Posts Tagged: "Federal Circuit"

All of this might be confusing to a Judge who is unfamiliar with computers, but that is not the test, is it? The question is supposed to be whether it would be confusing to a person of relevant skill in the relevant technology area. Indeed, disclosure sufficient for means-plus-function claiming may be implicit or inherent in the specification if it would have been clear to those skilled in the art what corresponds to the means-plus-function claim limitation. See MPEP 2181 and Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 1999). Indeed, the Federal Circuit in Atmel concluded that the title of the article incorporated by reference in the specification may, by itself, be sufficient to indicate to one skilled in the art the precise structure of the means for performing the recited function. So the focus is supposed to be on one of skill in the art even when interpreting whether the specification provides adequate support for means-plus-function claiming. Nowhere in the majority opinion is it stated that a person of skill in the art would not have known and would have found the claim vague or ambiguous.

Unfortunately this unspecific remand by the Supreme Court in AMP vacates as well the two-to-one ruling by this same Federal Circuit panel (Judges Lourie and Moore in the majority, Judge Bryson in dissent) that the claimed isolated DNA sequences were also patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. What, pray tell, does Mayo Collaborative Services change with regard to that ruling in the original AMP decision? For those, like the plaintiffs in AMP (including the ACLU), who would like to upset this “applecart,” they’re likely to be very disappointed. I can describe what should be the impact of the ruling (and reasoning) in Mayo Collaborative Services on the claimed isolated DNA sequences in three short monosyllabic words: NONE AT ALL. And the Federal Circuit can (and should) say likewise, perhaps in far more words.

Well, Justice Breyer, the writer of the dissenting opinion in Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., finally got his wish. Writing the opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., Breyer ruled that a claimed drug dosage calibration method based on previously unknown “precise correlations between metabolite levels [of administered thiopurine drugs] and likely harm or ineffectiveness” was patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because it “adds nothing to the laws of nature that is not already present when the steps [of the claimed method] are considered separately.” While I’m not surprised that Breyer ruled the claimed method patent-ineligible, his reasoning in Mayo Collaborative Services is, in my view, often nonsensical, and is fraught with unfortunate statements that could potentially eviscerate the patent-eligibility of drug testing methods generally under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The sky is falling! Those who feel the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. is terrible are right, although many won’t likely fully apprehend the gravity of the situation at first. Those in the biotech, pharmaceutical and chemical industries have just been taken out behind the woodshed and summarily executed by the Supreme Court this morning. An enormous number of patents will now have no enforceable claims. Hundreds of billions of dollars in corporate value has been erased. But that might be a good thing. Immediate attention now must turn to Congress. Thank goodness that the technical amendments to the America Invents Act are outstanding. This will provide a perfect opportunity for Congress to save an industry that employs many millions of people, while at the same time undoing a pathetic, narrow-minded decision of the Supreme Court.

Where the en banc decision gets particularly interesting (and adversarial) is with respect to the second question, namely when does “intervening rights” apply to reexamined claims? By a 6 to 4 vote, (and a reversal of the panel decision), a majority of the en banc Federal Circuit also concluded “as an alternative ground for affirmance” of the district court’s judgment that “intervening rights do not apply to claims that have not been amended and are not new.” The majority opinion by Judge Lourie (the dissenter in the panel decision) was joined by Chief Judge Rader, and Judges Newman, Bryson, Prost, and Linn (who was one of the 5 “nay” votes on the meaning “biocompatible). The dissenting opinion on the “intervening rights” question by Judge Dyk (who wrote the majority opinion in the panel decision) was joined by Senior Judge Gajarsa (who also joined the majority opinion in the panel decision), Judge Reyna, and Judge Wallach.

In the recently issued case of ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc., Judge Moore, writing for the Federal Circuit panel, distinguished the holding in the 2006 case of Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp. In ClearValue, Judge Moore ruled that a process having a claimed raw alkalinity of “less than or equal to 50 ppm” was anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 by a prior art process disclosing an alkalinity of “150 ppm or less.” I believe Judge Moore was correct in ruling that the claimed alkalinity of “less than or equal to 50 ppm” was anticipated by the art disclosed alkalinity of “150 ppm or less.” But her basis for distinguishing Atofina in ClearValue is very problematic in a number of respects, and could create further unnecessary confusion as to when a narrower claimed range in a process is anticipated by a broader range disclosed by the prior art. As illustrated by the ClearValue and Atofina cases, one area where the Federal Circuit sometimes struggles in articulating clear doctrine is when is a narrower claimed range in a process is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 by a broader range disclosed by the prior art.

The discussion was lively, perhaps even explosive. You could nearly see sparks fly when Chief Judge Rader continued to pepper Seth Waxman with question after question about his opinion on the propriety of parties lobbying the White House in order to obtain a favorable amici brief from the Department of Justice. Rader zeroed in on the slippery slope and obviously is not pleased with the mixing of law and politics, saying: “this is a cause for concern… Politics and law have a divide.” It is indeed troubling that the White House under both President Bush and President Obama have allowed lobbying by parties who seek a favorable DOJ amici brief. Interpretations of the law shouldn’t be for sale, or appear to be for sale to the largest donors.

On September 26, 2011, the a three-judge-panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a ruling in Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., which found intervening rights due to certain patent claims due to the fact that Marine Polymer made arguments about claim language during reexamination, but without actually amending the claims. See Marine Polymer vacated opinion. On January 20, 2012, the full Federal Circuit decided to hear this case en banc and ordered that the original panel decision be vacated and the appeal reinstated. No additional briefing by the parties was requested, but on January 26, 2012, the Federal Circuit issued an Order allowing amicus briefs to be filed on or before February 10, 2012. On February 10, 2012 the Biotechnology Industry Organization and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America filed a joint Amici Curiae Brief supporting the appellee and seeking affirmance of the district court decision.

In what seems to be a continuing trend, the United Stats Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is continuing to show increasingly little tolerance for abusive patent litigation tactics. In the most recent pronouncement along these lines the Federal Circuit, per Judge O’Malley (with Judges Newman and Prost joining), ruled the district court appropriately awarded the defendant $3,873,865.01 in attorney fees and expenses under § 285, as well as $809,788.02 in expert fees.

The doctrines of “secret prior art” and “inherency” both merged in the case Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP to surprise, and unpleasantly upend the patentee. Judge Linn’s opinion ruled that “[a]n inventor need not understand precisely why his invention works in order to achieve an actual reduction to practice.” Relying upon the collective holdings in Dow Chemical, Mycogen Plant Science, and Invitrogen, the Federal Circuit panel then concluded that “it is apparent that the district court correctly entered summary judgment” of invalidity of the asserted claims in the ‘502 patent under 35 § 102(g)(2).

Lovin has received exceptional attention in the patent law blogosphere. In short, Lovin permits an examiner to wait until an examiner’s answer to explain how and why dependent claims are rejected. What’s worse, Lovin permits the examiner to require the applicant to provide a substantive reason for patentability before the examiner explains the rejection. The Federal Circuit is considering whether to hear In re Lovin en banc, and indeed they should rehear Lovin en banc. The Federal Circuit should defend the applicant’s right to receive a meaningful explanation of claim rejections before the applicant is required to rebut the rejections.

If you think the title only raises a wild possibility, consider what happened in a recent case decided by the Federal Circuit. After being sued for infringement, the defendant had the ex-wife of the inventor of the patent-in-suit sell to it any interest she had in that patent. The defendant argued that as a result there could be no infringement, both because plaintiff lacked standing and because the defendant had acquired an undivided interest in the patent. It almost worked.

I have wondered out loud whether the Judges of the Federal Circuit realize that the outcome is unpredictable until the panel has been announced. It seems that at least some do. How is that defensible? How do others not on the Court not see a problem? The law needs to be certain and predictable and at the Federal Circuit far too many times it is neither. Claims construction is but one of the areas as clear as mud. The Federal Circuit was created to bring certainty to the law, but what has transpired over the course of the last 10 years or so seems to be anything but certainty and stability. For crying out loud a patent is a property right and for any property rights regime to flourish it must be stable and certain! In the words of this generation: OMG!

Since 1993, the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) has pursued an “aggressive campaign” to free itself from oversight by and accountability to the courts. [1] At the same time, the USPTO has been just as aggressive in ignoring the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and related administrative laws that place responsibilities on the USPTO vis-à-vis the public. Fortunately, most administrative laws provide the public a remedy exercisable against agency overreaching: when an agency skirts its obligations, the agency loses its powers of enforcement vis-à-vis the public. Unfortunately, in July 2011 the Federal Circuit in In re Lovin [2] (opinion authored by Judge Dyk) allowed the USPTO to avoid obligations that the USPTO owes the public under the APA, while giving the USPTO judicial deference on issues where the APA grants none. A petition for rehearing of the Lovin case would give the en banc Federal Circuit the opportunity to ”right this wrong,” and to give the public the remedy that Congress intended, and to reinforce that the Administrative Procedure Act gives agencies both rights and obligations.

Upon hearing Rader make such a bold statement the first thought that ran through my mind was — Really? Did he just say that? I have heard from others for some time that Rader has been heard to say these or similar things relating to obviousness, but I just discounted them as one would discount the output of a game of telephone. After something gets stated, shared and restated there is typically little of the same message remaining. That had to be why Rader was reported to have said such curious things about obviousness and the impact of KSR. But then I was sitting right there listening to Chief Judge Rader say something that is provably incorrect. I’ll bite. I’ll take that challenge.