefed and argued at the time the parties move to terminate an IPR. The Board may also proceed to a decision on the merits when there is a large number of existing district court cases involving the patent at issue.

Partial institutions lessen the value of estoppel because the petitioner avoids estoppel on claims that were challenged but not instituted. The PTAB never issues a final written decision for these challenged-but-not-instituted claims. And because estoppel only applies to claims receiving a final written decision, these non-instituted claims escape the estoppel statute See, e.g., Shaw Industries Group v. Automated Creed Systems, 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In effect, the PTAB’s current practice saves a petitioner from estoppel on claims it had little chance of invalidating. Thus, under the current practice, a petitioner currently only risks estoppel on claims that it stands a good chance of invalidating. But if the Supreme Court decides as expected, estoppel will attach to all challenged claims of an instituted IPR. Final written decisions will more often include claims found valid, and a petitioner will no longer be able to avoid estoppel for some claims by relying on the PTAB to sort strong challenges from weak ones at the institution stage.

An Inter Partes Review (IPR) is an important tool for companies that face frequent patent infringement challenges. An IPR is essentially a mini-litigation focusing solely on patent validity conducted before a panel of administrative patent judges sitting in the Patent Trial and Appeal board (PTAB). Once an IPR is initiated, a decision on validity is issued within one year. The narrow focus, fast timing, and lower cost of an IPR, along with certain legal advantages that make proving invalidity easier in an IPR than in a district court, make it an attractive alternative to district court litigation when good invalidity arguments are available.

IntegraSpec was denied the opportunity to make its case here because of collateral estoppel based on the reasoning that they already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the dispute. What exactly does “full and fair” mean? Figuring out what the means in the context of Rule 36 disposals is complicated. We do know, however, what “full and fair” cannot mean. The term “full and fair” cannot mean “equal.” While the Federal Circuit continues to want to say that cases decided using the Rule 36 summary mechanism are “no less carefully decided,” the fact is that litigants in Rule 36 cases receive less consideration by the Court; this truth is factually indisputable. It takes a certain amount of time to decide the answers to the questions presented, but it also takes a certain amount of time to explain those answers in a written decision. To think the act of writing the decision is purely ministerial and makes no difference strikes me as pure nonsense.

The remaining vitality of estoppel as a defense against patent infringement after SCA Hygiene Products is also not a hypothetical question. Indeed, the issue of estoppel remains very much “alive and well” in SCA Hygiene Products. Besides laches, the accused infringer in SCA Hygiene Products, First Quality Baby Products, had moved (not surprisingly) for summary judgment based upon an estoppel defense, which was also granted by the district court. Also not too surprisingly, that portion of the ruling by the district court was reversed and remanded by the Federal Circuit panel on the ground that there were “genuine issues of material fact” to be resolved. The Federal Circuit majority in its en banc ruling also reinstated and preserved the Federal Circuit panel’s reversal and remand of the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the estoppel defense. Finally, in footnote 2, SCOTUS’ decision in SCA Hygiene Products expressly states: “We do not address the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the District Court’s equitable estoppel holding.”

In the recent case of Intellectual Ventures v. Toshiba, Judge Robinson noted that “the Federal Circuit has construed the language quite literally” in the use of the word “during.” The term is spelled out as “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonable could have raised during that inter partes review” in § 315(e)(1). The judge noted that while extending the logic of non-instituted grounds as not being able to be raised “during” an IPR proceeding to prior art references that were never presented to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board at all “confounds the very nature of this parallel administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a way around the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in Shaw.” Thus, she did not estop Toshiba from presenting the grounds never presented to the PTAB in a pair of orders in December and January, and heavily implied that the Federal Circuit should weigh in to clarify the issue.