KeyCite Blue-Striped Flag
 	Appeal Filed by Insulet Corp. v. Eoflow, Co. Ltd., Fed.Cir., May 23, 2025
779 F.Supp.3d 124
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
INSULET CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
v.
EOFLOW CO., LTD.; EOFlow, Inc.; Nephria Bio, Inc.; and Jesse Kim, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 23-11780-FDS
|
Signed April 24, 2025
Synopsis
Background: Producer of insulin-patch pump brought action against competitors and one competitor’s CEO asserting misappropriation of trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) for pump’s design and manufacture and unjust enrichment under Massachusetts law. After jury returned verdict finding competitors and CEO liable and awarding producer $452 million in damages, composed of $170 million in unjust-enrichment damages and $282 million in exemplary damages for willful and malicious misappropriation of three out of four of producer’s trade secrets, producer moved to preserve its damages award and for permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets. Competitors and CEO moved for stay of any injunction and damages award pending appeal.
 
Holdings: The District Court, Saylor, Chief Judge, held that:
 
[1] requested permanent injunction was warranted;
 
[2] permanent injunction combined with entire jury award for $452 million in damages would, in substantial part, constitute impermissible double recovery for producer;
 
[3] award of $25.8 million for unjust-enrichment compensatory damages was warranted together with permanent injunction;
 
[4] award of $33.6 million for exemplary damages was warranted together with permanent injunction;
 
[5] producer was not entitled to award of prejudgment interest under Massachusetts law;
 
[6] supersedeas bond in compliance with local rules was required for competitors and CEO to obtain stay of monetary judgment against them pending appeal; and
 
[7] partial stay that permitted competitors to continue to sell their products to patients in foreign markets where product was then available was warranted.
 
Producer’s motion granted in part and denied in part; competitors’ motion granted in part and denied in part.
 
Procedural Posture(s): Motion for Permanent Injunction; Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment.

West Headnotes (52)

[1]
	InjunctionGrounds in general;  multiple factors
	
	A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction is traditionally required to satisfy a four-factor test: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

[2]
	InjunctionAvailability and Adequacy of Other Remedies
	
	A permanent injunction should not be granted where a less drastic remedy will suffice.

[3]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	Producer of insulin-patch pump would suffer irreparable harm in absence of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets, after competitors and CEO had been found liable for misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); competitors and CEO had, and could again, profit from sale of trade secrets enabling other competitors to avoid costs and compete with producer, competitors and CEO’s willful and malicious misappropriation of trade secrets heightened risk of future harm, and producer faced threat to its ability to expand its market, pricing power, and reputation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[4]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	In general, loss of trade secret constitutes irreparable harm for purposes of preliminary injunction.

[5]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	Money damages were not adequate remedy to prospective injuries faced by producer of insulin-patch pump in absence of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets, after competitors and CEO had been found liable for misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); competitors and CEO had at most approximately $24 million in net assets, making it highly unlikely that they had financial wherewithal to satisfy jury award of $452 million in damages, or even to come close to doing so. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[6]
	InjunctionRecovery of damages
	
	When considering a motion for a permanent injunction, a district court should assess whether a damage remedy is a meaningful one in light of the financial condition of the defendant before the alternative of money damages can be deemed adequate.

[7]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	Balance of equities favored permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump, after competitors and CEO had been found liable for misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); although injunction could force competitors to shut down, competitors were not prohibited from developing another product through legal means that did not use misappropriated trade secrets, and producer faced substantial burden by having to compete with product built upon its own stolen property. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[8]
	InjunctionInjury to or restraint of trade or business in general
	
	A defendant cannot escape an injunction simply because its primary product is an infringing one.

[9]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	Public interest favored permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump, after competitors and CEO had been found liable for misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); any short-term hardships faced by users of competitors’ products could be accommodated through other equitable means, and public had interest in providing robust protection of trade secrets, investing and innovating in new technologies, and deterring willful misappropriation of intellectual property. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[10]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	The public interest, as relevant to the determination to grant a permanent injunction, favors investment and innovation in new technologies, while also deterring willful misappropriation of intellectual property.

[11]
	InjunctionSpecificity, vagueness, overbreadth, and narrowly-tailored relief
	
	Injunctions must be tailored to the specific harm to be prevented.

[12]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	Worldwide application, under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), was warranted for permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump, after competitors and CEO had been found liable for willful and malicious misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under DTSA, even though one competitor was Korean company; CEO was United States citizen, other competitors were organized in United States, multiple acts in furtherance of misappropriation occurred in United States, and competitors had already attempted, and could attempt again, to sell trade secrets to foreign competitor. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837.

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[13]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	A worldwide injunction, as permitted by the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), is particularly appropriate in the context of trade-secret misappropriation to prevent further dissemination of confidential information to foreign competitors. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837.

[14]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	In absence of evidence that trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump could actually be independently developed in a specified amount of time, permanent injunction without time limitation was warranted to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets, after competitors and CEO had been found liable for willful and malicious misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under DTSA. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[15]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationRelief
	
	The victim of trade secret misappropriation may be entitled to ownership of any patents obtained by the wrongdoer on the misappropriated trade secret.

[16]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	Equitable reassignment of competitors’ patents derived from trade secrets of producer of insulin-patch pump, including patent describing proprietary aspects of producer’s occlusion-detection-algorithm (ODA) trade secret, was warranted, as part of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets, after competitors and CEO had been found liable for willful and malicious misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); patents were based on trade secrets that had been misappropriated, and reassignment to producer would prevent continued use of those trade secrets by competitors. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[17]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationDamages
	
	Disgorgement of anticipated $10 million break-up fee arising out of terminated sale of trade secrets belonging to producer of insulin-patch pump between competitors, who jury had found willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets under DTSA, and producer’s biggest competitor, was partial payment of jury award of $452 million in damages, and not impermissibly duplicative award; any amount producer received from break-up fee would reduce jury’s damages award and would not be windfall to producer. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[18]
	InjunctionDisclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential information
	
	Auditing rights permitting producer of insulin-patch pump to conduct audits up to two times per year for each competitor who jury had found willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets under DTSA were warranted, as part of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets; auditing rights would help mitigate threat of future misappropriation since competitors had engaged in willful and malicious misappropriation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[19]
	DamagesNature and theory of compensation
	
	Permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump combined with entire jury award for $452 million in damages based on unjust enrichment and finding that competitors and CEO willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets would, in substantial part, constitute impermissible double recovery for producer; award calculation was based on competitors and CEO’s future, unrealized gains, rather than producer’s actual loss, and injunction to prevent future harm overlapped to significant degree with purpose of damages award. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3).

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[20]
	DamagesNature and theory of compensation
	
	The law abhors duplicative recoveries; thus, double awards for the same injury are impermissible.

[21]
	DamagesNature and theory of compensation
InjunctionAward of damages and other monetary relief
	
	Under certain circumstances, an award of damages coupled with an injunction may constitute an improper double recovery for a plaintiff.

[22]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationDamages
InjunctionAward of damages and other monetary relief
	
	Although the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) permits a court to both grant an injunction to prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation and award damages for any unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation, the damages award may not apply to a period of use that overlaps with the period covered by the injunction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3).

[23]
	DamagesNature and theory of compensation
	
	District court may fashion an award to avoid duplicative recovery.

[24]
	Election of RemediesInconsistency of Alternative Remedies
	
	Whether a district court should in fact issue an injunction together with a reduced damages award that avoids duplicative recovery when it has the authority to do so is a matter for a plaintiff to decide, as it is an issue of election of remedies.

[25]
	Election of RemediesNecessity and time for election
	
	The time for a plaintiff to elect either a jury’s award of damages or a reduced damages award together with an injunction is after a verdict is entered but prior to entry of judgment.

[26]
	InjunctionAward of damages and other monetary relief
	
	Portion of jury award of $452 million in damages that was to compensate producer of insulin-patch pump for costs that competitors and one competitor’s CEO were able to avoid as result of their willful and malicious misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) would not have to be vacated upon entry of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets; avoided costs were backward-looking and did not overlap with forward-looking injunction, and competitors’ misconduct posed threat to value of producer’s trade secrets. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[27]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationDamages
InjunctionAward of damages and other monetary relief
	
	Injunctions prohibiting future use of misappropriated trade secrets may permissibly coexist with unjust enrichment damages based on previously avoided costs.

[28]
	Federal Civil ProcedureFailure to respond;  sanctions
	
	As part of determination for proper calculation of damages award in conjunction with permanent injunction in favor of producer of insulin-patch pump following jury determination that competitors and one competitor’s CEO willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets, district court would consider supplemental report from damages expert for producer only to extent that it simply restated or summarized expert’s trial testimony; report contained new theories and opinions that likely should have been disclosed before trial, and considering report that restated or summarized trial testimony appeared harmless. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

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[29]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationDamages
InjunctionAward of damages and other monetary relief
	
	Award of $25.8 million for unjust-enrichment compensatory damages was warranted together with permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump, following producer’s election to seek injunction with non-duplicative damages after jury determined competitors and CEO had misappropriated producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); jury adopted damages expert’s avoided-costs estimates that were recoverable with injunction for three of four misappropriated trade secrets, and entire award for fourth trade secret was excluded to avoid duplicative recovery, as jury award indicated rejection of avoided-costs award for that trade secret. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[30]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationDamages
InjunctionAward of damages and other monetary relief
	
	Award of $33.6 million for exemplary damages was warranted together with permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump, following producer’s election to seek injunction with non-duplicative damages after jury determined competitors and CEO had willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); exemplary damages awarded by jury had to be reduced to correspond to reduction in final unjust-enrichment award caused by producer’s election to comply with DTSA’s statutory cap on exemplary damages, and punitive nature of exemplary damages did not pose double-recovery risk combined with injunction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(a)(3).

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[31]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationDamages
	
	There is no “award,” as required to calculate an award of exemplary damages for willful and malicious misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), until there is a final judgment or decision. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(a)(3).

[32]
	Antitrust and Trade RegulationDamages
	
	Award of exemplary damages under the Defend Trade Secrets Act may not exceed two times the unjust enrichment damages ultimately entered for plaintiff, not the unjust enrichment determined, but not ultimately awarded, by the jury. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(a)(3).

[33]
	DamagesNature and Theory of Damages Additional to Compensation
	
	The primary goal of exemplary damages is to punish misconduct, namely, past misconduct.

[34]
	InjunctionProspective, preventive, or future-oriented nature of remedy
	
	Injunctions are designed as a remedial tool to prevent specific future harms.

[35]
	DamagesNature and theory of compensation
	
	When two damages awards serve different purposes, that is, when one is remedial and the other is punitive, then the awards are unlikely to be duplicative.

[36]
	Federal Civil ProcedureIn general;  necessity
	
	Producer of insulin-patch pump waived right to seek prejudgment interest under Massachusetts law on damages award to compensate producer for costs that competitors and one competitor’s CEO were able to avoid as result of their willful and malicious misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), as part of producer’s election to seek non-duplicative damages together with permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets after receiving jury award of damages, where producer did not request issue of prejudgment interest be submitted to jury or request jury instruction on prejudgment interest. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, §§ 6B, 6C.
1 Case that cites this headnote
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[37]
	InterestTrade secrets
	
	Producer of insulin-patch pump was not entitled to award of prejudgment interest under Massachusetts law on damages award to compensate producer for costs that competitors and one competitor’s CEO were able to avoid as result of their willful and malicious misappropriation of producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), as part of producer’s election to seek non-duplicative damages together with permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing producer’s trade secrets after receiving jury award of damages; producer did not assert any actual financial loss stemming from misappropriation for which it must be made whole, and producer’s other relief adequately deterred misappropriation and provided recovery. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3)(B); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, §§ 6B, 6C.

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[38]
	InterestPrejudgment Interest
	
	Essential rationale for awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that injured party is fully compensated for its loss.
1 Case that cites this headnote

[39]
	Federal CourtsBond or security
	
	No supersedeas bond is required for a stay of a money judgment pending appeal if (1) the defendant’s ability to pay is so plain that the posting of a bond would be a waste of money; or (2) the bond would put the defendant’s other creditors in undue jeopardy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).

[40]
	Federal CourtsBond or security
	
	If the supersedeas bond requirement for a stay of a money judgment pending appeal is waived, courts typically require some other form of security instead. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).

[41]
	Federal CourtsBond or security
	
	The nature and the amount of a supersedeas bond for a stay of a money judgment pending appeal is entrusted to the discretion of a trial court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).

[42]
	Federal CourtsBond or security
	
	Supersedeas bond in compliance with local rules was required for competitors and one competitor’s CEO to obtain stay of monetary judgment against them pending appeal of jury determination that competitors and CEO had willfully and maliciously misappropriated trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump; competitors lacked resources to make their ability to pay so plain that posting of bond would be waste of money, and cost of bond for final judgment award would not likely place competitors’ creditors in undue jeopardy. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d); U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules D.Mass., Rule 62.2.

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[43]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	Stays of injunctive relief pending appeal are not a matter of right.

[44]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	Stays of injunctive relief pending appeal must be evaluated under the traditional four-part standard applied to injunctions; parties seeking a stay thus bear the burden of satisfying the following: (1) they must make a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits in their appeal; (2) they must show that they will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) they must show that issuance of the stay will not substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) they must show that the stay would serve the public interest.

[45]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	In evaluating whether a party seeking a stay of injunctive relief pending appeal has met its burden to show a stay is warranted, the first two factors a court analyzes, that is, likelihood of success and irreparable injury, are the most critical.

[46]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	For the likelihood of success on appeal factor for determining whether to stay an injunction pending appeal, it is not enough that the chance of success on the merits is better than negligible.

[47]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	When a request for stay pending appeal is made to a district court, common sense dictates that a moving party need not persuade the court that it is likely to be reversed on appeal; instead, the movant need only establish that the appeal raises serious and difficult questions of law in an area where the law is somewhat unclear.

[48]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	Competitors and one competitor’s CEO seeking stay pending appeal of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump made strong showing that they were likely to succeed on merits of their appeal of jury determination that they willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets; reasonable minds could differ as to whether to apply inquiry-notice standard or discovery-based standard to statute-of-limitations provision under DTSA since accrual standard was not clearly established, and producer’s claims would likely be time-barred if inquiry-notice standard applied, as competitors argued. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[49]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	Risk that competitors would face irreparable harm by being forced out of business in absence of stay pending appeal of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump supported partial stay that permitted competitors to continue to sell their products to patients in foreign markets where product was then available, following jury determination that competitors willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); partial stay allowed competitors to maintain their current revenue stream throughout appeal process, but would prevent them from continuing to benefit from their misappropriation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[50]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	For the factor for determining whether to stay an injunction pending appeal requiring a showing that a movant will be irreparably injured absent a stay, simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury is not sufficient to warrant a stay.

[51]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	Partial stay pending appeal of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump that permitted competitors to continue to sell their products to patients in foreign markets where product was then available would not substantially injure producer, following jury determination that competitors willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); partial stay would protect producer from threats posed by misappropriation, including potential sale of its trade secrets to another competitor, expansion of competing product into new markets, and development of new products using its trade secrets. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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[52]
	Federal CourtsInjunction and temporary restraining order cases
	
	Public interest was well-served by partial stay pending appeal of permanent injunction to prohibit competitors and one competitor’s CEO from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing trade secrets that belonged to producer of insulin-patch pump that permitted competitors to continue to sell their products to patients in foreign markets where product was then available, following jury determination that competitors willfully and maliciously misappropriated producer’s trade secrets under Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); public interest was served by allowing competitors’ users to maintain uninterrupted access to their insulin-delivery system while appeal process played out. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et seq.

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Attorneys and Law Firms
Robert D. Carroll, Robert Frederickson, III, Alexandra Lu, Gerard J. Cedrone, Scott T. Bluni, William E. Evans, Goodwin Procter, LLP, Boston, MA, Alexandra D. Valenti, Pro Hac Vice, Arshjit Raince, Danit Maor, James P. Breen, Timothy Keegan, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, NY, Jenny Zhang, Matthew Ginther, Pro Hac Vice, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
John C. Bostic, HanByul Chang, Kyung Taeck Minn, Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Michael Sheetz, Adam S. Gershenson, John Wray, Matthew Oliver, Zachary Sisko, Kimberley A. Scimeca, Cooley LLP, Boston, MA, Isabel C. McGrath, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Boston, MA, Alexandra Mayhugh, Cooley LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Dustin Knight, Pro Hac Vice, Jordan Landers, Cooley LLP, Washington, DC, Hankil Kang, Covington & Burling, LLP, Washington, DC, Elizabeth M. Flanagan, Pro Hac Vice, Cooley LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Mead Lowell, Reuben H. Chen, Cooley LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendants EOFlow, Co. Ltd., EOFlow, Inc.
Adam S. Gershenson, Michael Sheetz, John Wray, Matthew Oliver, Zachary Sisko, Kimberley A. Scimeca, Cooley LLP, Boston, MA, Isabel C. McGrath, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Boston, MA, Elizabeth M. Flanagan, Pro Hac Vice, Cooley LLP, Minneapolis, MN, John C. Bostic, HanByul Chang, Kyung Taeck Minn, Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Mead Lowell, Reuben H. Chen, Cooley LLP, San Diego, CA, Alexandra Mayhugh, Cooley LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Dustin Knight, Jordan Landers, Cooley LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant Jesse Kim.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A STAY OF JUDGMENT
SAYLOR, Chief Judge
*132 This dispute concerns the misappropriation of trade secrets for the design and manufacture of an insulin patch pump, the Omnipod, produced by plaintiff Insulet Corporation. Plaintiff sued seven defendants: EOFlow Co., Ltd., and EOFlow, Inc. (collectively, “EOFlow”); Nephria Bio, Inc.; EOFlow’s Chief Executive Officer, Jesse Kim; and three former Insulet employees, Luis Malave, Steven DiIanni, and Ian Welsford.
 
After a month-long trial, a jury returned a verdict on December 3, 2024, finding six defendants—all except Malave—liable for misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 et seq. (“DTSA”). The jury awarded plaintiff $452 million, composed of $170 million in unjust-enrichment damages and $282 million in exemplary damages.
 
Plaintiff has now moved for a permanent injunction seeking, among other things, to prohibit defendants from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing plaintiff’s trade secrets.1 Plaintiff also seeks to preserve its $452 million damages award.
 
Defendants oppose the motion on two principal grounds.2 First, they contend that the requested injunction would constitute an impermissible double recovery. Second, they assert that the scope of the proposed injunction is unduly broad. Defendants separately seek a stay of any injunction and damages award pending appeal.
 
For the following reasons, the motion for a permanent injunction will be granted in part and denied in part. In addition, the Court will enter a partial stay of its final judgment, as set forth below.

I. Analysis

A. Permanent Injunction
Plaintiff seeks entry of a permanent injunction that would, among other things, prohibit defendants from using, possessing, selling, or otherwise distributing its trade secrets—and any product, including the EOPatch 2, that uses those trade secrets—anywhere in the world. (See ECF No. 931-1). Plaintiff also seeks a reassignment of certain patents belonging to defendants that incorporate elements of its trade secrets; disgorgement of a break-up fee due to defendants from Medtronic PLC; and the granting of auditing rights to ensure defendants’ ongoing compliance with the requested injunction order.

1. Legal Framework
[1] [2]The DTSA authorizes courts to grant injunctive relief for trade-secret misappropriation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A). “A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction is traditionally required to satisfy a four-factor test: ‘(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest *133 would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.’ ” Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 156 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008)). The First Circuit has stated that “[t]he first two factors together require ‘a substantial injury that is not accurately measurable or adequately compensable by money damages.’ ” KPM Analytics N. Am. Corp. v. Blue Sun Sci., LLC, 729 F. Supp. 3d 84, 123 (D. Mass. 2024) (quoting Glob. NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 706 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2013)). Thus, “[a]n injunction should not be granted where ‘a less drastic remedy’ will suffice.” Greene, 794 F.3d at 156 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165-66, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010)).
 
[3] [4]Starting with the first factor, in general, “[t]he loss of a trade secret ... constitute[s] irreparable harm.” TouchPoint Sols., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 345 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D. Mass. 2004). Here, it is clear that plaintiff would face irreparable harm if defendants were permitted to make unfettered use of its trade secrets. In the absence of an injunction, defendants could freely sell or distribute products incorporating plaintiff’s trade secrets, entirely undermining the value of its proprietary information. Such a prospect is not, as defendants suggest, theoretical. Indeed, EOFlow already attempted to profit from the stolen trade secrets when it agreed to terms of a sale with one of plaintiff’s largest competitors, Medtronic, before this lawsuit began. Without an injunction, defendants could once again profit from the sale of the trade secrets—secrets that plaintiff spent several years and millions of dollars to develop—enabling others to avoid significant upfront costs and compete with plaintiff.
 
Moreover, although the EOPatch 2 is available only in a select few markets, its continued sale and distribution constitute a genuine threat to plaintiff’s ability to expand its market, its pricing power, and its reputation. And defendants’ “brazen actions over a substantial period of time,” as recognized by the jury’s finding that EOFlow and Kim willfully and maliciously misappropriated certain trade secrets, only heightens the risk of future harm. See KPM Analytics, 729 F. Supp. 3d at 123; see also Benchmark Techs., Inc. v. Tu, 2023 WL 8371973, at *3 (D. Mass. May 30, 2023). Plaintiff has therefore met its burden on the first factor.
 
[5] [6]As to the second factor, money damages are not adequate to remedy the prospective injury. At the very least, “the questionable financial condition of [the defendant] reinforces the inadequacy of a remedy at law.” Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Indeed, “[a] district court should assess whether a damage remedy is a meaningful one in light of the financial condition of the [defendant] before the alternative of money damages can be deemed adequate.” Id. Here, the trial record established that defendants have at most approximately $24 million in net assets, making it highly unlikely that defendants have the financial wherewithal to satisfy the jury award, or even to come close to doing so.
 
[7] [8]As to the third factor, defendants contend that the balance of equities weighs in their favor because an injunction would force EOFlow to shut down. But a defendant “cannot escape an injunction simply because ... its primary product is an infringing one.” Id. at 1156. And nothing prohibits defendants from developing another product through legal means, without the benefit of misappropriated trade secrets. Meanwhile, requiring plaintiff to compete with a product built upon its own stolen property imposes a substantial burden that far outweighs the equities, if any, in plaintiff’s favor.
 
*134 [9] [10]Finally, the public interest in providing robust protection of trade secrets strongly weighs in favor of an injunction. The public interest favors investment and innovation in new technologies, while also deterring willful misappropriation of intellectual property. And any potential short-term hardship faced by current EOPatch 2 users does not alter the appropriateness of a permanent injunction, but could rather be accommodated through other equitable means, including a temporary carve-out of the injunction for those users in order to permit an orderly transition to other means of care.
 
Plaintiff has therefore satisfied the four-part test supporting its motion for a permanent injunction.

2. Scope of Injunction
[11]The scope of the requested injunction is also reasonable and warranted under the circumstances. “Injunctions must be tailored to the specific harm to be prevented.” Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 217 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2000). The jury found that defendants misappropriated four trade secrets belonging to plaintiff, and that EOFlow and Kim did so willfully and maliciously. As noted, multiple future harms will likely flow from defendants’ violation, including the further distribution of the trade secrets and the development and sale of competing devices that make use of those trade secrets.
 
[12]Defendants contest a number of aspects of the injunction. First, they oppose its worldwide application, as they would be prohibited from possessing, using, selling, distributing, or providing services using plaintiff’s trade secrets anywhere in the world.
 
The text of the DTSA plainly permits a worldwide injunction, as long as (1) the offender is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States, or an organization organized under the laws of the United States, or (2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1837. Here, Kim is a United States citizen, and EOFlow, Inc., and Nephria Bio are organized in the United States. Moreover, multiple acts occurred in the United States that furthered the misappropriation of plaintiff’s trade secrets, thereby extending the DTSA’s reach to—and the court’s authority to issue an injunction against—EOFlow Co., Ltd., a Korean company.3
 
[13]A worldwide injunction is particularly appropriate in the context of trade-secret misappropriation to prevent further dissemination of confidential information to foreign competitors. See Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674 F.2d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that “confidential information is worthy of protection without geographic limitation because once divulged the information or the fruits of the information quickly can pass to competitors anywhere in the world”); see also Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding a worldwide injunction appropriate in certain cases of trade-secret misappropriation and always appropriate in impacted foreign markets). Defendants have already attempted to sell the trade secrets and could readily attempt to do so again to a foreign competitor. Thus, a worldwide injunction is certainly justified under the circumstances.
 
[14]Defendants next contend that the injunction should be limited in time. They assert that a duration of only three and a half years is sufficient because that accounts *135 for the “head start” they received from misappropriating plaintiff’s trade secrets.
 
It may be true that courts often limit the duration of an injunction to a “period of time that would be required for independent development,” including reverse engineering. 4 Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 15.02[l][d]. However, there is limited evidence that plaintiff’s trade secrets can actually be reverse engineered, let alone within a three-and-a-half-year period.4 There was evidence that legitimate competitors of Insulet have been unable to develop a competing product, despite investing millions of dollars attempting to do so. The fact that plaintiff’s damages expert, Justin McLean, assumed a four-year head start for the purposes of estimating defendants’ unjust enrichment does not refute the fact that no other market participant has successfully developed a competing product to the Omnipod to date. Indeed, McLean did not testify that defendants would have, in fact, developed plaintiff’s trade secrets in four years. Rather, he testified as to the time that defendants saved from their misappropriation. See Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., 2013 WL 890126, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013). Thus, without any evidence that plaintiff’s trade secrets could actually be independently developed in a specified amount of time, a permanent injunction is appropriate. See Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 15.02[l][e] (stating that “courts do not always adhere to a rigidly-conceptualistic test based upon [independent-]development time but instead seek to do equity and will enter an arbitrary-term injunction if needed to accomplish the equitable result”).
 
[15] [16]Defendants next contend that the proposed reassignment of patent application US 2023/0248902A1, along with any other submitted patent applications that disclose the same invention, is unwarranted. However, “[t]he victim of trade secret misappropriation may be entitled to ownership of any patents obtained by the wrongdoer on the misappropriated trade secret.” Whiteside Biomechanics, Inc. v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Whiteside Biomechanics, Inc. v. Danek Med., Inc., 13 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s expert, Lane Desborough, testified that the patent application at issue describes proprietary aspects of plaintiff’s occlusion-detection-algorithm (“ODA”) trade secret—a trade secret that the jury found to have been misappropriated by defendants. Equitable reassignment of defendants’ patent applications derived from the trade secrets is appropriate to prevent continued use of those trade secrets. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Crescendo Techs., LLC, 2009 WL 2707805, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2009) (stating that “[e]quitable reassignment is appropriate for intellectual property that is misappropriated in a patent application” to ensure that “the wrongdoer is not improperly rewarded for its misappropriation”).
 
[17]Defendants next assert that the requested disgorgement of the anticipated $10 million break-up fee arising out of the terminated Medtronic acquisition is impermissibly duplicative of the jury award. Plaintiff, however, acknowledges that its damages award must be reduced by any amount received from the break-up fee. The disgorgement of the break-up fee serves as a partial payment of defendants’ financial obligation, not as a duplicative windfall to plaintiff. Thus, there is no risk *136 of duplicative awards from such a disgorgement.
 
[18]Defendants finally contend that the auditing provisions of the proposed injunction are overly burdensome and invasive. But the requested auditing rights—which would permit plaintiff to conduct audits up to two times per year per defendant—are justified by the jury’s finding that EOFlow and Kim engaged in willful and malicious misappropriation, and help mitigate the threat of future misappropriation.
 
The Court will therefore enter a permanent injunction, which will be set forth in a separate order. However, as set forth below, that injunction will be crafted to permit sales to current users of the EOPatch 2 for a limited period of time. Such an injunction will permit current users to transition to other means of medical care, and will also effectively preserve the status quo pending appeal.

3. Double Recovery
[19] [20] [21] [22]Defendants next assert that a permanent injunction, combined with the jury’s award of monetary damages, constitutes an impermissible double recovery for plaintiff. “[I]t is well settled that, ‘[t]he law abhors duplicative recoveries; thus[,] double awards for the same injury are impermissible.’ ” Americus Mortg. Corp. v. Est. of Belli, 2014 WL 1338294, at *7 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2014) (quoting Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417, 425 (1st Cir. 2007)). Under certain circumstances, an award of damages coupled with an injunction may constitute an improper double recovery for a plaintiff. See Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. The TriZetto Grp., Inc., 68 F.4th 792, 811 (2d Cir. 2023) (rescinding the award of monetary damages in part because the district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant’s use of the misappropriated trade secrets). Thus, although the DTSA permits a court to both “grant an injunction to prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation” and “award damages for any unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation,” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3), the damages award may not apply to “a period of use that overlap[s] with the period covered by the injunction,” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Jiangsu Tie Mao Glass Co. Ltd., 47 F.4th 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2022).
 
Again, the jury awarded plaintiff $452 million in total damages, consisting of $170 million in unjust enrichment and $282 million in exemplary damages based on the jury’s finding that defendants misappropriated four trade secrets, three of which were misappropriated willfully and maliciously.
 
Plaintiff’s damages expert presented two theories of unjust-enrichment damages to the jury. The first, the “head-start” theory, focused on the benefit of an accelerated development process that defendants gained as a result of the misappropriation. The second, the “market-value” theory, represented the value of the trade secrets to a prospective buyer, based in part on the agreed-upon sale of EOFlow to Medtronic. Both theories involved analyses of prospective, hypothetical sales of defendants’ products and their potential future value. McLean did not present any estimate of plaintiff’s “actual loss,” whether suffered through lost sales, market share decline, or another metric. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B). Instead, McLean and plaintiff focused entirely on the benefits that accrued—or would in the future accrue—to defendants as a result of the misappropriation.
 
The jury’s unjust-enrichment damages-award calculation was thus based in substantial part on defendants’ future, unrealized gains. It therefore overlaps to a significant degree with the requested injunction, which, by its nature, is designed to prevent future harm. And both granting *137 the requested injunction and upholding the entire jury award would, in substantial part, constitute an impermissible double recovery.
 
[23]A district court may, however, fashion an award to avoid duplicative recovery. See Villarini-Garcia v. Hosp. del Maestro, 112 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1997) (directing a district court to modify, but not entirely annul, the damages award to avoid partial duplication); see also E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (stating that it “goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery” (internal quotations omitted)).
 
[24] [25]For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that at least a portion of the avoided-cost and exemplary-damages award is not duplicative, and it may therefore issue an injunction together with a reduced damages award. Whether it has the authority to do so, however, does not answer the question of whether it should in fact do so. That is a matter for plaintiff to decide, as it is an issue of election of remedies. The time to make such an election is “after a verdict is entered but prior to entry of judgment.” Dopp v. HTP Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 515 (1st Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has made that election; in its supplemental post-trial memorandum, it stated that it “chooses to elect for a permanent injunction together with the avoided-cost and exemplary damages that are not duplicative of the injunction.” (ECF No. 934 at 2).
 
The Court will turn, then, to the questions of whether and to what extent any portion of the avoided-cost and exemplary-damages award is not duplicative of the remedy of injunctive relief.

a. Avoided Costs
[26]Plaintiff contends that defendants have already reaped certain benefits from their misappropriation—such as avoiding significant research, development, and regulatory costs as a result of the misappropriation—that are a portion of the jury’s award. Because those benefits are backward-looking, plaintiff contends that they do not overlap with the forward-looking injunction.
 
[27]Injunctions prohibiting the future use of misappropriated trade secrets may permissibly coexist with unjust-enrichment damages based on previously avoided costs. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., 980 F.3d 1117, 1133 (7th Cir. 2020) (upholding the jury’s unjust-enrichment award, which was calculated as defendant’s “avoided research and development costs,” even though the district court entered an injunction prohibiting the future use, possession, and retention of plaintiff’s trade secrets); PPG, 47 F.4th at 163-64 (upholding a damages award “for the development costs [the defendant] avoided” along with a “forward-looking permanent injunction” prohibiting future use of the plaintiff’s trade secrets); see also Syntel, 68 F.4th at 811 (indicating that, under certain circumstances, an injunction may coexist with avoided-costs damages).
 
Defendants cite Syntel in support of their assertion that an injunction and an avoided-costs award may only be issued together when the misappropriation “diminish[es]” or “destroy[s]” the value of the trade secrets. See 68 F.4th at 812. Because plaintiff here did not put forth a theory of damages based on the harm that it suffered from the misappropriation, defendants assert that an avoided-costs award is inappropriate.
 
The court in Syntel identified a number of factors that bear on whether an avoided-costs award is proper in conjunction with an injunction. Those factors include (1) “the extent to which the defendant has used the secret in developing its own competing product,” (2) “the extent to which *138 the defendant’s misappropriation has destroyed the secret’s value for its original owner,” and (3) “the extent to which the defendant can be stopped from profiting further from its misappropriation into the future.” Id. Notably, the misappropriation at issue in Syntel did not implicate any of those three factors, which the court considered “unusual[ ].” Id.
 
Unlike in Syntel, defendants here used plaintiff’s trade secrets to develop their own competing product. See id. Moreover, the jury found that EOFlow and Kim acted willfully and maliciously, raising concerns that they may again in the future engage in illicit misappropriation. Although plaintiff’s damages theory did not rely on the harm that it suffered, the record nonetheless supports the conclusion that defendants’ misconduct created a threat to the value of plaintiff’s trade secrets—specifically, in their signed sale agreement with Medtronic that nearly disclosed the trade secrets to one of plaintiff’s biggest competitors. Thus, the reasoning of Syntel does not require that an avoided-costs award be vacated if an injunction is to be entered.

b. Avoided-Costs Damages Calculation
[28] [29]Plaintiff has submitted a supplemental report by Justin McLean, its damages expert, to support its assertion that the avoided costs associated with the four misappropriated trade secrets total $52.8 million.5
 
Starting with the computer-aided design (“CAD”) files, soft cannula, and ODA trade secrets, there is no genuine disagreement that the jury adopted McLean’s market-value theory to arrive at its damages award of $83 million as to those three trade secrets. In presenting his market-value damages estimates to the jury, McLean explained that the estimated research and development costs were “roughly” $15 million for the CAD files, $9 million for the soft cannula, and $2.2 million for the ODA. (12 Tr. 90:2-5). He went on to testify that he incorporated plaintiff’s research-and-development costs into his calculation of the market value of each trade secret. The market-value damages calculations presented to the jury therefore were a function of his avoided-costs estimates, which totaled approximately $26.2 million for those three trade secrets.
 
As for the design-history-file (“DHF”) trade secret, McLean testified that its market value was approximately $232 million, with corresponding avoided costs of approximately $72 million. However, by awarding only $170 million for the misappropriation of the DHF, the jury evidently did not credit the market-value theory (or the head-start theory) in its entirety.
 
*139 Because the verdict form does not indicate which aspects of McLean’s theory that the jury rejected, plaintiff proposes reducing McLean’s estimated avoided costs of $72 million down to $52.8 million, which reflects the same ratio as that between McLean’s estimated DHF market value ($232 million) and the jury’s award ($170 million). However, as defendants note, it is possible that the jury substantially rejected an avoided-costs award as to the DHF. In any event, there is no obvious way to reconstruct the jury’s reasoning, and the Court is therefore disinclined to accept plaintiff’s proportionality approach. Instead, and to ensure that there is no real risk of duplicative recovery, the Court will exclude the DHF-related avoided costs altogether in fashioning its relief.
 
Thus, the Court will award unjust-enrichment compensatory damages of $25.8 million, which represents the avoided costs associated with the CAD files, soft cannula, and ODA trade secrets.6

4. Exemplary Damages
[30]Plaintiff seeks to preserve the jury’s award of $282 million in exemplary damages. Defendants assert that any reduction in the unjust-enrichment award requires a corresponding reduction in exemplary damages. Defendants further contend that exemplary damages of any magnitude raise double-recovery concerns and should be barred altogether.
 
[31] [32]To begin, plaintiff’s exemplary damages must be reduced to comply with the clear text of the DTSA, which states that “a court may ... if the trade secret is willfully and maliciously misappropriated, award exemplary damages in an amount not more than 2 times the amount of the [unjust-enrichment] damages awarded.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a)(3) (emphasis added). The DTSA therefore explicitly connects the cap on exemplary damages to the total unjust-enrichment award. There is no “award” until there is a final judgment or decision. Although an award may be granted by both a court and a jury, its critical feature is that it is a final determination. Thus, an award of exemplary damages under the DTSA may not exceed two times the unjust-enrichment damages ultimately entered for plaintiff—not the unjust enrichment determined (but not ultimately awarded) by the jury.
 
Plaintiff cites Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Assocs., Inc., 657 A.2d 1132, 1139 (D.C. 1995), in support of its position that it is entitled to the entirety of the jury’s award of $282 million in exemplary damages. In that case, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s decision to proscribe the entire compensatory-damages award on double-recovery grounds, while nevertheless preserving the punitive-damages award. Dyer, 657 A.2d at 1139. But the Dyer court’s reasoning is not persuasive in this context. First, Dyer involved a common-law tortious-interference claim, and was thus not governed by a statutory scheme. Id. at 1134. Second, the Dyer court applied a plain error, not de novo, review standard to the trial court’s damages award, holding that the lower *140 court’s decision “to set aside the award of punitive damages was not ‘plainly’ or ‘obviously’ wrong.” Id. at 1140. Finally, the Dyer court itself acknowledged that its own case law on “whether compensatory damages are a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages [has] not been a model of consistency.” Id. at 1140, n.12. In short, Dyer does not provide persuasive authority to depart from the text of the DTSA, and thus plaintiff’s exemplary damages will be limited to two times the amount of its final unjust-enrichment award.
 
As noted, the jury found that EOFlow and Kim willfully and maliciously misappropriated plaintiff’s trade secrets, and therefore awarded $282 million in total exemplary damages, consisting of $94 million related to the misappropriation of the CAD files, $14 million for the ODA, and $174 million for the DHF.7 And the Court will enter a final unjust-enrichment award for each trade secret—corresponding to the avoided costs—of $14.6 million for the CAD files, $9.0 million for the soft cannula, and $2.2 million for the ODA. Thus, in accordance with the exemplary-damages cap of the DTSA, plaintiff’s punitive damages will be reduced to $29.2 million for the CAD files and $4.4 million for the ODA, for a total of $33.6 million in exemplary damages.
 
[33] [34] [35]Defendants nonetheless oppose an award of exemplary damages of any magnitude. Their principal argument is that an award of exemplary damages constitutes an impermissible double recovery with a permanent injunction because they “deter future misconduct.” Forster v. Boss, 97 F.3d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1996). But the Forster court actually upheld an award of punitive damages alongside an injunction, stating that an “award of punitive damages ... is not duplicative of the relief contained in the injunction” because “punitive damages are not designed to compensate anybody.” Id. Rather, the primary goal of exemplary damages is to “punish misconduct”—namely, past misconduct. Id. Conversely, injunctions are designed as a remedial tool to prevent specific future harms. See Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 487 (1st Cir. 2009). When “two damages awards serve different purposes[—]that is, when one is remedial and the other is punitive”—then the awards are unlikely to be duplicative. Giguere v. Port Res. Inc., 927 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2019); see also Burnett v. Ocean Properties, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 3d 400, 430 (D. Me. 2019), aff’d, 987 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2021) (stating that “[p]unitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, are not aimed at making a plaintiff whole; thus the rule against double recovery is inapplicable when the damages awarded are punitive” (quoting Medina v. D.C., 643 F.3d 323, 329 (D.C. Cir. 2011))).
 
The exemplary-damages provision under the DTSA—which applies only to willful and malicious misappropriation—is unquestionably punitive in nature, and thus does not pose a double-recovery risk when combined with an injunction. Plaintiff will therefore be awarded $33.6 million in exemplary damages, resulting in a total damages award of $59.4 million.8

5. Prejudgment Interest
[36]Plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest on its avoided-costs award at the Massachusetts rate of 12 percent per year set by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, §§ 6B-6C. It asserts that defendants realized the benefit of the avoided costs during the development of the EOPatch 2 several years ago, *141 and thus prejudgment interest should be entered to adjust for the time-value of that benefit.
 
Plaintiff, however, has waived the right to seek prejudgment interest. It could have requested that the question of prejudgment interest be submitted to the jury. “But the question of prejudgment interest was not submitted to the jury, nor did plaintiff[ ] ask that the jury be instructed on it,” meaning that any subsequent “award of prejudgment interest [would] be [struck].” Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 98 (1st Cir. 1979)); see also Giorgio v. Duxbury, 2016 WL 3983232, at *2 (D. Mass. July 25, 2016) (stating that “[p]laintiffs are not entitled to pre[ ]judgment interest where they did not submit the question of pre[ ]judgment interest to the jury”).
 
Plaintiff asserts that it did not previously seek prejudgment interest because its two damages theories already accounted for the time-value of money, whereas an award of only avoided costs does not, thus justifying an award of prejudgment interest at this stage.
 
[37] [38]Regardless, an award of prejudgment interest is not warranted, because “[t]he essential rationale for awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss.” City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195, 115 S.Ct. 2091, 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995) (emphasis added). At trial, plaintiff did not assert any actual financial loss stemming from defendants’ misappropriation; instead, plaintiff’s damages theories focused entirely on defendants’ unjust enrichment, including their avoided costs. It is true that those avoided-costs benefits began accruing to defendants in 2018, as they developed the EOPatch 2 using plaintiff’s trade secrets. But plaintiff has not articulated any quantifiable loss for which it must be made “whole.” See Richwell Grp., Inc. v. Seneca Logistics Grp., LLC, 433 F. Supp. 3d 58, 64 (D. Mass. 2019) (citing Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 969 F.2d 1154, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Nor did it seek (or receive) any damages for “actual loss” under the DTSA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B). Moreover, plaintiff’s unjust-enrichment and exemplary-damages awards—combined with the permanent injunction—adequately serve the DTSA’s purpose of “deter[ring] misappropriation and provid[ing] recovery for trade[-]secret owners” without the addition of prejudgment interest. See Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. TriZetto Grp., Inc., 2021 WL 1553926, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2021), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 68 F.4th 792 (denying a request for prejudgment interest on damages awarded under the DTSA). Thus, plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest will be denied.

B. Stay of Relief
Defendants have moved to stay judgments of both monetary and injunctive relief pending appeal. Courts have employed different tests to evaluate the propriety of a stay as to each type of relief.

1. Monetary Relief
[39] [40] [41]Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d), the “execution of a money judgment is automatically stayed pending appeal upon the posting of a supersedeas bond.” Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 296 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2002). Local Rule 62.2 sets the bond amount at the final damages-award amount plus 10 percent to cover interest and $500 for costs. See CardiAQ Valve Techs., Inc. v. Neovasc Inc., 2016 WL 8710447, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2016). However, no bond is required if “(1) the defendant’s ability to pay is so plain that the posting of a bond would be a waste of *142 money; or (2) the bond would put the defendant’s other creditors in undue jeopardy.” Acevedo-Garcia, 296 F.3d at 17. If the bond requirement is waived, courts typically require some other form of security instead. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 2001 WL 640876, at *1 (D. Mass. June 5, 2001) (requiring a defendant to pledge a larger percentage of stock to a plaintiff as an alternative security when the defendant was unable to obtain a bond for the full judgment amount). Ultimately, the “nature and the amount of the bond is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.” Acevedo-Garcia, 296 F.3d at 17.
 
[42]Here, given the damages award of $59.4 million, defendants must post a bond in compliance with Local Rule 62.2 in order to obtain a stay of the monetary judgment. Defendants, by their own admission, lack the resources to meet the first exception to the bond requirement. As for the second exception, defendants filed a declaration by EOFlow’s head of finance stating that its current debt obligations total approximately $39 million. It is plausible that defendants’ creditors may have been placed at risk if the stay applied to the entirety of the jury’s $452 million award. But the cost of a bond for the final judgment award (plus 10 percent for interest and $500 for costs) will be significantly less expensive and will not likely place defendants’ creditors in undue jeopardy. Thus, a stay of the monetary judgment will be entered, subject to the posting of a bond by defendants equal to $65,340,500.9

2. Injunctive Relief
[43] [44] [45]Stays of injunctive relief are “not a matter of right.” See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009). Such stays must be evaluated under the traditional four-part standard applied to injunctions. See Acevedo-Garcia, 296 F.3d at 16. Defendants thus bear the burden of satisfying the following: (1) they must make a “strong showing that [they are] likely to succeed on the merits” in their appeal; (2) they must show that they “will be irreparably injured absent a stay”; (3) they must show that “issuance of the stay will [not] substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding”; and (4) they must show that the stay would serve “the public interest.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987)). In evaluating whether this burden has been met, the “first two factors”—that is, likelihood of success and irreparable injury—“are the most critical.” Id.
 
[46] [47]Starting with the first factor, “[i]t is not enough that the chance of success on the merits [is] better than negligible.” Common Cause Rhode Island v. Gorbea, 970 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35, 129 S.Ct. 1749). That said, “[w]hen the request for a stay is made to a district court, common sense dictates that the moving party need not persuade the court that it is likely to be reversed on appeal.” Reaves v. Dep’t of Correction, 404 F. Supp. 3d 520, 522 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan, 999 F. Supp. 144, 150 (D. Mass. 1998)). Instead, the movant need only “establish that the appeal raises serious and difficult questions of law in an area where the law is somewhat unclear.” Id.
 
[48]Here, defendants’ principal argument on appeal is that plaintiff’s claims are time-barred as a matter of law. Specifically, defendants maintain, as they have *143 throughout the litigation process, that the statute-of-limitations provision under the DTSA applies an inquiry-notice standard, rather than a discovery-based standard. An inquiry-notice standard would, in all likelihood, render plaintiff’s claims time-barred. However, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s October 31, 2024 summary-judgment memorandum and order, the Court rejected defendants’ proffered inquiry-notice standard as being inconsistent with both the clear text of the DTSA and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010). (See ECF No. 753). That said, reasonable minds may differ as to that determination, given that the accrual standard under the DTSA is not yet clearly established. The appeal therefore raises a substantial question of law on which there is genuine room for meaningful difference of opinion, thereby satisfying the first factor for a stay of injunctive relief.
 
[49] [50]As for the second factor, “simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury” is not sufficient to warrant a stay. Gorbea, 970 F.3d at 14 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35, 129 S.Ct. 1749). Defendants assert that a prohibition on all sales of the EOPatch 2, as contemplated under the proposed injunction, would almost immediately force them out of business, thus constituting a real risk of irreparable harm. That risk, however, does not warrant a stay of the injunction as a whole, but rather supports a partial stay permitting continued sales to existing EOPatch 2 patients in the European Union and Republic of Korea, the only markets in which the EOPatch 2 is presently available. Defendants could therefore maintain their current revenue stream throughout the appeal process, but would not be permitted to use the trade secrets to expand their sales, develop competing products, or in any other way benefit from their misappropriation.
 
[51] [52]A partial stay limited only to existing EOPatch 2 patients also comports with the third factor, because it protects plaintiff from the threats posed by the misappropriation, including a potential sale of its trade secrets to a competitor, the expansion of a competing product into new markets, and the development of new products using its trade secrets. And the fourth factor is also supported by a partial stay, as the public interest is well-served by allowing current EOPatch 2 users to maintain uninterrupted access to their insulin-delivery system while the appeal process plays out.
 
The Court will therefore enter a temporary partial exception to the permanent injunction to permit continued sales of the EOPatch 2 device only to existing users in the European Union and Republic of Korea, as will be set forth in a separate permanent injunction order. Defendants will also be ordered to notify all current EOPatch 2 users subject to the temporary partial exception about the Court’s permanent injunction order and the likely effect that it will have on their access to the device going forward.

II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants’ motion for a stay of judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Total damages of $59.4 million is awarded to plaintiff without prejudgment interest. A permanent injunction order and order as to final judgment will be entered separately.
 
So Ordered.
All Citations
779 F.Supp.3d 124

Footnotes
	
1
	On February 25, 2025, pursuant to a separately negotiated Consent Permanent Injunction and Judgment agreement between plaintiff and Malave, DiIanni, and Welsford, the Court entered a final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and issued a permanent injunction in accordance with the terms of the parties’ agreement. (ECF Nos. 924-25).
	
2
	For the sake of convenience, the term “defendants” will hereafter refer only to EOFlow, Nephria Bio, and Kim unless the context indicates otherwise.
	
3
	Defendants did not contest the application of the DTSA’s extraterritoriality provision at trial.
	
4
	Plaintiff’s expert, Boris Leschinsky, claimed at trial that he was able to reverse engineer the Omnipod, but in fact his testimony demonstrated he was unable to do so successfully. (See 13 Tr. 149:13-150:13; 152:22-153:5; 154:8-155:2; 155:19-156:10; 156:20-161:17).
	
5
	Defendants oppose plaintiff’s submission of McLean’s supplemental report on the ground that it is untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) and 37(c)(1). They assert that the report consists of new theories and opinions that should have been disclosed long before the trial. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 2015 WL 12990692, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2015) (stating that if a “declaration submitted after the close of expert discovery differs substantially from the [initial] report, offers a whole new theory, opinion, or methodology, or is outside of the scope or general scheme of the report, then it is an improper supplementation”). The Court shares defendants’ misgivings about the permissibility of McLean’s supplemental report, and will not consider it to the extent it presents new theories and analyses not previously disclosed. However, to the extent that it simply restates or summarizes McLean’s trial testimony, it appears to be harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (stating that if a party fails to timely disclose expert testimony, then it is precluded from using “that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” (emphasis added)).
	
6
	McLean estimated that the market value of the CAD files, soft cannula, and ODA trade secrets were $47.8 million, $29.6 million, and $7.2 million, respectively. The jury apparently reduced those values to the nearest million, ultimately awarding $47.0 million, $29.0 million, and $7.0 million for the misappropriation of those three trade secrets, respectively. To account for the rounding, plaintiff proposes proportionally reducing the $26.6 million of estimated research-and-development costs for those three trade secrets to $25.8 million. Because there is no genuine dispute as to the jury’s adoption of plaintiff’s market-value damages for those three trade secrets, the Court will enter an unjust-enrichment award of $25.8 million, comprised of $14.6 million for the CAD files, $9.0 million for the soft cannula, and $2.2 million for the ODA.
	
7
	The jury did not find that the soft-cannula trade secret was willfully and maliciously misappropriated.
	
8
	$25.8 million avoided-costs award + $33.6 million exemplary-damages award = $59.4 million total damages award.
	
9
	That total represents the $59.4 million final monetary judgment, plus $5.94 million in interest, plus $500.

End of Document
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