Expert Declaration Opposing Section 101 Motion to Dismiss for Patent Invalidity Deemed Not a Written Instrument

“Plaintiffs opposing a Section 101 Motion to Dismiss should … incorporate an expert’s findings into their complaints, pled as factual allegations. While this may lead to voluminous complaints, the alternative … risks a court striking the annexed declaration.”

Section 101 Patent eligibility challenges under 35 U.S.C. § 101 have been effective tools at the pleading stage for parties defending allegations of patent infringement. Defendants often attempt to avoid the costs of litigation by filing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6), seeking to invalidate the asserted patent(s) on the grounds that the claims are directed to ineligible subject matter — such as an “abstract idea.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).

Previously, a key tactic for plaintiffs to overcome such “Section 101 motions” was by amending the complaint and annexing an expert declaration. The expert declaration would bolster the plaintiff’s position by analyzing patent eligibility issues such as the state-of-art at the time of the patent filing, problems therewith, and the advantages provided by the claimed invention. Recently, however, this strategy has been called into question due to a recent decision in Marble VOIP Partners LLC v. Zoom Video Communications, Inc., 2-22-cv-02247 (DKS Apr. 24, 2023) (Julie A. Robinson) ( “Marble v. Zoom”).

The Marble v. Zoom Decision

In Marble v. Zoom, plaintiff, Marble VoIP Partners LLC, filed a lawsuit against Zoom Video Communications alleging infringement of United States Patent No. 7,376,129 entitled “Enabling Collaborative Applications Using Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) based Voice over Internet Protocol Networks (VOIP)” (“the ’129 Patent”).

Defendant Zoom filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the claims of the ’129 Patent were invalid for claiming ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Judge Robinson of the District Court of Kansas denied the motion, finding plausible factual allegations that the claims of the ’129 Patent were not directed to an abstract idea. However, in reaching this decision, the court specifically declined to consider the expert declaration submitted by plaintiff in opposition. Specifically, the court held that the declaration was not a “written instrument” under FRCP 10(c) and, therefore, it would be improper to consider such a document in deciding the motion to dismiss:

“While the analysis in this case requires consideration of some highly technical concepts, the Federal Circuit has recognized that ‘patent eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage without the aid of expert testimony.’ . . . Nor does the . . . Declaration qualify as the sort of material a court would be permitted to consider when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. While the Tenth Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue, other Circuit Courts of Appeal and district courts in this Circuit have held that an expert declaration is not a ‘written instrument’ within the meaning of Rule 10(c). The Court finds these holdings to be persuasive[.]?” Marble VOIP Partners LLC v. Zoom Video Communications, Inc., 2-22-cv-02247 (DKS Apr. 24, 2023) (Julie A. Robinson)

Rule 10(c), entitled, “Form of Pleadings” states that “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes.” FRCP 10(c). The presiding case law has interpreted a “written instrument” to mean a document that “evidences legal rights” or “sets forth the legal basis for a plaintiff’s claims.” See e.g. Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 254 (2nd Cir. 2015). For instance, courts have found documents such as contracts, notes, and other writings on which a party’s action or defense is based to be qualified as a “written instrument.” Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108, 1115 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). On the other hand, photographs of an accident scene or affidavits annexed to negligence complaints have been deemed improper “written instruments,” largely because they are unnecessary since allegations within a complaint are already presumed true. See, Allen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 19-cv-03594, 2020 WL 3000957, at *2 (D. Colo. June 3, 2020).

Other Courts on 10(c)

Until Judge Robinson’s recent decision in the Marble v. Zoom case, just one (1) other federal district court case had specifically addressed Rule 10(c) in the patent context. In Univ. of Fla. Rsch. Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 17CV171, 2017 WL5502940 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2017), the Florida district court considered the expert declarations attached to the patent infringement complaint “to the extent that the declarations…are not conclusory.” Id. Although the Marble v. Zoom court found the Univ. of Fla. Rsch Found, Inc. case to be unpersuasive, that case nevertheless found, under Eleventh Circuit law, that the supporting affidavits discussing patent eligibility were properly considered at the motion to dismiss stage under Rule 10(c).

The Marble v. Zoom decision raises interesting issues for plaintiffs hoping to ward off Section 101 Motions to Dismiss. Patent matters are uniquely technical; the Section 101 inquiry at the pleadings stage requires the court to analyze the claims as one of ordinary skill in the art before any expert discovery is conducted. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Presumably, courts would benefit from an expert declaration at the pleadings stage discussing the state of the art, problems, and innovations – i.e., the factual underpinnings used to decide the ultimate legal question of patent eligibility. However, as is often the case, it appears that whether an expert declaration will be deemed a “written instrument” will depend on the jurisdiction of the action. Indeed, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have all found, on varying facts, that documents such as affidavits, photographs and other supporting materials are inappropriate exhibits to a pleading. See, e.g., Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 254 (2nd Cir. 2015); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3rd Cir.1989); Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006); Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distributors, Inc., No. 03-cv-0159, 2004 WL 62747, at *2–3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 8, 2004), aff’d, 420 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005); Stuart v. Cadbury Adams USA, LLC, No. 09-cv-6295, 2010 WL 1407303, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010), aff’d, 458 F. App’x 689 (9th Cir. 2011). While the Tenth Circuit, of which the District of Kansas is a part, has not yet specifically addressed this issue, the Marble v. Zoom case will certainly be persuasive case law in that jurisdiction, should the issue arise again.

Minimize the Risk

In the remaining Circuits, whether the court may properly consider an expert declaration at the pleading stage remains unclear. Plaintiffs seeking to maximize the likelihood that a district court will consider an attached declaration as part of the pleading should set forth only the factual underpinnings upon which patent eligibility will be based and avoid conclusory assertions or opinions of law in the declaration.

Ultimately, to avoid potential 10(c) issues in any federal court, plaintiffs opposing a Section 101 Motion to Dismiss should simply incorporate an expert’s findings into their complaints, pled as factual allegations. While this may lead to voluminous complaints, the alternative, as in the Marble v. Zoom case, risks a court striking the annexed declaration and considering only what is alleged in the four corners of the complaint.

Image Source: Deposit Photos
Image ID: 81996574
Author: Wavebreakmedia

Share

Warning & Disclaimer: The pages, articles and comments on IPWatchdog.com do not constitute legal advice, nor do they create any attorney-client relationship. The articles published express the personal opinion and views of the author as of the time of publication and should not be attributed to the author’s employer, clients or the sponsors of IPWatchdog.com.

Join the Discussion

9 comments so far.

  • [Avatar for David Lewis]
    David Lewis
    July 25, 2023 01:14 am

    The proposed new legislation reads:

    (A) INGENERAL.—In an action brought for infringement under this title, the court, at any time, may determine whether an invention or discovery that is a subject of the action is eligible for a patent under this section, including on motion of a party when there are no genuine issues of material fact.
    (B) LIMITED DISCOVERY.—With respect to a determination described in subparagraph (A), the court may consider limited discovery relevant only to the eligibility described in that subparagraph before ruling on a motion described in that subparagraph.

    That seems like a mixed bag to me, that will be subject to court interpretation.

    I wonder, if discovery was allowed, wouldn’t that suggest that there was an issue of material fact, but yet the case may be dismissed anyway. I suppose that as a result of discovery, there is no longer an issue of material fact. Or, at least that is one way the law could be implemented, which at least could result in another avenue for invalidating patents pre-trial that would not have existed otherwise.

    Let’s, consider the realities of a judge’s work pressures. Presumably, most judges have busy dockets, and an easy way of reducing one’s docket load is by dismissing the case as patent ineligible, without a trial. Although the judge “may” allow discovery, he does not have to. That would seem to create a bias for dismissing patent cases as patent ineligible, without a trial and without discovery, if there is any plausible rationale for doing so, (and, as suggested above, when there is no plausible way of dismissing the case pretrial for patent ineligibility, perhaps after discovery there will be).

    Perhaps there is a way for the above law to be implemented that is more favorable to patents, but the above seems quite possible, but what do I know, I am just a patent agent.

  • [Avatar for Milton Farmer]
    Milton Farmer
    July 24, 2023 04:33 pm

    Will the PERA from Tillis Coons cause this issue of 101 rejections to go away? If it doesn’t, it should be amended to address this issue.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    Anon
    July 24, 2023 03:14 pm

    “At least in theory”

    my oh my, how sad those words ring out.

  • [Avatar for B]
    B
    July 24, 2023 11:12 am

    The trouble: The courts and particularly the CAFC lie and will tolerate no evidence or facts that go against their pre-conceived notions of patent eligibility.

    @ Curious “At least in theory, this is how it is supposed to work.”

    So when has the CAFC been concerned about evidence? Hey, I’m glad you’re finally on the evidence wagon (better late than never), but if the CAFC actually paid attention to evidence Alice/Mayo wouldn’t be such a joke

  • [Avatar for PTO Indentured]
    PTO Indentured
    July 24, 2023 10:05 am

    Checklist:

    A. Whatever can be done to do away with a meaningful US patent implement it.

    End of checklist.

    Take another step further away from “ensuring” — i.e., upholding the US Constitution (the sworn duty). Now, observe China IP thriving.

  • [Avatar for PTO Indentured]
    PTO Indentured
    July 24, 2023 09:27 am

    Checklist:

    A. Whatever can be done to do away with a meaningful US patent implement it.

    End of checklist.

    Take another giant step further away from “ensuring” — i.e., upholding the US Constitution (your sworn duty).

  • [Avatar for Pro Say]
    Pro Say
    July 23, 2023 09:42 pm

    Thanks — excellent advice.

    As Curious points out, however, such expert input should virtually never be needed when faced with a motion to dismiss. The patent does indeed speak for itself.

    Or at least it used to . . . . before the CAFC began practicing voodoo jurisprudence.

  • [Avatar for Curious]
    Curious
    July 23, 2023 07:23 pm

    This is somewhat interesting decision, but in the end, the judge got it right.

    A 12b6 motion is about the sufficiency of the complaint (or at least it was until the Federal Circuit decided to toss away Supreme Court law and make it about something else). Moreover, as noted in this article, written documents “are unnecessary since allegations within a complaint are already presumed true.”

    While I presume there may be some value in submitting a written opinion regarding eligibility under 101, it should not be necessary. The ISSUED patent itself should serve as an expert opinion (i.e., the opinion of the examiner) that the claims meet the requirements of 101. Moreover, any factual allegations in the complaint should be presumed to be true. As such, so long as factual allegations are made in the complaint that support a finding that the claims are directed to patentable subject matter, then the motion to dismiss should be denied. At least in theory, this is how it is supposed to work.

  • [Avatar for Model 101]
    Model 101
    July 23, 2023 07:19 pm

    This means there is nothing you can do.