Posts Tagged: "35 USC 112"

The purpose of the written description requirement is broader than to merely explain how to make and use the invention, which is the subject of the enablement requirement. Rather, to satisfy the written description requirement the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention… While the written description is just that – written – having multiple drawings that show the invention and various aspects of the invention from a variety of viewpoints can be extremely helpful. This is because every figure should be described with at lease one paragraph of text, frequently more.

Because it is clear when infringement occurs, and the scope of the claims is reasonably certain, the Court reversed the judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness… Claims having functional elements are not indefinite, as encompassing both an apparatus and a method, if they make clear whether infringement occurs upon creating the apparatus or upon its use. A claim with functional language clearly tied to a structure that defines its capabilities is an apparatus claim; such functional language does not make the claim indefinite by also claiming a method of use.

Join Gene Quinn on Thursday, November 9 at 2:00 PM ET for a free webinar conversation on the trends and reality of 112 disclosure requirements. Gene will be joined by Todd Van Thomme, a shareholder with Nyemaster Goode PC, and Cynthia Gilbert, co-founder of Blueshift IP. Van Thomme specializes in mechanical and food science related innovations, while Gilbert specializes in computer implemented inventions. We will, therefore, focus our 112 discussions on these specific areas.

The enablement requirement is specifically aimed at ensuring the claimed invention is described with sufficient detail so the relevant person of skill in the art or technology area will understand both how to make and use what has been actually claimed in the patent… While there is no particularly concrete and useful definition for what specifically constitutes undue experimentation, the requirement generally mandates that the description explain the invention so that it could be made and used without individuals having to go through a trial and error process in order to figure it out for themselves. In other words, the invention must actually teach so the invention can be achieved.

On June 21, 2017, In Storer v. Clark, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s interference decision, which awarded priority to Clark’s pending application (filed May 30, 2003) over Storer’s issued patent. The Court found that Storer’s earlier provisional application (filed June 28, 2002) did not enable the subject matter of Storer’s interfering claims… To satisfy the enablement requirement, applicants should provide either explicit examples of claimed compounds or direction or guidance on how to synthesize the claimed compounds. Disclosing generic structures or general approaches to synthesis does not by itself satisfy the enablement requirement for specific compounds. A known precursor does not enable synthesis of a claimed compound if the application does not disclose the precursor or how to convert it into to a claimed compound.

The crux of this so-called adequate description requirement is that once the first four patentability requirements are satisfied the applicant still must describe the invention with enough particularity such that those skilled in the art will be able to make, use and understand the invention that was made by the inventor. For the most part this requirement can be explained as consisting of three major parts. First is the enablement requirement, next is the best mode requirement and finally is the written description requirement.

MindGeek and Playboy filed an IPR petition. The Board determined that § 112 ¶ 6 did not apply because “‘wireless device means’ is not purely functional language, but rather is language that denotes structure.” In the alternative, Skky argued that the “wireless device means” term should be construed to require multiple processors or a specialized processor. The Board found Skky’s alternative argument unconvincing. The claims were held invalid in light of prior art that disclosed a “wireless device means,” specifically a cell phone. Skky appealed.