Posts Tagged: "US Supreme Court"

Seth Waxman, of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, a former Solicitor General and Soverain’s lead attorney, says, “Newegg is taking this case seriously and so should the Supreme Court. Newegg’s attempt to reargue the facts only confirms that this case should have gone to the jury.” Waxman says, “The judicial overreach that occurred in this case is not an isolated incident, but rather the acceleration of a trend in the Court of Appeals that presents a broader threat to all who rely on the stability and predictability of the patent system.”

The absolute truth known to everyone in the innovation community is that pioneering innovations become commonplace. What was revolutionary at the time the invention was made becomes taken from granted. In hindsight pioneering innovations look insignificant because they have become ubiquitous. The public, judges and critics find it difficult (assuming they try) to determine whether that which is commonplace today was really, truly obvious decades earlier as of the critical date. Even when an honest and fair obviousness inquiry is undertake it can be exceptionally difficult to put yourself back to before the invention was made in order to determine what was known and what was obvious at the time. But let’s dispense with the ridiculousness, shall we? The overwhelming majority of the world was not at all knowledgeable about or clued into the World Wide Web at the time this innovation was first made. So let’s dispense with the histrionics.

This ruling cannot stand, and the CAFC needs to step back from the brink. The CAFC has vastly overreached in Soverain v. Newegg, and it is imperative that the Supreme Court hear the case and that Soverain prevail. This attack on patent-holders and the adverse implications from the change proposed by Newegg are unprecedented, and would deal a devastating blow to any U.S. patent-holder, large or small. The proposed change would alter the law and effectively eviscerate the patent system.

Today, after several years of substantial turmoil, patent eligibility in a variety of economically significant technologies is extremely uncertain, including software, natural products, medical diagnostics and personalized medicine. It is with great irony that one of the few things we know with any degree of certainty is that business methods are patent eligible… If you haven’t noticed, overwhelming portions of the U.S. economy are tied to the biotechnology and software sectors. Are we about to throw away our economic leadership? There are already some lawyers talking openly with clients about whether they may be able to in some cases actually get broader, more certain protection outside the United States.

As in the U.S., when drafting claims in China, one must describe the invention sufficiently to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. For software patents, a flow chart and explanation should be included, along with drawings and description of associated hardware. Portions of the source code may be included for reference. Software claims may be drafted as either method or apparatus claims. However, Justin Shi, patent attorney at Sony Mobile Communications in Beijing, warns that apparatus claims may be deemed invalid if they are phrased only in means-plus-function language and fail to describe the apparatus or its embodiments.

Despite the turmoil surround software patent eligibility I believe with great certainty that software will remain patent eligible in the United States. The extreme decisions of the PTAB and viewpoints of those on the Federal Circuit opposed to computer implemented methods will not prevail because they are inconsistent with the Patent Act and long-standing patent law jurisprudence. After all, the Supreme Court itself explicitly found software patent eligible in Diamond v. Diehr. In the meantime, while we wait for the dust to settle, we need to engage in a variety of claiming techniques (i.e., methods, computer readable medium, systems claims, means-plus-function claims and straight device claims). Thus, if you are interested in moving forward with a patent application it will be advisable to file the application with more claims than would have been suggested even a few months ago. Patent attorneys also must spend increased time describing the invention from various viewpoints, which means specifications should increase in size. This all means that there is no such thing as a quick, cheap and easy software patent application – at least if you want to have any hope of obtaining a patent in this climate.

The Supreme Court quite directly contradicts the reasoning of Chakrabarty in Myriad. Thomas explains that it is a fact that isolated DNA is nonnaturally occurring, but still nevertheless not patent eligible. Whether we like it or not, the very foundation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty has been overruled, or at the very least significantly cut back. Arguments to the contrary are simply wishful thinking and ignore the explicit language of the Myriad decision.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered an arrangement by which brand firm Solvay paid generics Watson (now Actavis) and Paddock roughly $30 to $40 million to delay entering the market with generic versions of testosterone gel. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the activity, concluding that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” The court explained that “[p]atent holders have a ‘lawful right to exclude others from the market’” and that a patent “conveys the right to cripple competition.”

The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, concluding that, while a valid patent allows a patentee to charge “higher-than-competitive” prices, “an invalidated patent carries with it no such right.” The Court recognized the policy encouraging settlements. But for five reasons, it found that that policy did not dictate immunity for pay-for-delay settlements.

By holding that Myriad’s claimed cDNA was patent-eligible, Thomas’ opinion reaffirms the major holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that claimed subject matter which truly only the “hand of man” can make (not simply snipped out of “mother nature”) will make it to the patent-eligibility zone. (Whether that same cDNA makes it to patentability zone under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and especially under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is another and far more important story.) I would also be careful in reading too much into Thomas’ statement (which is also dicta) about “very short series of DNA which may have no intervening introns to remove in creating the cDNA” might be patent-ineligible. By definition, cDNA (i.e., complementary DNA) is a DNA molecule which is created from mRNA (i.e., messenger RNA) and therefore lacking the introns in the DNA of the genome. Thomas (or his clerks) may not have realized that what they were talking about isn’t what would be defined (at least by a molecular biologist) as cDNA. So the impact of that statement should have minimal, if any impact.

The baffling aspect of the opinion is that the Court seems to agree that both the DNA of claim 1 and the DNA of claim 2 are man-made and do not occur in nature. Of claim 1, the Court states that “isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule”. Page 14 (emphasis added). Of claim 2, the Court states that “the lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.” Page 17 (emphasis added). According to the way many patent attorneys (and Judge Rader) think, that should be sufficient to comply with §101. But the Court does not see things this way.

USPTO to Examiners: “As of today, naturally occurring nucleic acids are not patent eligible merely because they have been isolated. Examiners should now reject product claims drawn solely to naturally occurring nucleic acids or fragments thereof, whether isolated or not, as being ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”

You can expect a near complete cessation in many areas of personalized medicine. If creating something in a lab, such as a composite cDNA, does not make the underlying claims patent eligible because what results is indistinguishable from what appears in nature that means that the fledgling and potentially promising technologies to grow organs for transplantation will shrivel up and die. The whole point is to create an organ that is indistinguishable from what appears in nature so that it can be transplanted into a human body to prolong life. Given the breadth of this opinion and the uncertainty it will cause funding will dry up in the U.S.

The Supreme Court on May 20, 2013, agreed to review a Federal Circuit decision that a patent licensee bears the burden of proof in its action for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement where the license remains in effect to preclude the defendant patentee’s infringement counterclaim. The question presented is whether, in such a declaratory judgment action brought by a licensee under MedImmune, the licensee has the burden to prove that its products do not infringe the patent, or whether (as is the case in all other patent litigation, including other declaratory judgment actions), the patentee must prove infringement.

Some had hoped that the Court would use Bowman as an opportunity to address the extent of a patent owner’s monopoly over other self-replicating technologies in the areas of biotechnology and information technology, such as human cell lines or computer programs. Certainly, the Court hinted at the possibility of situations where the patented article’s self-replication is truly outside the purchaser’s control, or where the self-replication is an essential step in using the patented article for another authorized purpose. The Court, however, cautiously declined to extend its holding in Bowman to those situations. The decision in Monsanto is intended to be fact-specific and carry slight ramification. Indeed, the Court’s unanimous decision ended with a significant caveat that the holding is limited, “addressing the situation before [the Court], rather than every one involving a self-replicating product.”