Posts Tagged: "antitrust law"

IPXI is the first financial exchange that facilitates non-exclusive licensing and trading of intellectual property rights with market-based pricing and standardized terms. Earlier this week word came from the Intellectual Property Exchange International Inc. (IPXI) that the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division issued its Business Review Letter (BRL) upon the culmination of its eight-month review. The DOJ believes that the IP Exchange business model proposed by IPXI is capable of producing market efficiencies in the patent licensing arena and is likely to be pro-innovation. Although no permission is required of the DOJ before IPXI opens its exchange, having this review of the DOJ Antitrust Division complete has to make IPXI and Exchange participants much more at ease as the move closer toward their attempt to revolutionize IP licensing.

Under a settlement reached with the FTC, Google will meet its prior commitments to allow competitors access – on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms – to patents on critical standardized technologies needed to make popular devices such as smart phones, laptop and tablet computers, and gaming consoles. In a separate letter of commitment to the Commission, Google has agreed to give online advertisers more flexibility to simultaneously manage ad campaigns on Google’s AdWords platform and on rival ad platforms; and to refrain from misappropriating online content from so-called “vertical” websites that focus on specific categories such as shopping or travel for use in its own vertical offerings.

In the past several years, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have upheld these settlements (known as “reverse payment” agreements since the money flows from the patentee to the alleged infringer rather than the other way around). These courts have focused on the benefits of settling cases and the presumption of patent validity, and they have explained that payments fall within the “scope of the patent.” In contrast, the Third Circuit recently applied more aggressive scrutiny, rejecting the scope test and finding that payments for delay were “prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.”

Not only is the FTC arguing that product changes to patented drugs violate U.S. antitrust laws, but the FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) are going to look into whether patent enforcement activities that seek redress for infringement violate U.S. antitrust laws. See FTC, DOJ to Hold Workshop on Patent Assertion Entities. This does not bode well for a second Obama term, and I have to wonder whether those in the patent community that decided to vote for President Obama due to his perceived friendliness to patents and smooth running of the Patent Office are going to start to have regrets, particularly now that David Kappos is leaving the USPTO.

In a “no-AG” agreement, the branded firm, as part of the patent litigation settlement, agrees that it will not launch its own generic alternative when the first generic begins to compete. Since the introduction of the branded AG would cut into the revenues of a competing generic product, a no-AG commitment can induce the generic firm to delay entry of its product to the market. Thus, the Commission concludes, a no-AG commitment is legally sufficient to trigger a rebuttable presumption of illegality under the law of the Third Circuit.

One of the most complex issues in antitrust and patent law today involves agreements by which brand-name drug companies pay generics to delay entering the market. In the past decade, with the Supreme Court showing no interest in wading into the area, the Federal, Second, and Eleventh Circuits have upheld these agreements. And, with each court relying on its sister court, a momentum had developed that made it nearly impossible to discern a role for antitrust scrutiny. The Third Circuit just found that a reverse payment was “prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.”

Commenting on the Yahoo! Inc. patent infringement lawsuit filed against Facebook in March of 2012, Mr. Cuban concludes his post by stating: “I hope Yahoo[!] is awarded $50 billion dollars. It is the only way that consumers will realize what is at stake with patent law as is. Then maybe we can get it right and further innovation and competition in this country.” These statements are from a very influential technology entrepreneur, investor and generally-recognized American business guru. Thus, it would seem that the continuous negative headlines from the smart phone patent wars are definitely giving patents a bad rap!

So what did Apple and the other publishers do that put them on Uncle Sam’s Radar? Allegedly, they agreed among themselves to sell their e-books at the same price. This is also known as “Price Fixing” and it’s a big no-no. When companies who sell the same product agree among themselves to set the same price for that product, they could (not necessarily will) set that price as high as they wish, because there will be no place cheaper to get it. The type of price fixing alleged here – ‘horizontal’ price fixing – is considered violative of the Sherman Act regardless of the effect on the market. This means that even if the agreement didn’t actually harm the market whatsoever, it would still be considered anti-competitive.

The term “patent misuse” refers to specific types of prohibited behavior engaged in by the owner of the patent rights. Patent misuse is an affirmative defense that recognizes that it is possible for a patent owner to abuse the exclusive right enjoyed as a result of the issuance of a patent. As an affirmative defense, patent misuse cannot be used as a sword, but can only be used by an alleged infringer if and when the patent owner seeks to enforce the exclusive right of the patent in a patent infringement suit. Once a patent infringement suit is initiated, the alleged infringer, in order to successfully rely upon the patent misuse defense, must “show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.” If the alleged infringer can demonstrate that the patent owner did engaged in prohibited behavior, the patent will be unenforceable despite the fact that it is valid. In this respect, patent misuse is similar to the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which also works to make an entire patent unenforceable.

With copyright misuse having recently been successful in a rather high profile case I thought it would be worthwhile to revisit patent misuse and misuse concepts generally. To do that in a way that allows the casually interested reader to follow along probably requires first taking a step back away from the intellectual property centric theories to discuss some basic antitrust law concepts. This seems particularly appropriate since many of the misuse cases have a distinct antitrust flavor.

We conclude that the FTC has not identified sufficient evidence to raise serious doubt about the current efficiencies of the IP marketplace. Indeed, the available empirical evidence suggests that these existing rules and practices work well. The interests of consumers are well represented by standard setting organizations and competition among technology implementers who at the end of the day must make goods and services that people wish to purchase.

Earlier this month Dechert LLP, representing an undisclosed number of companies (“stakeholders”), sent a letter to IMG College (“IMG”) and its licensing division, the Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”), and demanded that IMG and CLC cease and desist any efforts to restrict the number of licensees permitted to supply merchandise bearing the brands of various NCAA colleges and universities. It looks likes trademark and antitrust issues are back on the menu in sports, which makes intellectual property nerds like me very happy. We all knew American Needle Inc. v. National Football League (“Needle”) would embolden private antitrust suits; it was just a question of when. But a pivotal question is should Needle be extended to permit private antitrust suits in collegiate athletics?

On Friday, May 13, 2011, the Federal Circuit issued the latest decision in a long line of Rambus decisions stemming out of conduct of Rambus as it participated in the JEDEC standard-setting body, as well as litigation events that followed. A five judge panel of the Federal Circuit (per Judge Linn) affirmed the district court’s determination that Rambus destroyed documents during its second shred day in contravention of a duty to preserve them and, thus, engaging in spoliation.

About 10 years ago, the NFLP decided that they wanted Reebok (and only Reebok) to make hats with the teams’ logos on them. American Needle, Inc., a competitor of Reebok, had been making these types of hats for the NFL for a really long time, and as a result of the NFLP’s deal with Reebok, it lost its contract with NFLP to make said hats. American Needle, Inc. did not have much of a sense of humor about this and sued the NFL under Antitrust principles. Enter American Needle v. National Football League et al. Needle is a big case because if the NFL had gotten what it asked for, the player’s union wouldn’t have been able to decertify and the players wouldn’t have been able to bring an antitrust suit.

One of the most debated issues in patent and antitrust law today involves pharmaceutical patent settlements. Brand-name drug manufacturers pay generic firms to settle patent litigation and delay entering the market. How should the antitrust laws respond? The Cipro case presents an ideal vehicle for Supreme Court review. It involves a simple, undisputed payment from brand to generic to delay entering the market.