The en banc Court reversed the previous panel, and expanded the circumstances under which an alleged infringer may be liable under §271(a). In addition to circumstances identified by the panel, liability may arise if “an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or the receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of the patented method, and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.” When that standard is satisfied, the actions of a third party may be attributed to the alleged infringer, who thereby directly infringes under §271(a), even though there was no “mastermind” acting though a formal agent.
In this issue of the Federal Circuit Review: (1) Damages for Lost Profits May Not Be Based On Extraterritorial Services Performed by an Infringer’s Customers Under § 271(f); (2) Federal Circuit Invalidates Claims Under the On-Sale Bar for Commercial Exploitation of the Invention Before the Critical Date; and (3) The PTO’s 180-Day Filing Deadline of the Optional Interim Procedure for PTA Reconsideration Request Is Not Arbitrary and Capricious.
It is understandable that those who are entering into a business endeavor would want to know what their potential exposure might be, and when you have an invention perhaps the single largest potential liability looming is the threat of infringing a patent owned by another. This being the case, it is understandable that individuals and small businesses would like to be able to obtain a patent search and opinion that if they were to do what they are about to do they would not be sued for patent infringement. The analysis required in order to make this determination is daunting, takes a lot of time and comes with substantial liability for the patent attorney who offers the opinion. What this adds up to is a freedom to operate opinion costing a lot of money. Allow me to explain why.
There can be little doubt of the exceptional importance of Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. to the intellectual property community, and to innovators as a whole. The issue of joint infringement has been the focus of much discussion in recent years by academia, the media, and industry. In its 2014 remand of this case, the Supreme Court suggested this Court would have the opportunity to “revisit the § 271(a) question if it so chooses,” 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 (“Akamai III”). The AIPLA, as amicus curiae, argues that the Federal Circuit should choose to do so by rehearing the case en banc because the single entity rule as set out by the Panel majority would make it nearly impossible for certain patent holders to enforce their patents against joint infringers.
After two and a half years of hard-fought litigation, Kroy IP Holdings has been defeated in a patent case brought against grocery retailer Safeway, Inc. In two comprehensive opinions issued May 29 by Judge William C. Bryson—a senior Federal Circuit judge sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Texas—the court granted Safeway’s motions for summary judgment and invalidated Kroy’s U.S. Patent No. 7,054,830 on several grounds. Not only did Judge Bryson find the ‘830 patent to be abstract and ineligible for patent protection, he also found the patent to be anticipated and obvious in view of Safeway’s cited prior art. Judge Bryson entered judgment for Safeway the same day, and ruled that as the prevailing party, Safeway is entitled to its costs.
Recently, a small business that designs, installs and services digital video surveillance systems, 3rd Eye Surveillance, sued the United States federal government for alleged patent infringement. The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, seeking damages exceeding $1 billion for unlawful use of the company’s three video and image surveillance system patents – U.S. Patent Nos. 6,778,085, 6,798,344, and 7,323,980. The surveillance system patents are owned by Discovery Patents, LLC of Baltimore Maryland, who is also a Plaintiff in the case, and exclusively licensed by 3rd Eye Surveillance.
In both theories of indirect patent infringement (i.e., inducement of patent infringement and contributory infringement), the patent owner must show that the defendant knew its activities were infringing. If the defendant can prove that it did not have such belief then it is a valid defense to indirect infringement. In Commil, the defendant went a step further and contended that it was not liable for inducement of infringement, arguing that it is axiomatic that one cannot infringe an invalid patent and it had a good faith belief that the patent at issue was invalid. The defendant mixed infringement and invalidity together. In the opinion, the Supreme Court placed a wall between the theories of infringement and invalidity and held that the mental state of the defendant as to the patent’s invalidity has no bearing on whether it thought its acts were infringing.
The issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether a good faith belief of patent invalidity is a defense to a claim of induced infringement. In a 6-2 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court ruled that belief of invalidity is not a defense to a claim of induced infringement. While it seems that the Supreme Court issued a reasonable decision in this case it is deeply troubling how little the Supreme Court actually knows about patent law. In addition to repeatedly discussing the validity of the Commil patent, rather than the validity of the patent claims, the Supreme Court also seemed to suggest that Cisco could have relied on a procedural challenge to the Commil patent that simply wasn’t available as an option at any relevant time during the proceedings.
The opinion provides guidance in terms of when divided infringement actually imposes liability for patent infringement. When a mastermind offloads one or more steps of a claimed method to another entity, then the actions of that other entity are vicariously attributed to the mastermind only if the relationship is one of a principal-agent or joint enterprise, or if there is a contract between the parties requiring or mandating the other entity to perform the offloaded method step. Whether other terms that limit the vicarious nature of a contract might impose liability will have to be litigated in the future.
Two of the biggest post-production/3D-conversion companies are preparing for battle in a patent infringement suit that is sure to create enemies and allies in the world of film post-production. Prime Focus Creative Services Canada filed a patent infringement suit against Legend3D in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. In the March 30, 2015 complaint, Prime Focus World requested a jury trial, an injunction banning Legend3D from performing the patented process, a finding of willful infringement and unspecified monetary damages. Each company has some of the biggest blockbusters in recent memory.
Of course, the substantial victories won by Bard and Apple do not match Polaroid’s in another very significant way. Polaroid was successful in securing an injunction against further infringement by Kodak that forced the goliath of the photography industry to withdraw all of its instant cameras and film from store shelves across the country. The courts imposed this punishment even though more than thirteen million Americans owned Kodak instant cameras that were immediately rendered useless by the decision.
The STRONG Patents Act appears to be overwhelmingly favorable to innovators and patent owners. This legislation stands in stark contrast with the Innovation Act submitted in the House by Congressman Bob Goodlatte (D-Va) and shows a very different, alternative vision for the patent system.
Infringers should not be able to arrogantly and recklessly violate patents for years but ultimately pay only the same amount they would have paid the patent owner for a license in the first place. Currently, however, that is the situation that exists, because an infringer can avoid being stuck with enhanced damages if the infringer’s attorneys, for the first time in the litigation, raise a newly-devised (but ultimately incorrect) argument that the patent is invalid or not infringed, even if this was not the actual reason why the infringer refused to take a license years earlier.
While there are several facets of willful infringement law that the Halo concurrence would have the full court reconsider, the one that could have the greatest impact, and potentially unwind the patent reform gains made by Seagate, is the substantive test for award of enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 for willful infringement.
In a decision barely reaching 11 pages, a unanimous Supreme Court in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies reversed and remanded the Federal Circuit’s per curiam majority ruling in Akamai Technologies and McKesson Technologies. That the Supreme Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s per curiam majority ruling is not a surprise. But what is truly shocking are the factually inaccurate statements, as well as the problematical reasoning that appears in Justice Alito’s opinion for this unanimous Supreme Court. With all due respect, Alito’s opinion is an abysmal ”comedy of errors.”