Posts in Courts

Those in the industry know that Judge Linn is one of a small group of Judges who are patent attorneys. He is one of us in so many ways. He is a very real and genuine person, he is a great believer in the patent system, and he has long been a friend to patent groups and a mentor to many. Judge Linn started his a career as so many patent professionals have — as the newest patent examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. We spent approximately 60 minutes on the record with my iPhone recorder on, meeting in his chambers at the Federal Circuit, which overlooking Lafayette Park. Judge Linn recently took senior status, and lives full-time in Florida. He returns approximately every other month, sometimes more frequent, to hear cases. He will soon be giving up this office once the President’s appointments to the Court are confirmed.

In January 2013, Taiwan’s InnoLux Corp. filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit, requesting the Court to overturn an award of enhanced post-judgment (“ongoing”) royalties that appeared to be enhanced, at least in part, because the trial judge took offense at an out-of-court remark made by the defendant’s CEO, after losing at trial. Following the verdict, the defendant’s CEO was quoted in a Taiwan newspaper as having said, “The issue of patent infringement is being taken too seriously sometimes.”

The Supreme Court tried to simplify the issue by concentrating on whether the state-law claim raised a substantial and disputed federal issue, which a federal forum would be able to entertain without disturbing the approved balance between federal and state jurisdictional responsibilities. The Supreme Court went on to note that “federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Where all four of these requirement are met, we held, jurisdiction is proper because there is a ‘serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”

The Honorable Alex Kozinski immediately posed the question—by way of an analogy to scientists who stare at the stars—of why should someone be able to get a gene patent just because there was a significant amount of effort put in to discover that gene. Throughout the event, Judge Kozinski took on the role of the generalist judge, who would need to be convinced that the invention in the lab is anything other than a product of nature. Professor David Winickoff of UC Berkeley followed that question up by discussing James Watson’s amicus brief and the idea that genes are both symbolic in our culture and shared by all humans, thus making them a unique item in our world.

After examining the record of the investigation the Commission decided to review the ALJ’s determination with respect to the claim construction of the phrase “touch sensitive input device,” which appears in claim 1 of the ‘862 patent. The Commission will also review: (1) the finding that the accused products literally infringe claim 1 of the ‘862 patent; (2) the finding that Harris ‘464 anticipates claim 1 of the ‘862 patent; and (3) the finding of non-obviousness. In connection with the Commission’s review, the parties have been requested to brief their positions these discrete issues.  The Commission will review no other issues.

While one can never know for certain how the Supreme Court will rule, even a casual observer has to conclude that the Supreme Court seems poised rule in favor of Monsanto. Seconds after Bowman’s attorney started Chief Justice Roberts interrupted asking why anyone would ever patent anything if Bowman were to prevail. Shortly thereafter Justice Breyer openly concluded that Bowman infringed in a matter of fact way. It later may have seemed Breyer was probing for a response he didn’t get more so than announcing his view of the case. Nevertheless, if Bowman loses Breyer he has no chance.

Semiconductor Energy Laboratory (“SEL”) appealed the decision of the District Court of California that dismissed with prejudice SEL’s complaint versus Yujiro Nagata (“Nagata”) due to a violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) –lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The CAFC also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a number of state law claims. Ultimately, the CAFC affirmed the decision of the district court stating in part: “[b]ecause the district court did not err in holding that there is no federal cause of action based on assignor estoppel and did not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, we affirm.”

In its amicus brief, CLI responds by arguing that the term “makes,” as used in Section 271(a), has its plain and ordinary meaning, which embraces the concepts of “bringing about” or “causing.” CLI contends that Bowman, through his acts of planting and cultivating, brought about and caused the formation of a next-generation of herbicide-resistant soybeans. Alternatively, CLI argues that, even if the concept of a “making” only literally reaches the acts of the herbicide-resistant soybean plants Bowman cultivated, Bowman would still be liable for those acts under principles of agency-instrumentality law. Based on his acts of planting and cultivating, CLI asserts that Bowman exercised sufficient control over the herbicide-resistant soybean plants he raised that they should be treated as mere instrumentalities of his, the conduct of which can and should be attributed to him.

One of the requirements of finding a violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is that the Complainant must establish that “an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the [intellectual property right] … concerned, exists or is in the process of being established.

The parties and amici have filed over 25 briefs in this case, almost none of which address or even consider whether the actual right granted under Section 109(a)—to “sell or otherwise dispose of” copies—applies outside the United States; instead, they have focused almost exclusively on Section 109(a)’s “lawfully made under this title” preamble, resulting in unsatisfactory readings of the Copyright Act as a whole. As the American Intellectual Property Law Association has urged the Supreme Court in its amicus filing, applying long-standing extra-territoriality principles to the actual right created by Section 109(a) handily harmonizes both Sections 109(a) and 602(a)(1). It also avoids damage to the rest of the Act caused by undue emphasis on the prefatory “lawfully made under this title” language.

Bowman v Monsanto involves a farmer who figured out how to get Monsanto’s patented seeds cheaper from a grain elevator than from the company. I won’t attempt to delve into the intricacies of the litigation or the doctrine of patent exhaustion, but do want to consider a larger point. What happens if our innovators lose confidence in the patent system? Some apparently believe this is a desirable outcome

BB&B initially moved to dismiss Hall’s complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) – failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The district court granted the dismissal of the complaint. In part, the district court stated that Hall’s complaint failed to contain “any allegations to show what aspects of the Tote Towel merit design patent protection, or how each Defendant has infringed the protected patent claim.” Order at 15-16. The CAFC cited Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Systems, Inc. as precedent for the requirements of patent infringement pleading. The five elements include (i) to allege ownership of the patent, (ii) name each defendant, (iii) cite the patent that is allegedly infringed, (iv) state the means by which the defendant allegedly infringes, and (v) point to the sections of the patent law invoked. The CAFC stated that Mr. Hall had presented a lengthy complaint outlining the merits of his case and, therefore, had satisfied the standards set forth in Phonometrics.

Earlier today President Barack Obama made two nominations for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Nominated were Raymond T. Chen, who is currently the Solicitor for the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and Todd M. Hughes, who is currently Deputy Director of the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division at the United States Department of Justice. The Federal Circuit is the Court of Appeals charged with handling all patent appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the various Federal District Courts regardless of where they are located geographically.

When an element is claimed using language falling under the scope of §112, ¶6, the specification must be consulted to determine the structure, material, or acts corresponding to the function recited in means-plus-function element in the claim. As emphasized by the Federal Circuit, “the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ that an examiner may give means-plus-function language is that statutorily mandated in paragraph six…, the PTO may not disregard the structure disclosed in the specification corresponding to such language when rendering a patentability determination.” In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(en banc); see also, MPEP 2182, 8th Ed. (August 2012). But here, the Federal Circuit held that there was no error in the Board’s reliance on the broadest reasonable interpretation for language appearing in a seemingly means-plus-function claim element.

In contrast to the Federal Circuit’s 2012 decisions in the context of pharmaceutical litigation, its decisions with respect to appeals from the Board were much less favorable to those seeking patent protection. This is likely the result of the different standard applied to Board decisions – while the question of obviousness is one of law and reviewed de novo, it is based on factual findings, and the appellant must do more than simply demonstrate that the Board’s decision was wrong. Instead, the appellant will prevail only if he/she can show that the decision was not based on “substantial evidence.” Moreover, unlike in district court litigation, the Patent Office is not required to establish obviousness by a “clear and convincing” standard.