Posts in Courts

A case currently pending before the Federal Circuit is anticipated to provide greater guidance into the answer to this question, namely, how district courts should determine whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea. The case, McRo, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, No. 2015-1080, recently heard oral argument on December 11, 2015. The panel’s questioning indicated that its anticipated decision may provide greater insight into how district courts are to determine whether a claim is, in fact, directed to an abstract idea. The patents are directed to automatic three-dimensional lip-synchronization for animated characters. Whereas prior art lip-synchronization required manually synchronizing an animated character’s lips and facial expressions to specific phonemes, the patents are directed to rules for automating that process.

Patent risk solutions provider RPX yesterday released its 2015 NPE Activity: Highlights report, which offers a first look at trends in patent litigation activity for 2015. According to RPX, NPE litigation activity rebounded in 2015 following what now appears to have been a slowdown in the latter half of 2014. The Eastern District of Texas also continues to dominate as the venue of choice for NPEs, with NPEs suing more defendants there in 2015 than in any year since 2009.

It is that time once again when we look back on the previous year in preparation to close the final chapter in order move fresh into the year ahead. 2015 was a busy year in the patent world, although change was not as cataclysmic as it was in 2013 when the United States became a first to file country or in 2014 when the Supreme Court issued the Alice v. CLS Bank decision. It was still an interesting year nevertheless. As I close out 2015, I’ve reviewed my patent articles and have come up with my own top 10 patent moments for 2015. They appear in chronological order as they happened throughout the year.

This year our panel of industry insiders is quite diverse, with commentary from Bob Stoll (Drinker Biddle), Ashley Keller (Gerchen Keller), Paul Morinville (US Inventor), Alden Abbot (Heritage Foundation), Marla Grossman (American Continental Group) and Steve Kunin (Oblon). Unlike last year where there was near unanimous agreement that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice v. CLS Bank was the biggest moment of the year, this year our panel of industry experts focused on a variety of different matters. There was one recurring theme, however. The inability of patent reform to advance on Capitol Hill was undoubtedly one of the biggest stories of the year.

On December 18, 2015, several amici filed a brief in support of appellants in Netflix, Inc. v. Rovi Corp. et al., No. 15-1917 at the Federal Circuit. The amici Broadband iTV, Inc., Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property, LLC, Access Control Advantage, Inc., and Fairway Financial U.S., Inc. are all former practicing entities and patent holders that built, developed, and commercialized computer-implemented technology and maintain an interest in the patented results of their research and development that solved real world problems faced by their respective businesses. The district court found the five patents-at-issue in this case, generally relating to video-on-demand technology, patent-ineligible as allegedly directed to the abstract ideas.

Yesterday the Federal Circuit in an en banc decision held that the portion of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, which bars federal registration for trademarks that are disparaging, is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The government advanced three principal arguments for why §2(a) did not violate the First Amendment: (1) because §2(a) does not “prohibit” or suppress speech at all; (2) because trademark registration is government speech; and (3) because §2(a) merely withholds a government subsidy. The Court rejected all three of the government’s arguments, and in doing so issued holdings on three separate issues that have divided other tribunals.

The Federal Circuit affirmed a patentee’s burden included showing patentability over prior art from the patent’s original prosecution history. Prolitec failed to show that its amended claim would still be patentable (non-obvious) over the combination of an original prior art reference and Benalikhoudja. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board’s finding of anticipation and obviousness. In her dissent, Judge Newman argued that the PTAB erred in denying Prolitec’s motion to amend, explaining the motion should have been granted because refusing to enter a proposed amendment that would resolve a dispositive aspect of claim breadth contradicted the America Invents Act.

Section 1071(b)(3) does not expressly or implicitly permit the award of “attorney fees” to the PTO. Specifically, Section 1071(b)(3) states simply that all the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the party bringing the case, whether the final decision is in favor of such party or not. By its express terms, the statute merely allows for the award of “expenses,” and not “attorney fees.”

On remand, the Federal Circuit used the de novo standard. Teva’s deferential “clear error” standard did not apply, because the district court did not make any factual findings based on extrinsic evidence in connection with its claim construction. Although extrinsic evidence may be used at trial, a district court must rely on subsidiary factual findings from that evidence to reach its claim construction, in order for any deference to arise on appeal. In this case, the Federal Circuit held that the intrinsic evidence led to a de novo conclusion that the district court conflated the claimed virtual machine with applications written to run on the virtual machine.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) cancelled the claims of the patent, finding them anticipated or obvious over several references. The Board construed “is connected” to mean that the computer be “active and online at registration,” even if the connection server’s database record was inaccurate, and the computer was no longer online. The Court reversed this construction, holding that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “is connected” requires that the computer be connected to the network at the time the query is sent. The term “is” has a plain meaning, which requires concurrency. Where the claim language has a plain meaning that leaves no uncertainty, the specification generally cannot be used to infer a different meaning, absent clear redefinition or disavowal.

On July 8, in In re Cuozzo, the CAFC denied en banc review of a prior panel decision that confirms the PTAB can use a different standard for interpreting claims than a district court. The patent owner in In re Cuozzo filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court on October 6, 2015. The response was due on November 9, 2015. If the Supreme Court takes up the issue, it could decide contrary to the current Federal Circuit precedent. It is also possible that Congress could change the standard for claim construction that applies to post-grant proceedings through legislation.

On appeal, Ariosa challenged the Board’s refusal to consider the background reference because it was not identified as a piece of prior art “defining a combination for obviousness.” The Federal Circuit agreed with Ariosa’s position that the background reference should have been considered by the Board, stating that background art must be considered even though such art is not true “prior art” presented as the basis of obviousness grounds for review. While the Court did agree that Ariosa’s articulation of the background reference’s impact on motivation to combine prior art references was lacking, the Court found the Board’s explanation for its failure to consider the reference equally lacking and thus warranting remand.

The Federal Circuit held that the written description requirement is met for negative claim limitations where the specification simply describes alternatives. In other words, the “reason to exclude” required by Santarus can be met without discussion of advantages of exclusion or disadvantages of inclusion. Further, alternative elements need not be explicitly described as alternatives, so long as the specification conveys to a person of skill in the art that those elements are, in fact, alternative or optional. Negative limitations are only unsupported where the specification provides no examples or suggestions that such limitations are alternative or optional.

The law of patent eligibility is created by the nine least qualified people to make such a determination; the Justices of Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court arbitrarily chooses which of its own prior decisions to follow and ignore, refuses to read and enforce the laws passed by Congress even when the statue is but a single sentence (as is 101), and they openly legislates from the bench by creating judicial exceptions to patent eligibility where no such statutory prerogative exists. If the Federal Circuit will not step up and do the right thing and limit the lawless Mayo decision, which instructs lower courts to ignore the patent statute and drive 100% of the analysis into 101, the U.S. will forfeit our lead in the biotechnology and medical device industries. That will be bad for the economy, but far worse for public health.

In a November 10 ruling, the Federal Circuit held that routine quality control testing of each batch of a generic drug as part of the commercial production process, after FDA approval, is not protected by the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). However, infringement only occurs under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), as a result of “making” a product, which does not include quality control testing.