Posts in US Supreme Court

Late last month, TiVo won its second intellectual property battle with Comcast at the International Trade Commission (ITC) and is poised to win a third ruling this summer. The agency issued an exclusion order under Section 337 of the Tariff Act to prevent Comcast from importing digital video receivers that violate TiVo’s Rovi cable box patents. Now, unable to win on the argument that it did not infringe on TiVo’s patents, Comcast is trying again, this time attacking the ITC as an institution.

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al., v. Booking.com B.V., (Case No. 19-46) yesterday, in the High Court’s first ever telephonic hearing. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) urged the Supreme Court to reverse a judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that held BOOKING.COM to be a registrable trademark. The Respondent, Booking.com, argued that the primary significance test, rather than the Federal Circuit’s precedent in Goodyear Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., holds the answer to the question of how to distinguish between descriptive and generic names, and under the primary significance test, BOOKING.COM is a registerable trademark.

In Part I of this series we examined the mathematics exception to patentability and the historical underpinnings of its justification. In Part II, we will continue to examine the case history around patenting of mathematic principles.

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Georgia et al. v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc. that a state code revision commission cannot claim copyright protection over annotated state code. The ruling upheld the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 2018 decision in Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., which reversed-in-part, vacated-in-part and remanded a lower court’s ruling in a copyright infringement case involving an annotated version of Georgia’s official state code. The decision was not a shock, but could have serious implications going forward. Here is what some members of the copyright bar had to say.

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that a state code revision commission cannot claim copyright protection over annotated state code in Georgia et al. v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc. The Court dove into the judicially created “edicts doctrine,” which has not really been explored since the 1800s. The “original works” in question were supplementary annotations accompanying the statutes in Georgia’s Official Code, known as the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA”). These annotations and summaries of judicial decisions were owned by Georgia’s Code Revision Commission (“Commission”), although they were originally authored by a division of the LexisNexis Group under a “work made for hire” contract.

Amid the crush of patent-eligibility case law, see 35 U.S.C. §101, patent lawyers and even courts can lose sight of the key principles and precedents that serve as the foundation of the eligibility analysis. Or they may not have appreciated in the first place the underlying bases for these §101 cases and whether, for example, those cases accord with precedents they cite from decades before. In any event, this article addresses these foundational Supreme Court precedents for §101 and the Mayo-Alice ineligibility regime that dominates the patent landscape today. In particular, we trace the Court’s precedents from nearly 50 years ago, with an emphasis on key cases separated by some 30 years but tied together by the Court’s representation that it has faithfully followed (and not overruled) any such precedent. After analyzing the precedent in this light, with due emphasis on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), the article briefly examines the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance on §101—the Article II branch’s response to the §101 sea change wrought by the Article III courts. Finally, based on these authorities, the article offers a mix of points and observations for patent litigators and judges to consider as they continue to shape §101’s eligibility law.

In his second foray into intellectual property law this week, Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court today in Romag Fasteners v. Fossil Group Inc., reversing the Federal Circuit’s August 2017 decision and holding that willful infringement is only one consideration for awarding an infringer’s profits, and that 15 U.S.C. Section 1117(a) of does not articulate a willfulness prerequisite. Most attorneys who weighed in for IPWatchdog welcomed the decision as providing clarity and being pro-IP. Here is what they had to say.

Circuits have long split over whether willfulness is required before a trademark infringer’s profits may be awarded. Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act allows an award of profits “subject to principles of equity.” In Romag v. Fossil, the jury awarded Fossil’s $6.7 million in profits to Romag to deter infringement, even though the jury found only 1% of those profits were attributable to the infringement. However, because the jury found Fossil infringed “in callous disregard” but not willfully, the Federal Circuit refused to allow the award of Fossil’s profits. The Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the Federal Circuit in today’s decision. Instead, “mental state” or “mens rea” is only a consideration for an award of the infringer’s profits, albeit an “important” or “highly important” consideration. The Court gave nodding mention to the substantial competing policy-based arguments submitted by both parties and amicus briefing and fleshed out further at oral argument. But ultimately, the decision stuck closely to the statutory language, finding Section 1117(a) could not support the weight of a willfulness prerequisite.

In an energetic dissent in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Tech., LP, 590 U.S. __ (Apr. 20, 2020), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch provides a compelling defense of patent rights, and he champions a patent owner’s ability to obtain judicial review of certain threshold administrative decisions from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). But while Justice Gorsuch’s insightful analysis is receiving accolades from many in the patent community, it failed to garner any support among his Supreme Court colleagues, save for one, Justice Sotomayor.

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), by and through his designees, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), has the unchallengeable authority to institute inter partes review (IPR) proceedings even when they are brought outside the statute of limitations. Thus, the PTAB is now the most important patent court in the United States. This begs an important question that Congress must soon wrestle with regarding access to the PTAB. We have been told over and over again just how essential the PTAB is to the patent system. How necessary the PTAB is with respect to rooting out bad patents that never should have issued. And, honestly, the PTAB has been very, very good at killing patent claims and patents. But there is a fundamental unfairness at the PTAB. If the PTAB is so important, why are the fees so high? If the PTAB plays such a vital role in correcting the egregious mistakes of patent examiners (of which there are apparently many given the number of valuable patents that die upon review), why should only those patents that are owned by independent inventors, universities, start-ups and research and development companies be the targets? What about the truly ridiculous, idiotic patents that are issued to large entities?

Yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies was in some ways unsurprising, but has generated buzz among the patent community all the same. Many pointed to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent as being particularly poignant, and perhaps indicative of what issues will be front and center in other pending petitions at the Court, such as Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew. IPWatchdog Founder and CEO Gene Quinn said yesterday that, with the Thryv decision, “the Supreme Court sets hundreds of years of fundamental procedural law on its head…. No challenge is proper, and if the PTAB wants to institute outside the statutory time period there is nothing anyone can do.” Here is what some other members of the patent bar had to say.

In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court ruled today that Section 314 (d) of the U.S. Patent Act, which bars judicial review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decisions to institute inter partes review (IPR), should preclude appeals of PTAB institution decisions, even where the appeal is based on Section 315(b)’s one-year time-bar for institution. “Congress designed inter partes review to weed out bad patent claims efficiently,” wrote the Court in today’s decision. “Allowing §315(b) appeals, however, would unwind agency proceedings determining patentability and leave bad patents enforceable.” Despite Click-to-Call’s argument that the bar on appeals under Section 314(d) is limited to the agency’s threshold determination under §314(a) of the question whether the petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, the Court explained that Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee “is fatal to that interpretation.”

Three amici have weighed in supporting Chrimar Systems, Inc.’s petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court and urging the High Court to clarify the law and undo the harm they say has been caused by the Federal Circuit’s application of the so-called Fresenius/ Simmons preclusion principle. On March 10, Chrimar Systems, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the High Court in Chrimar Systems v. ALE USA, Inc. asking the Court to weigh in on when a patent judgment becomes final. Chrimar is specifically asking the Court to answer: “1. Whether the Federal Circuit may apply a finality standard for patent cases that conflicts with the standard applied by [the Supreme Court] and all other circuit courts in nonpatent cases, and 2. Whether a final judgment of liability and damages that has been affirmed on appeal may be reversed based on the decision of an administrative agency, merely because an appeal having nothing to do with liability, damages or the proper calculation of the ongoing royalty rate is pending.”

“The COVID-19 crisis has once more highlighted the need for incentivizing investment and innovation—and thus, for patent laws that duly “promote” and protect such “progress,” precisely as our Founders envisioned,” writes Chief Judge Paul Michel, now retired from the Federal Circuit. As he so often is, Judge Michel is absolutely correct. Many are asking why testing for the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 has been slow to roll out, and why tests in many countries are inaccurate. Those familiar with U.S. patent laws understand the problem. There has been a deemphasis on medical diagnostics in America as the result of a series of Supreme Court and Federal Circuit rulings, coupled with Congressional inaction.

On April 6, Arthrex, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on two discrete patent issues. Notably, one of the issues raised in Arthrex’s April 6 petition is likely to prove especially compelling to the Supreme Court, and may well tilt the balance for it being granted, as it provides an inroad to a constitutional Appointments Clause issue that is central to several other petitions by various parties on the same issue. Arthrex is widely anticipated to file another petition for certiorari on this issue stemming from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s recent denial of a rehearing en banc in Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew wherein the main issue had been the Federal Circuit’s ruling that Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) judges were indeed unconstitutionally appointed under the America Invents Act (AIA), but that the Federal Circuit’s field expedient blue penciling of the underlying statutes corrected any constitutional flaws nunc pro tunc.