The Problematical IPR Proceedings of the AIA: BRI, Reviewability, Constitutionality

cliff-clouds-stormCommonly known as the “patent killer,” Federal Circuit review of decisions in the inter partes review (IPR) proceedings by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) enacted through the AIA (which I usually refer to as the “Abominable Inane Act”) has begun in earnest. In three related decisions (most recently including a denial of rehearing en banc by a badly divided 6-5 decision issued concurrently with reissuance of the earlier panel decision) titled In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, the Federal Circuit has held: (1) claim construction in IPR proceedings is governed by the prosecution standard of “broadest reasonable interpretation,” rather than the adjudicatory standard applied in the district courts (i.e., claim terms have their “ordinary and customary meaning” per the 2004 Federal Circuit decision of Phillips v. AHW Corp.); and (2) the Federal Circuit lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR proceeding, even if such review is requested of an IPR proceeding which is (a) final and (b) is alleged to be instituted improperly. A vociferous dissent was jointly filed by five Federal Circuit judges (Chief Judge Prost, as well as Judges O’Malley, Newman, Moore, and Reyna) from the denial of rehearing on the applicability of BRI to IPR proceedings. Besides filing a separate dissent in the en banc decision, Judge Newman also filed a scathing dissent in the original and reissued In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies panel decisions which additionally challenged the majority’s view on the lack of appellate reviewability of an improperly instituted IPR proceeding.

Besides the extremely valid and persuasive arguments made by the dissenters in these three In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies decisions on holdings (1) and (2), with respect to holding (2) there is an equally valid and persuasive argument that, whether or not the AIA permits appellate review of improperly instituted IPR proceedings, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) clearly permits such appellate review, something all of the judges of the Federal Circuit, as well as the patentee, completely blipped over.

But there is an even larger “storm cloud” currently percolating up to both the Federal Circuit (MCM Portfolio v. Hewlett-Packard, currently on appeal from the PTAB) and the Fourth Circuit (Cooper v. Lee, currently on appeal from the Eastern District of Virginia): can an Article I tribunal, such as the PTAB, invalidate a granted patent (which is acknowledged to be “intangible property” under 35 U.S.C. § 261), or does our Constitution mandate (in view of the Fifth Amendment right to “due process,” the Seventh Amendment right to “trial by jury,” as well as generally by the “separation of powers” doctrine) that the validity of a granted patent may only be adjudicated by an Article III tribunal, such as a district court? And if the IPR provisions do fall as being constitutionally invalid, is the whole validity of the AIA now in jeopardy? As some have cogently argued, the various provisions (including those relating to IPRs) of the AIA may not be “severable,” thus potentially causing a chain reaction which could doom the remainder of the Abominable Inane Act to legal oblivion.


Applicability of BRI to IPR which Is an Adjudicatory Proceeding

Briefly, under the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard, claim terms are given their broadest reasonable construction and without importing limitations into the claims from the patent specification. See MPEP § 2111. The policy underlying the BRI standard is that a patent applicant is free to amend pending claims during prosecution, thus applying the BRI standard may reduce the possibility that claims would be interpreted to have broader scope than might be justified in view of the relevant prior art. Put differently, under BRI, the scope of the claim being interpreted for the purposes of validity is essentially construed “broadly” and within “reason” to include a potentially wider range of prior art than might otherwise be permitted under the more restrictive adjudicatory standard of Phillips that the claim terms be interpreted in view of their “ordinary and customary meaning,” including how those claim terms are defined by the patent specification.

As noted above, a key presumption of the BRI standard is that the patent applicant is “free to amend pending claims.” But as anyone who has any familiarity with IPR proceedings knows, the patentee is not truly “free to amend” the claims of a patent in an IPR proceeding. Instead, the PTAB has rarely granted motions by the patentee to amend claims in patents challenged during IPR proceedings, and only under the most restrictive requirement that patentee fully demonstrate that such amended claims will overcome the validity challenge being made. In short, whatever right to amend such claims exists in IPR proceedings is extremely “limited.”

In the Cuozzo Speed Technologies decisions, the patentee argued that the PTAB shouldn’t have applied the BRI standard to IPR proceedings based essentially on the following arguments: (1) the BRI standard was inappropriate for adjudicatory proceedings such IPRs, especially given the limited ability to amend claims during such proceedings; and (2) the USPTO lacked rule making authority to make BRI the claim construction standard for such IPR proceedings.

The bare majority in the panel decisions, as well as the bare majority in the denial of rehearing en banc rejected these arguments. The majority in all of these decisions acknowledged that that IPR statute did not explicitly provide that the BRI standard be applied to IPR proceedings, but instead referred to the approval of the BRI standard by the Federal Circuit in a variety of other proceedings which included “examinations, interferences, and post-grant proceedings such as reissues and reexaminations.” The majority then argued that there was no indication that the AIA (which enacted the IPR proceedings) “was designed to change the claim construction standard (i.e., the BRI standard) that the [USPTO] has applied for more than 100 years.” Given that Congress was “well aware” that BRI standard was the “prevailing rule” in USPTO proceedings prior to enacting the AIA, the majority argued that it could “be inferred that Congress impliedly adopted the existing rule of adopting” the BRI standard.

But as the dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc (as well as Judge Newman’s dissent in the panel decisions) screamed, that “impliedly adopted” argument only goes so far. First, silence by Congress “has no meaning in this context” as Congress, in enacting the IPR proceeding in the AIA “was not legislating within an already existing regime.” Second, existing Federal Circuit law “not only fails to support the conclusion drawn by the panel majority, it points to the opposite result,” namely that the BRI standard only applies to proceedings “prior to patent issuance,” citing the 1969 CCPA decision of In re Prater, as well as the 2007 and 1989 and Federal Circuit decisions of In re Buszard and In re Zietz.

Third, the dissenter’s addressed the panel majority’s conclusion that “we must defer to the [USPTO]’s action” as it relates to adopting the BRI standard in IPR proceedings in view of subsections (2) and (4) of 35 U.S.C. § 316. As correctly observed by the dissenter’s, these subsections “are consistent with Congress’ previous grants of authority to prescribe procedural regulations” (citing the 2008 Federal Circuit case of Cooper Techs Co. v. Dudas), thus no Chevron deference should be given to the USPTO’s adoption of BRI as the claim construction standard for IPR proceedings. And even if adoption of the BRI standard “might be properly classified as procedural,” deference was still not warranted as such adoption was “contrary to the intent of Congress.” In any event, even if Chevron deference were applicable, the dissenter’s would have found adoption of the BRI standard in IPR proceedings “unreasonable.”

The next (and most feeble argument) offered by the majority in the panel decisions in favor of the BRI standard was that the ability to amend claims in IPR proceedings “are not materially different in that respect” from other USPTO proceedings. But as Judge Newman might wryly comment, that argument won’t even pass the “chuckle test.” As even the majority conceded, while the opportunity to amend in IPR proceedings is “available,” it is nonetheless “cabined,” including being “limited to a single amendment.” Even that concession was an understatement as, in practice, getting the PTAB to approve any amendment to patent claims in an IPR proceeding was exceedingly rare, as well as requiring the patentee to figuratively “jump through hoops” to get such amendments approved by the PTAB. As observed by the dissenters: “Even the panel majority acknowledges the adjudicatory nature and limited amendment process of IPRs.” In addition, the dissenters rightly questioned how such a limited amendment process “fits within our prior case law emphasizing the ‘readily’ available nature of amendments in other proceedings in which the [BRI standard] is appropriate.”

As David Boundy has astutely pointed out in his recent article Why Administrative Law Matters to Patent Attorneys with respect to the Cuozzo Speed Technologies decisions, there is another fundamental flaw with IPR proceedings specific to the denial of the patentee’s motion to amend its patent which would also undermine applying BRI as the claim construction standard: failure by the USPTO to promulgate those IPR regulations properly. Such failure unfortunately evidences a continuing pattern by the USPTO to play “fast and loose” with the rulemaking procedures, including compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). As witnessed by the fiasco with the proposed claim-continuation rules in the Tafas/GSK cases, as well as OMB punting an earlier proposed version of the USPTO’s appeal rules, compliance with such RFA and PRA statutes is not a mere “technicality.” Instead, the OMB, as well as others such as David Boundy and me, view such compliance as a serious matter and rightly so. More significantly for IPRs, as David Boundy’s article observes: “During the rulemaking process for the [USPTO]’s AIA regulations, several of the comment letters noted procedural deficiencies in the [USPTO]’s Notices of Proposed Rulemaking and its supporting materials. The letters warned that these deficiencies would expose the PTAB’s decisions [such as in IPRs] to challenge because the PTAB’s regulations were not validly promulgated. The oversights were not corrected before the final regulations were published.”

Regrettably, none of these administrative “faux pas” in promulgating the IPR rules were brought to light by the patentee in these Cuozzo Speed Technologies decisions. But that omission still leaves others free to bring these serious administrative “deficiencies” to the attention of the Federal Circuit (and potentially even the Fourth Circuit) in later cases. How any Federal Circuit judge can ignore such fundamental violations of administrative rulemaking will require judicial “hand waving” and “hoop jumping” even greater than that proffered by the Federal Circuit majority in these Cuozzo Speed Technologies decisions.


Reviewability of an Erroneous Institution of IPR by Appeal

The patentee also argued that the IPR proceeding was improperly instituted with respect to certain patent claims because the PTAB relied upon certain alleged prior art that was not properly identified in the IPR petition, something IPR regulations required. The prior 2014 Federal Circuit case of St. Jude Medical v. Volcano Corp. ruled that a failure to institute an IPR proceeding was not reviewable on appeal in view of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (entitled “No Appeal”) which says: “The determination by the Director whether to institute an [IPR] under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” As characterized by the majority in the Cuozzo Speed Technologies panel decisions, the holding in St. Jude “precludes interlocutory review of decisions whether to institute IPRs,” and, in dicta, had suggested that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) “may well preclude all review by any route.” The majority in Cuozzo Speed Technologies now made that dicta in St. Jude its holding, concluding that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) “prohibits review of the decision to institute [IPRs] even after a final decision.” (The panel majority in Cuozzo Speed Technologies also suggested a less than inviting alternative to the patentee for challenging an improperly instituted IPR, namely a petition for mandamus.)

In dissent in the Cuozzo Speed Technologies panel decisions, Newman disagreed with the panel majority holding that the propriety of instituting an IPR couldn’t be reviewed on appeal in view of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). (Strangely, in her separate dissent in the denial of rehearing en banc, Newman didn’t restate her disagreement with this majority panel holding on whether an improperly instituted IPR could be challenged on appeal.) As characterized by Newman, the purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) was to “control delay and harassing filings” of IPRs, i.e., it only addressed interlocutory reviews, not reviews of final decisions. Newman then observed that such “review is not barred [by 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)] of material aspects that were decided in connection with the petition to institute [the IPR].” In short, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) “does not preclude judicial review of whether the statute was applied in accordance with its legislated scope.”

But as David Boundy’s article again astutely observes, the Federal Circuit in Cuozzo Speed Technologies never addresses the impact of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and specifically 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (which essentially says that such requested review for compliance by the agency with its own rules must be granted unless the subsequent statute specifically and explicitly excludes this provision, which the AIA most certainly does not): “[A]dministrative law requires a court to exercise jurisdiction to review agency compliance with the agency’s own regulations and guidance, and to set aside agency action issued ‘without observance of procedure required by law.’” As further observed by David Boundy (including pointing out that the Supreme Court has addressed other similar review preclusion statutes on “about a dozen occasions”) review preclusion statutes like 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) “must be read narrowly, to preclude review only of the ultimate decision on the merits, leaving intact jurisdiction to review whether the agency departed from [its] procedural requirements.” In conclusion, David Boundy observes that the “Supreme Court has applied this principle to statutes even broader and clearer than [35 U.S.C. §314(d)], and to government interests far more fundamental.” And while the patentee in Cuozzo Speed Technologies didn’t raise this highly valid argument of procedural impropriety, others are most certainly free to raise it in subsequent cases which allege improper compliance by the PTAB with its IPR regulations.


The Constitutionality of IPRs to Allow an Article I Tribunal to Invalidate Granted Patents

The biggest “nose of the camel” in the IPR “tent” is whether an Article I tribunal, which the PTAB obviously is, can be given (delegated) authority by Congress to invalidate (either wholly or partially) a granted patent. As the appellants in the pending appeals of MCM Portfolio, as well as Cooper persuasively argue, there is binding Supreme Court precedent over a century old which strongly suggests Congress cannot delegate such authority to the PTAB, but only to an Article III court.

The primary case cited for the AIA’s unconstitutional delegation of authority to the PTAB to hold granted patents wholly or partially invalid in IPRs is the 1898 Supreme Court case of McCormick Harvesting Co. v. Aultman. In the context of a reissue proceeding initiated by the inventor, McCormick Harvesting held that the Commissioner of Patents had no constitutional authority to revoke or cancel such a granted patent:

It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, and has had affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the Government. … It has become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as other property.

McCormick Harvesting further observes:

The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent.

Even so, there is Federal Circuit precedent which has distinguished the applicability of McCormick Harvesting to reexamination proceedings. In the 1985 Federal Circuit case of Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, a Federal Circuit panel opinion (authored by Judge Newman) held that a reexamination instituted by other than the patentee didn’t violate “due process” under the Fifth Amendment, the guarantee of “trial by jury” under the Seventh Amendment, the authority of the federal courts under Article III, or the “separation of powers” doctrine generally under the Constitution. Without going into a lengthy and esoteric discussion that will most likely cause an Excedrin-size headache, Newman’s basis for distinguishing McCormick Harvesting involves the difference between “public rights” and “private rights.” In brief, those situations involving “public rights” may be resolved by Article I tribunals (such as the PTAB), while “private rights” may only be resolved by an Article III court. In Patlex, Newman deemed patents to be a “public right,” and thus reexamination of a patent could be constitutionally carried out by an Article I tribunal, i.e., the USPTO.

In addition, Newman distinguished McCormick Harvesting as involving reissue for correction of errors by the inventor, initiated by the inventor. By contrast, the purpose of reexamination is “to correct errors made by the government, to remedy defective governmental (not private) action, and if need be to remove patents that should never have been granted.” Accordingly, Newman concluded that McCormick Harvesting didn’t “[forbid] Congress to authorize reexamination to correct governmental mistakes, even against the will of the patent owner.”

With due respect to significant legal prowess of Judge Newman on patent law jurisprudence, one has to wonder whether the distinctions she makes in Patlex would hold up in an en banc Federal Circuit decision, and particularly if brought before the Supreme Court. Such potential fragility of the Patlex ruling as valid precedent is duly noted by the patentees in both MCM Portfolio and Cooper. As also duly noted by the patentees in both these cases, Judge Newman’s understanding at the time of Patlex of the case law doctrinal basis for “public rights” versus “private rights” may have changed in view of subsequent and more recent Supreme Court case law. Accordingly, under the current case law doctrine, the patentees in both MCM Portfolio and Cooper argue that patents would be viewed as “private rights,” meaning only an Article III court may properly and constitutionally adjudicate the validity of such granted patents.

If either (and especially both) the Federal Circuit and the Fourth Circuit in MCM Portfolio and Cooper rule that IPRs enacted through the AIA are an unconstitutional delegation of authority to an Article I tribunal, another significant “shoe” may then be “dropped” on the AIA. As many have observed, there is no “severability clause” in the AIA. And as those many have also observed, the lack of such a ““severability clause” in the AIA was not an oversight by Congress, but a deliberate omission to ensure passage of it. (A “severability clause” was present in earlier drafts of the AIA, but was then removed from the final version.) In other words, it could be very validly argued that if the IPR provision is ruled to be unconstitutional (invalid) by the courts, the entire AIA could completely fall because the invalid IPR provision cannot be “severed” from the remaining (and so far) valid provisions of the AIA. And if that argument is made, it will be very interesting to see what “hoop jumping,” “hand waving,” and so forth is exerted to try to save the Abominable Inane Act from self-destruction due to the deliberate “folly” of the Congress which enacted it.

*© 2015 Eric W. Guttag. Posted on IPWatchdog on July 13, 2015.


Warning & Disclaimer: The pages, articles and comments on do not constitute legal advice, nor do they create any attorney-client relationship. The articles published express the personal opinion and views of the author as of the time of publication and should not be attributed to the author’s employer, clients or the sponsors of

Join the Discussion

17 comments so far.

  • [Avatar for Curious]
    July 16, 2015 05:37 pm

    However, the point of distinction is that the client is the one that calls the shots – not some cabal of attorneys.
    Oh I agree. The point I was attempting to make involved those attorneys that may be taking positions that are against the interests of other clients. I hope this isn’t the case, but I think the fields are fertile for this type of behavior.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    July 15, 2015 07:50 pm


    It should be abundantly clear that there are organizations (like the moniker of “Big Corp”), whose interests are well-served by the destruction or vast weakening of the patent system.

    That is most definitely not a “shadow” concept. It is simple (big) business sense.

    However, the point of distinction is that the client is the one that calls the shots – not some cabal of attorneys.

  • [Avatar for Curious]
    July 15, 2015 06:57 pm

    Firms are in business to make money and it is not their habit to take on issues that they know will cause them to lose clients.
    How do you explain those firms that are advocating for the extreme expansion of the scope of the “abstract idea” exception to 35 USC 101?

    I wonder if any of them have prosecution clients (or clients with issued patents).

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    July 15, 2015 02:49 pm

    anon, regarding conspiracy, the only thing I have to go on is personal experience. Firms are in business to make money and it is not their habit to take on issues that they know will cause them to lose clients.

    It is good that you personally objected to the IPR provisions of the AIA. You seem to have been far ahead of most of us in this.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    July 15, 2015 09:44 am


    Even for “plain word” Justices, the AIA has neither “this law is separable” nor “this law is not separable, so a further search into meaning would be required.

    As I (and you, I realize that you understand this) recognize, this law has a history that informs and controls.

    Mr. Heller @ 5), you ask “why was everyone so sanguine that IPRs were constitutional that no one looked seriously at the issue.

    I will correct you and offer that not everyone was “sanguine” during the passage of the Act. I personally contacted my congressional representatives, explained my background in engineering, business, and patent law, and highlighted many concens including the present issue. I was politely listened to and my representatives voted as they did anyway.

    Further, I have difficulty with your supposed “conspiracy,” if for no other reason, lawyers know that clients decide that parameter of representation. No attorney will so conspire and go against their client’s directions in such an obvious ethical breach. At the most, an attorney can inform the client of withdrawal, but you offer no evidence (or even hint of evidence) that such was what you were suggesting. I thus surmise that you were merely stirring up the waters on baseless speculation. There are plenty of “shadows” in work – I just don’t think that that particular shadow has much credibility.

  • [Avatar for EG]
    July 15, 2015 08:22 am


    As Anon correctly points, when it comes to the “severability clause” issue in the AIA, we’re not writing on a blank slate. I also didn’t say it was a “slam dunk” either.

    If Congress had never put a “severability clause” into any drafts of the AIA, I would agree that it would be much, much harder to suggest that invalidity of one provision would take down the whole AIA. But that’s not what happened. So if IPR provision goes down, the reviewing court is going to have to determine why Congress first put a “severability clause” in the AIA and then took it out.

    I’m also aware that some judges, Justice Scalia being a notable example, consider the legislative intent/history to be irrelevant to the “plain words” of the statute. Normally I would agree with that view, but here you’ve got a clear situation where the “severability clause” was put in and then taken out. Why did Congress do that? And I’m sure many plausible arguments will be made on that score. But one of those is surely to be that Congress’ intent was that all provisions of the AIA should rise (or fall) together. And whether any of those plausible arguments will be deemed persuasive can only be resolved by court decision.

  • [Avatar for Anon]
    July 14, 2015 10:13 pm


    You have been misinformed. If indeed “superfluous,” then the amendment would not have been rejected.

    The amendment was rejected.
    Congress expressed its will.

    Do you mind if I ask who gave you that answer?

  • [Avatar for Christopher]
    July 14, 2015 07:31 pm

    Dear Mr. Guttag:

    I passed along your conclusion about severability of the IPR process with respect to the AIA and received the following comment. I would appreciate your thoughts about this to help everyone further understand this important subject. Thanks

    “I always value your posts, but this one is off base. In the absence of a severability clause, the Supreme Court is free to determine what provisions it may sever from a law for it to be constitiutional. The standard severability clause language merely restates the Supreme Court’s position that provisions should be severed unless the legislative scheme is such that they must stand or fall together. Therefore, a severability clause is unnecesary. A nonseverability clause, though, can prevent the Supreme Court from severing a provision it otherwise might, if Congress has decided that certain provisions must stand or fall together. The presence in many bills of the standard severability clause is a holdover from a time when the Supreme Court hadn’t made its position on severabilithy issues clear. The standard severability clause, as well as other provisions, continue to be added to bills out of an abundance of caution or just plan ignorance of the Supreme Court’s position on this matter. Modern legislative drafting recognizes that severability clauses, as well as other provisions such as a “such sums” authorization of appropriations, just state what is already the case, which is why you see them less and less often nowadays.”

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    July 14, 2015 06:53 pm

    Curious, you might be right that the average patent practitioner is “not equipped” to argue a constitutional issue to the extent you mean that they do not have experience arguing the law — and that is all this is. Litigators do this kind of thing day in and day out. So maybe the focus of my comments should be on firms that litigate as well as prosecute.

    As to the client, I think we have a duty to point out to them things like Lockwood that throw into serious question constitutionality of reexaminations. Some clients are being systematically abused by the reexamination and IPR process such that they would be eager to do anything to get rid of them.

  • [Avatar for Curious]
    July 14, 2015 06:09 pm

    There seems to be a “conspiracy” among the patent bar to block constitutionality challenges to re-examinations and to IPRs. This reluctance can be a result of intimidation where big clients make it clear that that a firm will be blackballed if it makes a constitutionality challenge.
    I think you are overthinking the issue. I think the more plausible answer is that the patent bar, by and large, is just not equipped to handle a constitutional challenge to reexaminations. It takes a certain amount of experience/expertise to recognize/argue the issues — you just don’t find that in patent attorneys.

    To have raised this issue before requires: (i) a reexamination (they are relatively rare), (ii) an attorney capable of recognizing the constitutional issues, and (iii) a client willing “to go the distance” (and be capable of paying to go the distance) which means the Federal Circuit (or likely further). I suggest that all three are rare themselves and the combination of all three would be extremely rare.

    Albeit in a different context, I worked for a firm (when I was much younger) that didn’t appeal any decisions. It wasn’t that they didn’t have decisions to appeal … the attorneys just didn’t have experience doing appeals before the Board so they went the after-final/RCE route.

    Can anyone think of any other explanation for complete lack of a constitutionality challenges post Lockwood when the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Patlex was overruled?
    See above

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    July 14, 2015 03:36 pm

    Further to my post above about academic articles in the wake of Lockwood, why didn’t any patent owner, not even one, raise the constitutionality of reexaminations post Lockwood? 1995-2014. Nothing.

    Recently, a small business owner called me complaining about BRI and a particular reexamination. He was saying that reexaminations and now IPRs have forced him out of the patent system. He was encouraging me in our constitutionality challenged. I asked him whether he had asked his counsel to challenge the constitutionality of the re-examination proceedings. He said he had asked his counsel to do so but that they had refused.

    I suspect most patent owners being subjected to re-examinations and IPRs would want to challenge the validity these proceedings if they even suspected they were of dubious constitutionality – but after MCM challenged IPRs, many, it seems, want to challenge reexaminations and IPRs and they are being blocked by their counsel who refuse to cooperate.

    There seems to be a “conspiracy” among the patent bar to block constitutionality challenges to re-examinations and to IPRs. This reluctance can be a result of intimidation where big clients make it clear that that a firm will be blackballed if it makes a constitutionality challenge.

    Can anyone think of any other explanation for complete lack of a constitutionality challenges post Lockwood when the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Patlex was overruled?

    Can anyone say they advised their client to challenged a reexamination post-Lockwood and was refused by the client? Anyone?

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    July 14, 2015 02:51 pm

    Mike, we have not been notified yet. September is our guess.

  • [Avatar for Edward Heller]
    Edward Heller
    July 14, 2015 02:50 pm

    EG, one does find it interesting that not one single amicus has supported the government position that IPRs are constitutional. Not one. Not even academics are weighing in, as they are normally seem compelled to do. I suspect they have read our briefs and agree that we are right, that the consequences to IPRs are clear, and that the AIA itself is in peril.

    They may all be asking themselves what happened? Why was everyone so sanguine that IPRs were constitutional that no one looked seriously at the issue.

    It is remarkable that there were no academic articles the constitutionality of reexaminations after Judge Nies noted that Lockwood overturned Patlex. No one took an interest. Why is that?

    Seriously, why is that?

  • [Avatar for Mike Schulze]
    Mike Schulze
    July 14, 2015 09:06 am

    Are the oral argument dates set in the MCM Portfolio or the Cooper case? If so, will someone please provide them? Thanks.

  • [Avatar for Curious]
    July 13, 2015 09:59 pm

    This is a great article. I wish this was read by everyone in Congress. Unfortunately, Google et al. has millions of dollars to spend to recharacterize their patent killing proposals as troll-fighting proposals and it is extremely difficult to compete with that kind of funding.

    This is just one reason why I dislike the Supreme Court giving corporations nearly free reign to impact policy making. Corporations are not acting in the best interest of the United States or its citizens. Corporations are acting (and are required to do so) in the best interest of their shareholders, who may or may not be US citizens. In this instance, we have a certain subset of corporations who don’t have a problem dismantling a patent system that has driven our country to economic greatness so as to avoid paying for (i.e., licensing) technology that they did not invent. It is shortsightedness at is worst.

  • [Avatar for Congressional Hammer]
    Congressional Hammer
    July 13, 2015 03:59 pm

    Congressional Hammer July 13, 2015 3:56 pm

    Congress has declared war on the American inventor and entrepreneur with so called “Patent Reform.” In what even one Congressman calls “crony capitalism” H.R. 9 and S. 1137 represent nothing short of the destruction of the US Patent System in favor of markets and capital, and the corporations controlling them. The American inventor and entrepreneur is being sold out, with potentially enormous economic consequences. Yahoo published an article last week entitled “The Anti-Innovation Patent Act of 2015?


    Congress Declares War on American Inventors

  • [Avatar for Robert Greenspoon]
    Robert Greenspoon
    July 13, 2015 12:04 pm


    I would add only one thing to your excellent survey — that even in 1985, Judge Newman carefully cabined how she expressed “public rights” concepts in relation to patents. She effectively held that the “grant” or “issuance” of a patent is a public right. And she likened reexamination (which, after all has the word “examination” in it) to an administrative return to the “threshold” granting question:

    “In contrast with the private rights at issue in Northern Pipeline, the grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern. Validity often is brought into question in disputes between private parties, but the threshold question usually is whether the PTO, under the authority assigned to it by Congress, properly granted the patent.”

    Many think that she wrote that a patent itself is a public right. She did not. And many others argue that she held that invalidity adjudications are a public right. Again, she did not.

    Our opening brief in the Fourth Circuit explains these facts (and harmonizes Patlex, faulty as it is) by identifying Judge Newman’s approach as creating a legal fiction. The fiction holds that ex parte reexamination simply re-opens the grant or issuance process. Granting or issuing patents is understandably viewed as central to the USPTO’s administrative function. We can follow how someone might shoehorn such a proceeding into the “public rights” box.

    The USPTO at the same time emphatically and correctly describes IPRs as not involving examination, but adjudication. Judge Newman’s reasoning in Patlex does not carry over.