Posts in US Supreme Court

There are two stages of litigation in the Supreme Court.  There’s what’s called the petition stage and the merit stage.  This is a phenomenon that doesn’t exist in the Federal Courts of Appeals, which are courts of mandatory jurisdiction.  There’s no doubt that if you lose a patent trial you have a right to appeal to the Federal Circuit.  You don’t have to come hat in hand begging the Federal Circuit to take your case or making it appear so sexy that they’re smitten and they take it.  But the Supreme Court of the United States has very, very little mandatory jurisdiction.  It’s almost all discretionary jurisdiction.  It gets 10,000 petitions a year and it currently grants review in about 75 cases a year.  And so there is a whole level of advocacy that begins with the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari and then it’s followed by a brief in opposition by the winning party below and then a reply brief.  And whatever amicus briefs are filed by friends of the petitioner or the respondent in 10,000 cases in which the court is picking a few for plenary review.

The other thing I think that’s at play here, and maybe it’s the principal reason is a point that I made earlier which is our economy depends utterly on intellectual property. That is in fostering innovation and inventiveness in the manner in which the framers of the Constitution understood needed to be fostered. That is within appropriately countered system of protections for discoveries and inventions and novel expression. But that doesn’t smother innovation by competitors and by others. And because our economy is so utterly tied to intellectual property the Supreme Court correctly understands that this is a substantive area in which it is very, very important for the correct balance to be struck.

Waxman on the advantage of not being a “Patent Specialist”: Perhaps paradoxically, it seems to me, the advantage in litigation with respect to esoteric areas of the law and technology goes to the generalist. All too often, experts apply all sorts of mental shortcuts in explaining why their view is correct. It’s difficult for anyone with expertise to put herself in the mindset of someone who isn’t, and is approaching the issue as a generalist adjudicator. Even Federal Circuit judges with technical training lack expertise with respect to the vast majority of the kinds of innovation that comes before that court.

All of these accomplishments would be more than enough to fill out a lifetime spent in the law, but upon leaving the Department of Justice, Waxman has become nationally recognized and highly sought after as one of the preeminent appellate attorneys in America. He has also developed a particular niche in the area of patent law and litigation. Simply stated, if you have a patent case before the Supreme Court and you want to win, Waxman will be on your short list of attorneys to call. In fact, he should be right at the top.

This month I have been running a series of articles on the United States Supreme Court. Today we switch things up a little and talk patents, focusing on one of the most important decisions the Supreme Court has made over the last generation — i4i v. Microsoft. I recently chatted with Michael Cannata. His is a name you might not know, but he was intimately involved in the i4i case. He is the manager of a fund that put up the capital for i4i to fight the battle. He consequently became a Director for i4i and was involved with co-managing the litigation for i4i.

In 1879 the United States Supreme Court first had the opportunity (and necessity) to address whether Congress had been granted in the Constitution the power to enact legislation to protect trademarks. Since 1879 there have been many cases involved trademark issues that have wound up the top Court in the United States. But a summary start to finish of all Supreme Court trademark cases is even a bit ambitious for us in a single article. Thus, what follows is a summary of those trademarks issues that have reached the Supreme Court over the last generation.

In a recently published Forbes.com article titled”The Federal Circuit, Not the Supreme Court, Legalized Software Patents,” Lee doubled down with his absurd and provably incorrect assertions regarding the patentability of software patents. But he also more or less sheepishly admitted that his reading of the most relevant case is not one that is widely accepted as correct by anyone other than himself. He wrote: “To be clear, plenty of people disagree with me about how Diehr should be interpreted.” Thus, Lee admits that his primary assertion is one he created from whole cloth and contrary to the widely held views to the contrary. Of course, the fact that his radical views are in the minority was conveniently omitted from his ?Ars Technica? article. If Lee has any integrity he will issue a public apology to the Federal Circuit and issue a retraction. If Lee doesn’t come to his senses and do the right thing in the face of overwhelming evidence that he is wrong then Forbes.com and Ars Technica should step in and do what needs to be done.

October overwhelmingly means one thing in the legal world. No, not Halloween, although to some it may seem just as scary. Every October the United States Supreme Court breaks its hibernation and starts its new session. Every case heard and decision handed down by the Supreme Court between October 1, 2012 and the end of June 2013 will be a part of the Court’s October 2012 term. This, the first of what will be a handful of SCOTUS related intellectual property articles, is a summary of the most important Supreme Court copyright fair use cases dating back to Baker v. Selden in 1879.

At the request of the Federal Trade Commission, the Solicitor General of the United States petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review a recent federal appeals court ruling concerning the FTC’s case against a “pay-for-delay” agreement. The petition for certiorari, the mechanism for asking for the Supreme Court to review a case, argues that the agreement that postponed generic competition for the testosterone-replacement drug AndroGel is anti-competitive and should not be legal. But thanks to the byzantine legal rules created by the Hatch-Waxman Act, the brand name owner was doing nothing more than what seems to explicitly be authorized by the law.

One week ago, on July 18, 2012, Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court sat down for an interview with Piers Morgan of CNN. See Scalia interview transcript. During the interview Morgan asked Scalia what his hardest decision has been while on the Supreme Court. I thought it might be fun to ask some industry insiders what their guess was as to the unnamed case Justice Scalia was thinking of as the “hardest decision.” Some of those I asked didn’t offer a guess, but rather took the opportunity to discuss the aforementioned Scalia statements more generally. Those “musings” will be published tomorrow.

Now the Patent Office and the courts have the unenviable task of trying to figure out what the Supreme Court really meant in Mayo v. Prometheus. If Diehr remains good law, which it clearly does, and Mayo v. Prometheus is good law, which it has to be as the last pronouncement, then it becomes clear that the proper statutory analysis is to go step by step through the statute analyzing patentability under the separate and distinct patentability requirements of 101, 102, 103 and 112. That is unless there is something that allows for the short-circuiting of the appropriate analysis as in Mayo v. Prometheus. What is that something?

A decision with the right outcome but for the wrong reasons can confound jurisprudence nearly as much as a decision that is entirely wrong. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that all that found its way into the Siedman patents was the results of the very research that had been recommended in the 1996 paper and which Prometheus had been prompted to under-write. The more natural objection which, unfortunately, was not pursued was therefore lack of inventive step under 35 USC §103. It is submitted that this should have been enough to dispose of the issue between the parties, arguably even in a motion for summary judgment, but unfortunately it was not how the case was pleaded and argued.

This is a good time to review the implications of this case, but an even better time to look into the origins and constitutionality of the Non-obviousness requirement. You might object that the jurisprudence of the non-obviousness requirement is so well established that nothing can be learned from this sort of analysis. I disagree. Patent law is under assault by the Supreme Court, the media, the ‘information wants to be free’ crowd, multinational corporations, and the economics profession. If we attempt to explain patent law based on the decisions of people who never passed the patent bar, never wrote a patent, never prosecuted a patent, and do not have a technical background, we are doomed. We need to define patent law as a natural law/right based on certain fundamental truths. This is the only way to get the non-patent attorney judge or the general public to understand patent law and understand that it represents justice.

On Monday, April 30, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued its final decision in the matter of KSR v. Teleflex, which overruled the Federal Circuit’s application of the so-called “teaching, suggestion, motivation” test (or simply TSM) as it applies to determining whether an invention is obvious. At least for the last generation (and likely longer) no other Supreme Court case in the patent arena has been nearly as influential as the Court’s decision in KSR v. Teleflex. This is because obviousness is where the rubber meets the road for the patentability of inventions. This 5th Anniversary of the ruling provides an opportunity to revisit the decision and where we have come since. This will be a recurring theme this week on IPWatchdog.com as we look at the law of obviousness in the wake of this infamous decision.

Maybe it is the result of the case being of such little importance to the patent system as a whole, or maybe it is just evidence that every blind squirrel finds a nut every once in a while. Whatever the case may be, the United States Supreme Court yesterday did get it right in a patent case. Virtually no one brings appeals from the Patent Office to the district court under § 145 despite the far more favorable review standard, which we have known about at least since 1999 in Dickinson v. Zurko. § 145 will remain an infrequently used relic of the patent system, and we are left to lament that it would have been far better for the Supreme Court to get Mayo v. Prometheus right than for them to get Kappos v. Hyatt right. Sigh.