Posts in Courts

… in order to handle the messy reality that the system claims, illustrated above, are clearly not abstract under any intellectually honest definition, they merely say that if the method and computer readable medium claims are not patent eligible neither are the system claims because… well just because. It seems inventions rise and fall based on what the applicant really wants to protect, not the claims… Assuming you have snapped back from the Twilight Zone yourself you may be hearing in your head the clanking of coconuts as several Monty Python players exit stage left in search for the holy grail! Of course, regardless of whether the coconuts migrate, those coconuts are are obviously abstract and not tangible, clearly not patent eligible and a fiction of your imagination. Therefore, you really can’t be hearing the coconut clanking noise because imaginary non-migratory coconuts that don’t exist can’t be banged together to make a sound.

While the Lighting Ballast majority upheld the Cybor standard, even Judge Newman, who penned the opinion, seemed to recognize that the decision was on shaky legal footing, relying heavily on stare decisis and the fact that Cybor has been the law for over a decade in sustaining the rule. The majority stated, “the court is not now deciding whether to adopt a de novo standard in 1998. Today we decide whether to cast aside the standard that has been in place for fifteen years.” Opponents of the de novo standard of review in claim construction cases, as set forth in Cybor, might still have another day in court. The Federal Circuit’s ruling could be taken up by the United States Supreme Court next term, especially if the Solicitor General recommends granting the petition for certiorari that is sure to arrive at the Court in the next few months. In a prior case, Retractable Technologies v. Becton, Dickinson, and Co., the Solicitor General recommended to the Supreme Court that “in an appropriate case, this Court’s intervention might be warranted to determine the proper standard of appellate review of district court factual determinations that bear on the interpretation of disputed patent claims.” Here’s a look at the three basic arguments made to the Federal Circuit, and that would likely be made again before the Supreme Court, should it decide to hear the case.

The Court will hear oral argument as follows: on February 26, in two cases on granting (Octane Fitness) and reviewing (Highmark) attorneys’ fee awards; on March 31, in a case (Alice Corp.) on patent eligibility of system and computer-implemented method claims; on April 21, in a case (POM Wonderful) on claims under Section 43 of the Lanham Act challenging labels regulated by the Food and Drug Administration; on April 22, in a case (Aereo) on whether a provider of broadcast television programming over the Internet violates a copyright owner’s public performance right; on April 28, in a case (Nautilus) on the proper standard for finding indefiniteness invalidity for patents; and on April 30, in a case (Limelight) on joint liability for method claim infringement where all of the claimed steps are performed but not by a single entity.

The reason the abstract idea doctrine is unworkable is because the Supreme Court has never defined what is an abstract idea. The Supreme Court has treated the term “abstract idea” much as they have the term “obscenity”; they know it when they see it. Such a level of subjectivity leads to chaos, which is exactly how the Judges on the Federal Circuit can manage to find themselves evenly split on the issue of whether software is patent eligible. The Supreme Court abhors bright line rules unless they are the ones who announce them. Such an irrational fear of certainty and predictability is curious given how those concepts are so fundamentally important to a functioning judicial system. Still, if they don’t like bright line rules that everyone can follow as announced by the Federal Circuit they at least owe us a workable test that they are willing to endorse.

In Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp. (Fed. Cir. December 26, 2013), in a 2-1 decision, the majority suggested that the fee shifting provisions of 35 U.S.C. §285 have broader application and are not applicable only when subjective bad faith and objective baseless claims are found. The push for broader application for the existing fee shifting statutory provisions is particularly relevant since there has been an increase in media coverage about certain abusive litigation tactics of patent trolls. This case might signal a nod to the district courts to apply the fee shifting provisions when trolling behaviors are practiced by the patent owner.

In Novartis, this Federal Circuit panel (opinion by Judge Taranto, joined by Judges Newman and Dyk) ruled that the second exclusion from PTA in the “B period” portion (i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(ii)) excludes from PTA any time consumed by a Request for Continued Examination (RCE), even if that RCE is filed more than 3 years after the “actual filing date” of the patent application. Not only is this ruling a questionable interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(ii) for reasons I’ll discuss below, but it creates an unfortunate, and surely unintended impact on RCEs specifically, as well as continuation practice generally. And the more I dig into the PTA statute, the more problematical this ruling in Novartis becomes.

Article written by Martin Goetz… Over the years the term “software” has been terribly abused when a patent application has a computer in its specifications. We hear the terms abstract, ideas, laws of nature, mathematical algorithms when those against “software patents” argue their case. But true inventions — whether specified in hardware, software, solar power, gears, or what have you — must stand on their own two feet and meet the test of an invention as specified in the US Patent law. Additionally, the USPTO states that an invention is defined in its claims and not by its specification. Unfortunately, many USPTO examiners have been issuing patents for very questionable inventions that only computerize (or automate) a manual process or computerize a new, but obvious, use of a computer.

Everyone who has objectively looked at the case knows that the Federal Circuit made a terrible mistake, but not that won’t be corrected and a serial patent infringer that has made a business practice of ignoring patent rights gets to use the Soverain technology for free. And just when you think things couldn’t get more strange, Newegg makes a bizarre comment with misogynistic undertones. “The witch is dead, hurray,” said Lee Cheng, Newegg’s Chief Legal Officer. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to realize that Cheng is calling Wolanyk a witch. Of course he will denied such a charge and he and his supporters will proclaim their innocence. But this is no different than liberals working “weight” into every comment or tweet they make about New Jersey Governor Chris Christie. This type of not so subtle dig is what those familiar with Newegg have come to expect. It is this juvenile, over the top, holier-than-thou attitude that Newegg personifies.

Even if one disregards the categorical distinctions between over-ruling the ITC order and foreign compulsory licenses, there are differences in the specifics as well. For example, the Administration’s decision rested heavily on the fact that the patent being violated was part of an industry standard. A patent that is critical to an industry standard can convey market power (and possibly monopoly power) on that patent holder. The Administration focused on and justified its decision based on avoiding abuse of that market power. Patents on medicine are completely different. There is rigorous competition, new medicines can be invented to treat the same malady, and there is no need for the types of industry standards that are more common in electronics. But it is those health care patents that foreign governments are undermining.