USPTO Urges Supreme Court to Reverse in Now-Delayed Case

“Treating ‘’ terms as protectable trademarks would permit first adopters to leverage the fact that only one entity at a time can hold the contractual rights to a particular domain name into additional trademark-law benefits that would not be available to brick-and-mortar ‘Generic Inc.’ equivalents.” March 13, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) filed a reply brief urging the Supreme Court to reverse a judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that held BOOKING.COM to be a registrable trademark. The case was set to be argued earlier this week, but was postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Fifteen parties have filed amicus briefs in the case, most of those in support of

In response to’s brief of February 20, the USPTO primarily argued that, 1) Goodyear Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co. remains good law and resolves the question presented in the present case, 2) Sound trademark policy supports the conclusion that adding a top-level domain, such as .com, to a generic term does not lead to a protectable trademark, and 3)’s survey evidence does not provide a sound basis for treating the term “” as a registrable trademark.

Goodyear Remains Good Law and is Applicable in this Case

The USTPO responded to’s argument that even if Goodyear was good law, it did not apply to this case, by noting that the addition of “.com” only conveys that the “would-be-rights-holder” operates a commercial website, which is no more entitled to a federal trademark than “Booking Company” or “Booking Inc.” would be. The USPTO further noted that the fact that only one entity can hold the rights to a given domain name, as argued distinguished this case from Goodyear, only strengthens the rationale of Goodyear. In addition, the USPTO pointed out that the USPTO and every court of appeals to consider the issue, other than the Fourth Circuit, have acknowledged Goodyear’s applicability to “” terms. Rather, citing, Inc., 616 F.3d at 981, the USPTO noted that “other courts have warned of the harms that would result if the fact that such terms ‘have become identified with a first user’ were deemed a sufficient basis for registration.”

The USPTO also responded to’s argument that the Lanham Act overruled Goodyear in stating that’s approach to implied abrogation violates the principal that statues are not to interpreted as changing the common law unless the change is clear, which is not the case in this instance. For example, Congress’s use of the words “combination effect” in the Lanham Act would be an “extremely subtle” way of overturning Goodyear. Further, USPTO noted that even if the Supreme Court in Goodyear used the term “descriptive” in modern sense, as contended by, it would not affect the present case because Goodyear’s relevance lies in its holding that adding a word such as “Company” or “Inc.” to an unprotectable word does not create a protectable mark. The USPTO’s argument’s also included remarks that the Lanham act did not overrule Goodyear by adopting the Primary-Significance test, which originated in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. and established that in order to establish a trade name an owner must show that “the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.”  Thus, the USPTO concluded that did not identify any sound basis for the conclusion that the Lanham Act overruled Goodyear.

Adding a Top-level Domain to a Generic Term Does Not Lead to a Protectable Trademark

The USPTO argued that “Treating ‘’ terms as protectable trademarks would permit first adopters to leverage the fact that only one entity at a time can hold the contractual rights to a particular domain name into additional trademark-law benefits that would not be available to brick-and-mortar ‘Generic Inc.’ equivalents.” The USPTO also argued that’s recent comments the it would not use it’s trademark registration to prevent competitors from using similar domain names such as “” and “” reinforces the conclusion that BOOKING.COM is not a protectable mark. Further, the USPTO noted that incorrectly suggested that without trademark protection it would be defenseless against “unscrupulous businesses” using similar or misspelled marks. The USPTO responded that unfair-competition law would protect from such businesses seeking to mislead customers.

The Office also said that incorrectly argued that its registration and other “’Generic Company, Generic Inc., or’ names would not ‘stymie competitors’ marketing and sales” because the USPTO has already registered many such terms. The USPTO explained that most of the generic examples cited by were irrelevant. Further, “to the extent that trademark examiners have erred in permitting registration of some fraction of the marks in respondent’s brief and appendix, mechanisms exist for correcting those mistakes.”  Thus, the USPTO noted that it would be improper for to leverage any such examiner errors to overturn the Supreme Court’s precedent.

Survey Evidence Does Not Provide a Sound Basis for Treating “” as a Registrable Trademark

The response brief argued that’s survey results, and surveys in general, are “ill-suited to the specific contexts of ‘Generic Inc.’ and ‘’ terms,” because consumers are likely to infer that any particular ‘’’ term refers to a particular brand even without any prior awareness. The USPTO further noted that’s “proposed per se rule” that all genericness inquiries must be determined by survey evidence is “inconsistent with the Lanham Act’s preservation of the distinction between generic terms, which are not eligible for trademark protection even upon a showing of secondary meaning, and descriptive terms, which are potentially registrable if secondary meaning is established.” In stating that’s argument would effectively result in trademark protection for all “Generic Inc.” or “” terms where secondary meaning was demonstrated, the USPTO concluded that such a result “contravenes Goodyear and bedrock trademark-law principles.”

David Bernstein of Debevoise, who is co-counsel to, told IPWatchdog in February that the case “presents an important opportunity for the Court to confirm that courts and the PTO must consider all relevant evidence, including surveys, in deciding whether marks like, Pretzel Crisps, The Episcopal Church, and innumerable other important trademarks (many of which are listed in the appendix to the brief) are generic or are potential brand names entitled to registration.”

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Join the Discussion

7 comments so far.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    March 30, 2020 09:08 am

    I have to say that I am a bit disappointed in the trademark attorney readers out there. We often have lively patent law discussions from a diverse set of patent law stakeholders, but the voices of stakeholders in the trademark arena have been stunningly silent.

    Is there a different blog that one should tune into for more lively trademark law discussions?

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    March 28, 2020 09:06 am

    Pardon the autocorrect:

    “The did say that” => “I did say that”

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    March 27, 2020 08:07 pm

    Pro Say,

    The did say that.

    Follow the link that I provided and read through the comments.

  • [Avatar for Pro Say]
    Pro Say
    March 27, 2020 02:04 pm

    ” . . .’s recent comments that it would not use it’s trademark registration to prevent competitors from using similar domain names such as “” and “” reinforces the conclusion that BOOKING.COM is not a protectable mark.”

    While nice that “promises” (whatever that’s real-world worth should they prevail) to not assert their TM right against other companies operating on “Booking” “variations,” will they make the same promise to others who operate under Booking . . . but on different Internet extensions; e.g.,,, . . .?

    Given their arguments, any such Booking.any-not-com would have the same TM rights as feels they’re entitled to.

    Yet, what would / their parent company do . . . should some other company launch — and heavily advertise — their . . . offering the same services does? (cue the screaming banshees)

    I haven’t read the briefs, but if the PTO didn’t include this argument, they should have.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    March 27, 2020 12:06 pm

    Night Writer,

    Not to pick a fight, but your views are shallow and have not fully grasped the nuances of the arguments provided.

    There may well be “policy” involved in the arguments, but there is MUCH more than just that.

    As a reminder:

  • [Avatar for Night Writer]
    Night Writer
    March 27, 2020 10:33 am

    In my opinion there is not a lot to say about this. I think the judgement is right. I think the USPTO position is a policy reason to reverse. Maybe it makes sense to reverse for a policy reason, but it would be for a policy reason.

    It is pretty clear that “.com” after “booking” creates secondary meaning just as the “X” in “Space X” creates instant secondary meaning. We all know they are companies and the X means a company that thinks it is cutting edge and the “.com” means the company is Internet based.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    March 27, 2020 07:39 am

    At first blush, the USPTO position reflects my detailed views in the last exchange on this topic between myself and Night Writer.

    I invite Night Writer (as well as experienced Trademark attorneys) to weigh in on this matter, as I recognize that my views are based merely on First Principles, and Trademark Law is outside the bounds of my day to day activities.