Posts in Patents

On July 3, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied en banc rehearing in Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services. The 86-page order from the Federal Circuit includes eight separate opinions—four concurring with the en banc denial and another four dissenting from the decision. The separate opinions reflect a Federal Circuit that isn’t divided so much on the issue of the importance of Athena’s now invalidated patent claims but, rather, the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence under Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories (2012). Throughout the opinions, it seemed clear that the Federal Circuit was eager to have the Supreme Court take this case up on appeal in order to clarify Mayo’s judicial exception to laws of nature and its impact on patent claims covering medical diagnostics.

Happy 4th! This week Barks & Bites comes early, starting with a bite: The Federal Circuit denies rehearing of Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services, shattering the hopes of many amici and diagnostic companies; Huawei warns against politicization of IP law after the Trump Administration rolls back part of its ban against Huawei’s U.S. suppliers; Chinese President Xi Jinping talks IP theft compensation at G20 summit; USPTO announces new rule for attorneys representing foreign-domiciled trademark applicants and amends its software acquisition plan; the University of California earns a seventh patent covering CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing; Toshiba registers the UK’s first motion trademark; major U.S. tech firms plan to move production away from China; and Ed Sheeran’s copyright case is stayed until the “Stairway to Heaven” case is resolved at the Ninth Circuit.

I thought the Electric Power Group decision was effectively dead. It used an overbroad characterization of patent claims under Step 1 of Mayo/Alice. Following that decision, I encountered many Section 101 rejections that put forth an extremely broad characterization of claims, citing Electric Power Group as authority. I saw no rebuttal until the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (January 7, 2019). “Claims that do not recite matter that falls within these enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should not be treated as reciting abstract ideas.”  See id. at 53. The Electric Power Group decision was nowhere cited, and “collecting information” was not listed as one of the abstract ideas. Indeed, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB’s) art unit 3600 soon decided that “‘collecting usage information’ … is not an abstract idea.” See Final Decision in Ex parte Fanaru, Appeal 2017-2898 at page 5 (PTAB 2019). I was thus able to use the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance and Ex parte Fanaru to counter an examiner’s broad characterization of claims. Now, however, Electric Power Group may make a comeback. The very recent Cellspin decision again cited to Electric Power Group to support a very broad Step 1 characterization of claims. The Federal Circuit panel (Lourie, O’Malley, and Taranto) found the claims were “drawn to the idea of capturing and transmitting data from one device to another.”  See Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., et al., at page 16 slip opinion (CAFC, decided June 25, 2019).

It has been more than two years since I last wrote here that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank decision has left the IP bar without a clear and reliable test to determine when exactly a software (or computer-implemented) claim is patentable versus being simply an abstract idea “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” It is now mid-2019, and the USPTO’s newest Section 101 guidelines interpreting Alice—and the accompanying examples—have not cleared the confusion, and Alice continues to distract the USPTO, courts, and practitioners from focusing properly on Sections 102 (novelty) and 103 (obviousness). The net effects still being increased cost, lower patent quality, lower patent portfolio valuations, wasted patent reform lobbying dollars and, in many instances, the denial of patent protection for worthwhile software inventions. Meanwhile, in the real world, which is experiencing the Fourth Industrial Revolution—where even the average modern car contains roughly 150 million lines of code—the importance of software is undebatable.

Now that the Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property has concluded its hearings on patent eligibility reform, it appears that the draft changes to Sections 100 and 112 are the last great danger in the overall patent eligibility debate and we must not let our guard down. A new version of the bill is due out sometime after the July 4 holiday; please send the following text with any of your edits to [email protected].

On June 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc. (2018-1817, 2018-1819 to 1826), reversing a district court’s grant of various Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss complaints that alleged patent infringement based on U.S. Pat. No. 8,738,794 (the ’794 patent), U.S. Pat. No. 8,892,752 (the ’752 patent), U.S. Pat. No. 9,258,698 (the ’698 patent), and U.S. Pat. No. 9,749,847 (the ’847 patent). The Federal Circuit did so because the district court misconstrued precedent from both Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) and Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Federal Circuit panel consisted of Judges Lourie, O’Malley, and Taranto. Judge O’Malley authored the panel’s opinion. he Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the claims were directed to an abstract idea but reversed anyway on the basis of the district court failing to conduct a proper Alice step two. This was because the district court ignored Cellspin’s factual allegations that, when properly accepted as true, precluded the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

On Tuesday, June 24, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) declared an interference proceeding  between a collection of entities that are on opposing sides in the race to commercialize CRISPR-Cas9 genomic editing technologies. The patent interference will decide if inventors from the Regents of the University of California, the University of Vienna and the Umea University of Sweden were the first to invent certain methods for gene editing in eukaryotic cells, or plant and animal cells, that are covered by patent claims which have been issued to the Broad Institute, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard College. The patent interference involves 10 patent applications that have been filed by the University of California group and 13 patents that have been filed by the Broad Institute group. These two groups have been facing off in a series of legal battles regarding which side can properly claim to be the rightful inventor of perhaps the world’s most widely applicable gene editing technology useful for treating diseases, improving life science research and increasing the rate of biotechnology innovations.

IPWatchdog’s third Patent Masters Symposium was held this past week in Arlington, Virginia, and included some of the best and brightest in the patent world. The event focused on the effects of Alice five years on, but more importantly, identified practical approaches for navigating Section 101 law now and in the future. Throughout the event, I also asked attendees to vote on several statements in an effort to come to consensus on certain points relating to the pending patent reform legislation. Those statements that received at least 80% of the vote are included in the letter below, which will be sent to the Senators and Representatives working on the next draft of the new Section 101.

Coverage of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property hearings on proposed amendments to the Patent Act has trumpeted the possibility that Congress will undo the Alice test for Section 101 eligibility. Many stakeholders have commented on the benefits this could bring to patentees. But if this comes to pass, accused infringers won’t cease bringing early validity challenges—they’ll instead shift their focus from Section 101 to other grounds. Testimony before the Senate and the data on recent district court decisions strongly suggest that Section 112(f) will emerge as the preeminent ground for early validity challenges.

This week in Other Barks & Bites: The Supreme Court today agreed to hear two trademark cases next term; Senators Thom Tillis and Chris Coons issue a statement regarding the recent round of patent eligibility hearings by the Senate Intellectual Property Subcommittee; four bills that would impact pharmaceutical patents and practices have passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee; Huawei publicly calls out negative impact of Senator Marco Rubio’s legislative amendment preventing it from seeking U.S. patent infringement damages, one day after losing its trade secret case against CNEX Labs; Spotify settles a pair of major copyright suits targeting its music streaming service; Intel will reportedly auction thousands of IP assets related to wireless device technology; and revised data shows that U.S. GDP grew 3.1% during the first three months of 2019.

On May 2, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) took the unusual step of submitting a Statement of Interest in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) case against Qualcomm to take a position contrary to the FTC. The DOJ argued that “[b]ecause an overly broad remedy could result in reduced innovation, with the potential to harm American consumers, this Court should hold a hearing and order additional briefing to determine a proper remedy that protects competition while working minimal harm to public and private interests.” In response, the FTC informed the court that it “did not participate in or request” the DOJ’s filing, that it “disagree[d] with a number of contentions” made by the DOJ, and that the DOJ “misconstrues applicable law and the record.” In the end, the court agreed with the FTC and issued injunctive relief against Qualcomm without conducting the further remedy proceedings the DOJ advocated. The public feuding between the two federal antitrust enforcement agencies about how to resolve a case litigated by one them was a remarkable spectacle. It also brought into focus a broader divide between the FTC and DOJ on the role of antitrust law in addressing patents that are essential to industry standards (SEPs) and subject to commitments to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.

One of the more dramatic moments in my $20 million dollar patent brawl occurred in the pivotal preliminary injunction hearing at the courthouse in downtown Tyler, Texas. I learned that Walmart was coming to monitor the proceedings. I think they were curious to meet the crazy inventor who dared to sue the largest retailer on the planet. The proposal on the table was that I dismiss the suit with prejudice (i.e., drop the suit and waive all my rights) or else Walmart would never buy another product from my exclusive licensee, Zuru—no balloons, no robotic fish, no dart guns. Distraught, I hid in a side room and didn’t show for the meeting where my lawyers had advised me to capitulate. Curiosity heightened; the Walmart attorney unexpectedly suspended all demands and invited me to sit down and explain my point of view. I pointed to the infringing spiral-faced Battle Balloons and told her they were selling my invention without permission, thereby harming me and my family. The Walmart attorney was flummoxed and suggested that I didn’t understand how the patent system worked and was overreaching. Here I was claiming to have invented this apparatus that looked different than mine. It had a spiral face and mine was flat. This is the problem with our patent system; it is run by people who don’t understand invention. Think about it, we have to use this bizarre legal document not only to describe our discovery but to describe the boundaries of it. For inventors, there are no boundaries—why would we stop applying and extending our discoveries? We do our best to describe it, but in the end, non-inventors write and interpret the laws that determine our rights.

The Investpic v. SAP America case (Supreme Court Dkt. No. 18-1199), which is the 44th patent eligibility case to be considered for certiorari since the notorious Alice Corp. decision, was announced earlier this week. Cert. denied. Unlike almost any other case, the Investpic decision represents a hostility to the patent rights of software developers based on capricious foundations. The Federal Circuit’s holding is inconsistent with the statutory language of Section 101, the holding is hostile to Section 112(f), and the holding has no nexus to preemption. Investpic is just one of Judge Taranto’s latest monstrosities that holds that a patent must be based on a “physical realm improvement” of the sort that has an “inventive concept.” Investpic also holds that one isn’t allowed to use functional claim language, and that algorithms are unworthy of patent protection.

The Federal Circuit last week upheld a PTAB final written decision invalidating Mayne Pharma’s U.S. Patent 6,881,745 over its objection that the petition for inter partes review (IPR) filed by Merck Sharpe & Dohme (MSD) was fatally defective for having omitted parent corporation Merck & Co., Inc. as a real-party-in-interest. Mayne Pharma Int’l v. Merck Sharp & Dohme, Case No. 2018-1593 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2019). Because Merck would have had to add its parent as an RPI in the proceeding after the one-year time bar had lapsed, Mayne argued the error was not correctable. The Federal Circuit rejected this view, holding that the Board has authority to make corrections to a petition that are “in the interest of justice.” This decision suggests that form will not be elevated over substance in addressing the one-year IPR time bar of Section 315(b).

The United States is on the brink of making changes to the U.S. patent law that would be modeled on India’s Patent Law. At a Senate Judiciary Committee markup scheduled for tomorrow, June 27, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) plans to offer language as an amendment in the form of the No Combination Drug Patents Act. The language of the bill would prohibit the patenting of new forms, new uses and new methods of administration of new medicines unless the patent applicant can show “a statistically significant increase in efficacy”. This language is oddly similar to India’s Section 3(d), something the Trump Administration’s U.S. Trade Representative has complained “restricts patent eligible subject matter in a way that poses a major obstacle to innovators” (see here, page 49). Other Senators have also weighed in against “a generally deteriorating environment for intellectual property” in India (see here), including Judiciary Committee ranking member Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Judiciary Committee members Mike Crapo (R-ID), Amy Klobuchar(D-MN)and Chris Coons (D-CT).