Posts Tagged: "patent eligible"

The reason the abstract idea doctrine is unworkable is because the Supreme Court has never defined what is an abstract idea. The Supreme Court has treated the term “abstract idea” much as they have the term “obscenity”; they know it when they see it. Such a level of subjectivity leads to chaos, which is exactly how the Judges on the Federal Circuit can manage to find themselves evenly split on the issue of whether software is patent eligible. The Supreme Court abhors bright line rules unless they are the ones who announce them. Such an irrational fear of certainty and predictability is curious given how those concepts are so fundamentally important to a functioning judicial system. Still, if they don’t like bright line rules that everyone can follow as announced by the Federal Circuit they at least owe us a workable test that they are willing to endorse.

MUELLER: “I think a lot is going to ride on what we see going forward from the PTAB, for example decisions in post grant review. Will those decisions be high quality and will the courts respect them? We know that the Office has hired some really good folks but they’ve also been hampered by the sequestration. I’m delighted that Michelle Lee has taken the reins. I sure hope that’s going to be permanent. I think she’ll do an outstanding job and be highly respected. But I also think a lot of attention is going to be paid to what happens as those post grant review decisions start coming out.”

CHISUM: “I’m very skeptical when Congress starts talking about reform. I don’t think there is enough sophistication in Congress and among committee staff members about how the patent system really operates and about the challenges the many thousands of people operating the system face. Most of the legislative efforts I’ve seen over the last 30 years to reform the patent system, in fact, reformed very little. The “reforms” have tended to respond to particular interest groups, to particular complainants. Congress has tended to respond only to a consensus that something was wrong rather than thinking outside the box as to what will really improve the efficiency and predictability of the patent system.”

my iPhone can be a bell that you physically shake and it goes “ding” like a hotel desk bell; or it can be a carpenter’s level to help hang pictures, level a cabinet; or, it can be a compass that swings this way and that just like the one from a long ago scouting exercise; or it can be a flashlight. Clearly, one can patent a bell, level, or compass in whatever form it exists, it is a device. That much is not in dispute. But, what about the “code” that creates that “device”. It is now that we have the conundrum: is software (the code that both creates and instructs the machine) patentable apart from the machine? The answer to this question, when phrased in this way, is self-evident; yes, of course it is patentable. For the same reasons machines have always been patentable, they are a part of the “useful” arts. You see, the software is the machine. The machine is software. These are one in the same “thing”. If this is all so simple, then what is the argument about?

Today, after several years of substantial turmoil, patent eligibility in a variety of economically significant technologies is extremely uncertain, including software, natural products, medical diagnostics and personalized medicine. It is with great irony that one of the few things we know with any degree of certainty is that business methods are patent eligible… If you haven’t noticed, overwhelming portions of the U.S. economy are tied to the biotechnology and software sectors. Are we about to throw away our economic leadership? There are already some lawyers talking openly with clients about whether they may be able to in some cases actually get broader, more certain protection outside the United States.

Not surprisingly, the decision of the latest Federal Circuit case on software patent eligibility – Accenture Global Services, GMBH v. Guidewire Software, Inc. – could be predicted from the makeup of the CAFC panel. Judge Lourie, joined by Judge Reyna, issued the majority opinion that the system claims were invalid. The Court followed the analysis for determining patent eligibility from CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) and affirmed the district court’s finding that the system claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,013,284 (“the ‘284 patent”) were ineligible. Judge Rader predictably dissented from the majority and stated that he would hold the system claims to be patent-eligible subject matter. One takeaway from this decision is that the Court remains predictably divided. In this case, all three judges on the panel ruled in a way that was consistent with their ruling in CLS Bank, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

In perhaps lesser known fashion Congress made two significant, but limited, statutory changes to what is considered patent eligible subject matter. In a bizarre circumstance Congress chose not to render tax strategy patents patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. Rather they chose a far more convoluted route. Tax strategy patents are still patent eligible subject matter pursuant to Section 101, but for purposes of evaluating an invention under section 102 or 103 of title 35, any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at the time of the invention or application for patent, is deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art.

As in the U.S., when drafting claims in China, one must describe the invention sufficiently to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. For software patents, a flow chart and explanation should be included, along with drawings and description of associated hardware. Portions of the source code may be included for reference. Software claims may be drafted as either method or apparatus claims. However, Justin Shi, patent attorney at Sony Mobile Communications in Beijing, warns that apparatus claims may be deemed invalid if they are phrased only in means-plus-function language and fail to describe the apparatus or its embodiments.

Despite the turmoil surround software patent eligibility I believe with great certainty that software will remain patent eligible in the United States. The extreme decisions of the PTAB and viewpoints of those on the Federal Circuit opposed to computer implemented methods will not prevail because they are inconsistent with the Patent Act and long-standing patent law jurisprudence. After all, the Supreme Court itself explicitly found software patent eligible in Diamond v. Diehr. In the meantime, while we wait for the dust to settle, we need to engage in a variety of claiming techniques (i.e., methods, computer readable medium, systems claims, means-plus-function claims and straight device claims). Thus, if you are interested in moving forward with a patent application it will be advisable to file the application with more claims than would have been suggested even a few months ago. Patent attorneys also must spend increased time describing the invention from various viewpoints, which means specifications should increase in size. This all means that there is no such thing as a quick, cheap and easy software patent application – at least if you want to have any hope of obtaining a patent in this climate.

The Supreme Court quite directly contradicts the reasoning of Chakrabarty in Myriad. Thomas explains that it is a fact that isolated DNA is nonnaturally occurring, but still nevertheless not patent eligible. Whether we like it or not, the very foundation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty has been overruled, or at the very least significantly cut back. Arguments to the contrary are simply wishful thinking and ignore the explicit language of the Myriad decision.

By holding that Myriad’s claimed cDNA was patent-eligible, Thomas’ opinion reaffirms the major holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that claimed subject matter which truly only the “hand of man” can make (not simply snipped out of “mother nature”) will make it to the patent-eligibility zone. (Whether that same cDNA makes it to patentability zone under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and especially under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is another and far more important story.) I would also be careful in reading too much into Thomas’ statement (which is also dicta) about “very short series of DNA which may have no intervening introns to remove in creating the cDNA” might be patent-ineligible. By definition, cDNA (i.e., complementary DNA) is a DNA molecule which is created from mRNA (i.e., messenger RNA) and therefore lacking the introns in the DNA of the genome. Thomas (or his clerks) may not have realized that what they were talking about isn’t what would be defined (at least by a molecular biologist) as cDNA. So the impact of that statement should have minimal, if any impact.

The baffling aspect of the opinion is that the Court seems to agree that both the DNA of claim 1 and the DNA of claim 2 are man-made and do not occur in nature. Of claim 1, the Court states that “isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule”. Page 14 (emphasis added). Of claim 2, the Court states that “the lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.” Page 17 (emphasis added). According to the way many patent attorneys (and Judge Rader) think, that should be sufficient to comply with §101. But the Court does not see things this way.

USPTO to Examiners: “As of today, naturally occurring nucleic acids are not patent eligible merely because they have been isolated. Examiners should now reject product claims drawn solely to naturally occurring nucleic acids or fragments thereof, whether isolated or not, as being ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”

You can expect a near complete cessation in many areas of personalized medicine. If creating something in a lab, such as a composite cDNA, does not make the underlying claims patent eligible because what results is indistinguishable from what appears in nature that means that the fledgling and potentially promising technologies to grow organs for transplantation will shrivel up and die. The whole point is to create an organ that is indistinguishable from what appears in nature so that it can be transplanted into a human body to prolong life. Given the breadth of this opinion and the uncertainty it will cause funding will dry up in the U.S.

Under what authority does the PTAB ignore specifically recited structure? The authority that the PTAB seems to be relying on to ignore claim terms is unclear and not explained in the opinion in any satisfactory way. It does, however, seem that the fact that the invention can be implemented in any type of computer system or processing environment lead the PTAB to treat the method as one that could be performed on a “general purpose computer,” rather than a specific purpose computer. Thus, the PTAB picks up on the arbitrary and erroneous distinctions between general purpose computer and specific purpose computer without as much as a thought and wholly without factual explanation.