Posts Tagged: "patent eligibility"

The Australian Patent Office yesterday released its new guidelines in response to Australia’s High Court decision on the patentability of genetic material. The good news for Australia, though cold comfort for us on the other side of the Pacific, is that the Australian Patent Office has shown our counterpart US institutions the correct way to interpret and apply an important new case carving specific subject matter out of the broad default of patent eligibility. Rather than declaring ineligible from patenting everything under the sun “involving” a law or product of nature, Australia has instead read the High Court’s decision faithfully yet narrowly to exclude exactly what it said it excluded.

Don’t be afraid to make the technical disclosure long, dense and difficult to read, at least for those without technical training. In my opinion one of the biggest reasons the Supreme Court has embarked upon this path to render much innovation patent ineligible is because they actually understand the inventions in question. In Bilski, for example it was little more than thinking, observing and acting. In Alice they convinced themselves it was just little more than ledger accounting. Dumbing down the technical disclosure so even a Justice of the Supreme Court can understand is a mistake, at least in my humble opinion.

The law of patent eligibility is created by the nine least qualified people to make such a determination; the Justices of Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court arbitrarily chooses which of its own prior decisions to follow and ignore, refuses to read and enforce the laws passed by Congress even when the statue is but a single sentence (as is 101), and they openly legislates from the bench by creating judicial exceptions to patent eligibility where no such statutory prerogative exists. If the Federal Circuit will not step up and do the right thing and limit the lawless Mayo decision, which instructs lower courts to ignore the patent statute and drive 100% of the analysis into 101, the U.S. will forfeit our lead in the biotechnology and medical device industries. That will be bad for the economy, but far worse for public health.

”There should be no serious question that computer-implemented inventions such as software constitute patent-eligible subject matter under § 101,” Paul Clement wrote in a brief filed on behalf of IBM to the Supreme Court in 2014. Ultimately, the IBM brief would argue that the abstract idea doctrine is unworkable, which it is. Sadly, nearly 18 months after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Alice v. CLS Bank we are no closer to having a working understanding about when and under what circumstances software is patent eligible.

“As this group knows, I had further opportunity to see Supreme Court reversals in patent cases,” Lourie explained. “That has led to a lot of uncertainty in the law when they decided cases related to patent eligibility… the myriad case involving breast cancer patents. I wrote the majority opinion in that case which the Supreme Court unanimously reversed.” Judge Lourie would go on to say that the week following the reversal he received the outstanding public service award from the New York Intellectual Property Law Association. With the audience laughing loudly he wondered whether the Association regretted the decision. Being unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court in Myriad is and will remain a badge of honor in my opinion. Judge Lourie gets patent eligibility, and he gets the science.

A dim view of software patents does not make Mark Cuban unique, but his latest foray into the patent debate does provide interesting insights into his arbitrary views on innovation. Like your technophobic grandfather, Cuban seems to believe that innovators are entitled to patent rights as long as the innovations are tangible. When those innovations manifest themselves in the form of intangible software the underlying innovation is for some reason no longer entitled to patent protection. Surely Cuban has to realize that this self balancing scooter could accomplish the same exact functionality if the control logic were software based, right?

3D printed human organs are coming increasingly close to being a reality according to several reports. In addition to potentially saving thousands of lives every year, this ground-breaking technology raises issues related to patent law that cannot be ignored. Are human organs and/or tissues that are created through 3D printing process that use naturally-occurring cells eligible for patenting? Or are such organs and tissues considered to be products of nature and therefore ineligible for patenting? The America Invents Act (AIA) creates serious questions, as do some recent Supreme Court ruling on patent eligibility.

A couple months ago I commented on Ex parte Khvorova, expressing disappointment in its analysis and concern over what this might mean since it is “the first PTAB decision in molecular biology since patenting in that field got turned upside down.” To follow up on these notions, and to give credit where credit is due, I wanted to briefly comment on Ex parte Boyden, which the PTAB issued September 2, 2015.

KAPPOS: “Back when I was an engineer we saw it in mainframe computers where you’d make an invention and frequently initially the software wasn’t fast enough to be able to run the algorithm. So the algorithm would first be built in silicon, really expensive, but you’d wind up then fabbing up chips to be special purpose chips to run the algorithm. And then later as the software got faster the underlying computer systems got faster you’d reimplement the same algorithm in software, same algorithm, same invention but just reimplement it in software and then even later after that when the ASIC density got good enough you’d reimplement yet again in an application-specific integrated circuit, an ASIC. And so you’d have a little bit of a hybrid, if you will, but more on the hardware side, it’s an IC. It’s again putting the algorithm in a chip. And so what you’d see by looking at that is that it made no sense to say that an algorithm was patentable if it was implemented in a hardware chip. But the same algorithm implemented in software was unpatentable. Just didn’t make sense to say that.”

KAPPOS: ”Companies like Microsoft and Apple and GE — all of whom are members [of the Partnership for American Innovation] along with IBM, Ford, DuPont and Pfizer as well as smaller companies like Many Worlds and Second Sight — all of them are engaged in the hard work of making major, I’ll call it bone-grinding innovations. Second Sight is literally coming up with electro mechanical and implantable human interfacing medical technology that enables blind people to see. And like you said, Gene, serious software development involving lots of super smart people and putting in tremendous amount of time with a lot of specialized expertise, devising solutions to very important problems. You know, enabling blind people to see — it’s hard to imagine a more tangible, practical and important problem than that.”

The United States Supreme Court is commonly known to resolve difficult issues of law. Yet, Alice v. CLS Bank[ii], last year’s unanimous Supreme Court decision, has caused confusion about whether computer-implemented business methods and software innovations are patentable under 35 U.S.C. §101. The question of patentability of software-related innovations – even those involving merely implementations of business-related innovations – seemed…

Drew HIRSHFELD: ”One thing that really can move the ball toward a higher quality patent is again the clarity of the record, and the amount of information that’s in there so that third parties can really tell what the patent was about. So quality has, as you’ve identified before, many ways to look at it. But when I leave this position, whenever that time is, certainly if I can have a more clear record, more full explanations on the record, I think the system would be in a better place and that is one of my goals.”

The panel decision in this case reads recent Supreme Court precedent to create an existential threat to patent protection for an array of meritorious inventions. It avowedly holds that “groundbreaking” new diagnostic methods that make a significant contribution to the medical field” are ineligible for a patent whenever they (1) incorporate the discovery of a natural phenomenon, and (2) the techniques involved in putting that discovery to its first practical use were individually known beforehand. In other words, the person who first discovers a natural phenomenon can never obtain a patent on any practical application of that new knowledge, however surprising or revolutionary the results, unless the steps she teaches to use it are independently novel. As the example of this case vividly shows, that cannot be correct.

While Mayo and Alice presented a two-part “framework” to address when a particular claimed invention preempts a “fundamental principle,” neither case purported to have that framework replace a preemption inquiry nor authorize a court to ignore the ultimate question, i.e., does the claim preempt a fundamental principle instead of merely claim a practical application of such a principle? The failure to consider preemption has resulted in courts and the PTO over-using §101 in a gatekeeper or threshold fashion for which it was never intended to be used, either as enacted by Congress or as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

This is a really important question both with respect to biologics and other interventions and also as the Federal Circuit does work with the Supreme Court’s body of precedents. We have basically two principle points. One is that in our view the Federal Circuit has to do a better job rationalizing and reconciling two different sets of precedent. One is the set of modern cases and the second is an older case that the modern cases embrace, Diamond vs. Diehr, which as we understand it adopts exactly the opposite rule from the Federal Circuit in this case, which is that the combination is what has to be new not the individual processes. And then second we believe that we have a case that fits squarely within what the Supreme Court intended to remain patent eligible after those more modern cases. So we filed an en banc petition and we thought that there would be amicus support for sure. But what we didn’t expect, to be honest, was the outpouring of interest and support that we received.