Posts Tagged: "Federal Circuit Review"

Appellant General Hospital Corp. (“GHC”) appealed the Board’s dismissal of an interference because the claims of its involved patent application lacked sufficient written description. The disclosure of a wide range with exemplary values does not provide written description support for a narrower claimed range, absent something to indicate the claimed range was considered critical or that inventor was in possession of the specific claimed embodiments. The Board cannot reject a motion to add a new claim to a patent application involved in an interference without explaining its findings.

The Federal Circuit recently affirmed a decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to reject VerHoef’s pending application 13/328,201 for a dog harness under pre-AIA Section 102(f) because the applicant “did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” At the Federal Circuit, VerHoef conceded that the figure “8” loop was an essential feature, and did not dispute that the veterinarian, and not he, contributed the idea of the figure eight loop.

In Energy Heating v. Heat On-The-Fly, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding clear and convincing evidence that the inventor knew that the prior uses were material and specifically intended to deceive the PTO by not disclosing them. The court had sufficient evidence – including evidence of 61 commercial sales dating back to 2006 and no contemporaneous evidence of experimentation – to disbelieve Mr. Hefley’s testimony to the contrary.

In Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions v. Renesas Electrics, a jury found Renesas liable for both patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation. The jury awarded a reasonable royalty for infringement and a disgorgement of profits for misappropriation. The Federal Circuit affirmed a jury finding that Renesas was liable for trade secret misappropriation and patent infringement for a set of apparatus claims, but vacated the damages awards in the case and remanded for further proceedings… There is no right for a jury to award a disgorgement of profits in trade secret misappropriation cases under the Seventh Amendment. Double recovery of damages for essentially same injury is not justified by presenting two legal theories for relief.

On appeal, WesternGeco argued 1) the Board erred as to its unpatentability determinations; and 2) the IPR proceedings were time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because ION acted in privity with PGS, and over a year passed between its infringement complaint against ION and the PGS IPR petition. Based on the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision known as Wi-Fi One, the time-bar issue was appealable, but WesternGeco’s argument was unpersuasive because the relationship between ION and PGS was not close enough to trigger the time bar.

In 01 Communique Lab v. Citrix Systems, the Federal Circuit rejected Communique’s appeal. The court properly relied on a comparison of the allegedly infringing GoToMyPC product to the asserted patent claims, as shown by careful jury instructions. Citrix’s comparison to the BuddyHelp prior art, in aid of a legitimate defense, did not cause prejudice to Communique. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that claim terms must be construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement. Thus, if a narrow construction was appropriate for validity in the reexamination to avoid the prior art, a broader construction should not be applied against alleged infringers.

How the Federal Circuit could rule that Alice did not change the law governing § 101 is a bit of a mystery. Applying the same two-step test seems a convenient way of dodging reality. At a time when there is real momentum gathering for a legislative solution to § 101 why did the Federal Circuit choose to perpetuate a myth that Alice did nothing to change the law? Outcomes are unquestionably different as the result of Alice, and if outcomes are different how exactly is it possible that the law did not change? If the law remained the same why was Alice a clear pivotal moment in software patent history? Saying Alice did not change the law shows just how out of touch and insulated from reality the Federal Circuit has become.

If an action is dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing, the defendant will be considered the prevailing party and attorney’s fees can be awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Federal Circuit also affirmed that the case was exceptional under § 285 because the court properly examined the totality of the circumstances in making its determination that Raniere litigated the case in an unreasonable manner.

Appellee Kamstrup A/S (“Kamstrup”) filed an IPR, and the Board instituted review of the challenged patent. Apator attempted to swear behind a cited prior art reference and submitted an inventor declaration and three emails with attachments to support the earlier conception date. The Board noted that there were no indicia in the body or header of the emails indicating what files were attached or what the attachments disclosed. The Board also noted that the only evidence that a file was attached to these emails was the inventor declaration. Accordingly, the Board rejected Apator’s attempt to swear behind the reference.

Equitable estoppel does not bar assertion of patent claims later amended by reexamination when those new claims differ in scope from earlier claims in the patent that were not asserted. Thus, a defendant’s reliance on a patentee’s knowing silence and failure to enforce an earlier patent does not shield him from allegations of infringing later-issued claims of different scope.

In an IPR brought by E*Trade in response to an infringement suit by Droplets, the Board found that the Droplets ‘115 patent was invalid due to obviousness. The patent properly claimed priority to the ‘838 patent but also attempted to claim priority to an earlier ‘917 provisional patent and an intervening ‘745 patent through incorporation by reference. The Board concluded that these priority claims were not proper, and the Federal Circuit agreed.

Where a contractual assignment of patent rights is not unequivocal the contract cannot defeat standing at the pleadings stage in a correction of inventorship action. A contract between two legal entities cannot assign the patent rights of a non-party, when the non-party signed the agreement on behalf of one of the entities and not for himself. A contract to develop and deliver software, absent express language conveying an assignment, does not imply a transfer of patent rights and does not create an implication that the developer was hired to invent.

An IPR petition is not time-barred for reasons of privity with a district court defendant in a prior litigation when no evidence shows that the petitioner controlled the litigation and would be bound by its outcome, or was in privity with a litigant for other reasons. It is not enough for the petitioner to indemnify litigants or have an interest in the outcome. Similarly, for a district court defendant to be a real party in interest in an IPR, the petitioner must have filed the petition at the behest or on behalf of the defendant. Finally, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery, when the requested discovery would not prove privity on the grounds alleged in the motion.

As in civil litigation, the petitioner in an inter partes review is master of its complaint and is “normally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address.” Therefore, the Board must decide the validity of every challenged claim when it agrees to institute inter partes review of any one challenged claim.

The Federal Circuit has agreed to expeditiously hear an appeal from Dodocase VR, Inc. v. Merchsource, LLC No. 17cv7088 (N.D. Cal.) (“Dodocase”) in which the district court determined that a forum selection clause could not be overridden to allow a patent validity challenge at the PTO without breaching the contract containing the clause.  The court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the withdrawal of the petitions MerchSource had filed with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).  Dodocase at 24.  In its arguments, MerchSource strongly relied on the public’s interest in permitting the PTO to correct its mistakes.  This interest, however, was not found to outweigh the policy favoring enforcing parties’ agreed upon selection of a forum.  Id. at 17.